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Abstract 
The central theme of this thesis is the connection between art and politics focussing 
in 
particular on its recent post-foundational formulation by Jacques Ranciere. While Ranciere 
does provide a convincing articulation as to what a political or critical art practice might 
look like or hope to achieve, I contest his position whenever the constraints of the art- 
politics interconnection is unjustifiable. 
Chapter One. (a) provides an overview of Ranciere's philosophical system, which prepares 
the ground for an analysis of Duncan Campbell's artists' film Falls Burns Malone Fiddles 
(2003). Chapter One. (b) reads this work as an exemplary instance of that 'dissensual' 
spectatorial experience that Ranciere associates with aesthetic regime art. In Chapter Two I 
address the 'cultural sociology of Pierre Bourdieu accusing him of a type of (foundational) 
metaphysical thinking, which leads inexorably to a determinist understanding of 
spectatorial subjectivity, as well as securing for himself a position of mastery. Similar 
accusations are made in relation to the work of Andrea Fraser as represented by her 
performance Official Welcome (2001). 
In Chapter Three I attempt to expose a limitation in Ranciere's assessment of art's 
criticality. In trying to protect art from the dangers of performing an authoritarian role 
within society, he erects unnecessary barriers to thinking the artist as politically committed. 
I attempt to hurdle those obstacles, so as to stretch his system to accommodate a figure of 
the artist as directly performing political subjectivization. This alteration both significantly 
changes his aesthetic philosophy, while retaining its constitutive logic. This chapter is 
therefore a polemical intervention into Ranciere's influential discourse, a questioning of 
the validity of his ethico-theoretical decision to exclude a specific type of commitment from 
art. From this customised position I re-describe the political functioning of Suzanne Lacy's 
canonical feminist artwork In Mourning and in Rage (1977). 
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Introduction 
The central theme of this thesis is the connection between art and politics focussing in 
particular on its recent formulation by Jacques Rancie re. I take Ranciere to propose a "post- 
foundational political thought" (Marchart 2007) in which art takes a privileged role. 
Contemporary art is situated under a historical regime of identification, which Ranciere 
terms "aesthetic" (2004c, pp. 22-29). One way of articulating the politicality of aesthetic art 
is to say that it enables an emancipatory spectatorial experience; art can cause the social 
order to waver, to appear less concrete than before (Ranciere 2004c, pp. 63-66). However, 
for Ranciere, this action on 'the social' through envisioning it differently 'falls-short' of any 
particular populist political action or, in other words, cannot directly partake in 
'subjectivization'. This term names a 'paradoxical' collective subject (Ranciere 1999, pp. 35- 
42) which emerges in dissensus with the social status quo - the police order (Ranciere 1999, 
pp. 21-42) - around a specific demand for equality ('we want higher wages, or rights denied 
us but afforded others', etc) and thereby begins a political sequence. It is the task of 
Chapter One. (a)l to explicate Ranciere's theory of politics defining and contextualizing his 
concepts of subjectivization and the police order. I pay particular attention to his quasi- 
transcendental notion of equality, which is compared to similar 'deconstructive' concepts 
within the philosophy of Jacques Derrida (1997, p. 141-164,269-316). 
Art, then, has its own politics which is not that of subjectivization. Ranciere states this 
explicitly in a conversation with Fulvia Carnevale and John Kelsey, claiming that the politics 
of collective action (subjectivization) can be "truly distinguished" from that of art-politics 
(Ranciere 2007a, p. 264). Also Ranciere most often frames the difference between these 
two 'politics' in this way: for an artwork to become directly involved in collective political 
struggle it will attempt to hail a spectator, to convince them to join a cause. And this is 
problematic within the context of the aesthetic experience because its disorderly nature 
disrupts the transmission of any (singular) communication: "[the] core problem is that 
there is no criterion for establishing an appropriate correlation between the politics of 
1 In recognition of the impossibility of entirely separating Ranciere's understanding of politics from his 
understanding of art and the aesthetic, I have split my first chapter into two, parts (a) and (b). Part One. (a) 
brackets his notion of the emancipatory potential of art and the aesthetic to concentrate on his formulation of 
the police order and its disruption by 'political equality'. Section One. (b) focuses on Ranciere's theorisation of 
the interconnection of art and politics. 
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aesthetics and the aesthetics of politics [subjectivization]" (Ranciere 2004c, p. 62). Art can 
therefore not guarantee the effect it will have on any potential collective political subject. 
See also Ranciere's Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community: Scenes from the Aesthetic 
Regime of Art (2008a) for another clear expression of this argument. This partition between 
art-politics and the politics of subjectivization is the subject of Chapter Three. 
However this 'partitioning' does not mean that we should underestimate Ranciere's 
conception of the politics of aesthetics, which is certainly a form of political action (2007b). 
Presenting (or interpreting) 'reality' as disorderly, rather than 'naturally ordered' is part of 
the process of changing that reality, a first step. However the politics of subjectivization is 
different, involving as it does a specific hailing of the police order, an attempt to oblige the 
beneficiaries of hierarchy to 'apprehend' a particular social inequality (Ranciere 1995, 
p. 86). I therefore call this latter politics, in comparison with the former, a more targeted, 
direct or active approach2. 
According to Ranciere it is this attempt to 'hail' that problematizes the aesthetic status of 
some art. Aesthetic art's political worth is tied to the way it renders all police orders 
suspect; to fight for a specific cause, to make direct political claims on behalf of oneself, or 
for others is to side with a project to build another order and as such instrumentalizes art. 
In these Instances artwork acts dogmatically, or ethically, which amounts to the same 
thing, and enforces the stultifying logic of 'mastery' (Ranciere 1991; 2004c, pp. 49-50). I 
produce a detailed analysis of mastery in Chapter Two. This position of dogmatism is 
antithetic to the definition of aesthetic regime art, so we could say that the practice of a 
master becomes something other than art. Rather, what is desired is a work that opens 
itself to a political reading without dictating what that reading ought to be. 
It is within these arguments that I have attempted to negotiate some distance from 
Ranciere. This project is, ultimately, an attempt to think - contra Ranciere - certain types of 
practice as directly political, that is, a contribution to a particular subjectivization; the 
artwork becomes part of a collective demonstration tied-up with a semantic demand, 
2 However 'collective political action as art' is not aggressive to the 'politics of aesthetics', and one is not 
necessarily better than the other; they both would seem to have strengths and weaknesses, which I discuss in 
Chapter Three. 
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which has equality as its final quasi-referent. And this project proceeds by clarifying the 
difference between Ranciere's concepts of mastery and subjectivization as they are 
deployed in relation to art and the aesthetic. 
But let me make two preliminary points concerning the precise nature of my intervention. 
First, I follow Ranciere when he insists that art offers an enshrined equality which can lead 
to emancipatory interpretation. In Chapter One. (b) I describe Duncan Campbell's 16mm 
film Falls Burns Malone Fiddles (2003) as an exemplary instance of this work. The film is 
then positioned within the broader context of the aesthetic regime, its political efficacy 
described in terms of a mobilization of equality. Politics and aesthetics are shown to be 
profoundly connected by their mutual relation to this figure. This connection is explored 
through a summary of Ranciere's reading (2002; 2003b, pp. 197-202) of Emanuel Kant's 
Critique of Judgement (1790: 1972). 
Secondly, I also follow Ranciere when he asserts that to 'fight for a particular cause', to 
make direct political claims on behalf of oneself or others is problematic, if done so in the 
modality of 'message' (Ranciere 2007a, p. 258). To present metaphysical, secure messages 
within art leads to a position of mastery for artist/theorist and the concomitant 
stultification of possible dissensual readings through art. In Chapter Two I shall address this 
problem which concerns much work that views itself as critical or political. The spine of this 
chapter relates to Pierre Bourdieu, as well as his influence on Andrea Fraser. I read 
Bourdieu as one of the most formidable purveyors of 'messages' in the realm of art and the 
aesthetic. Drawing on theoretical resources provided by Ranciere, Derrida and Judith Butler 
amongst others, I challenge his sustained attack on the Kantian aesthetic attitude. 
Bourdieu's critique has to be dealt with because it is suspicious of 'the aesthetic' to the 
extent of debunking any 'promise' that it might hold (Bourdieu 2004). Bourdieu's account Is 
therefore directly antagonistic to Ranciere's. The sociologist focuses particularly on the 
falsity of the universal claim for the aesthetic. This airy philosophical invention is brought 
back down to earth by showing it to be statistically incorrect. The 'promise of equality' is 
turned on its head, shown not only to be an unsupportable claim, but a motivated lie which 
keeps the dominated in their lowly place (Bourdieu 2004). I conclude that the obsession 
with this secret-message-of-the-aesthetic is problematically foundational, installing a 
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relation of 'mastery' and serving to close-down the possibility of art as the site of a 
continuing resistance to power. 
However, suspicious as I am of messages, I find Ranciere's tacit denigration of commitment 
within art to be problematic (2004c, pp. 60-65). My intervention, then, opposes the way his 
writing suggests that the expression of commitment, or an assertion about how the world 
might be 'improved', always halts Kantian 'free play'. I do not intend to justify all 'messages 
of commitment' within the aesthetic, rather I am advocating a paradoxical kind of message, 
what I call a 'political demand'. The activity of the master, who utilizes messages, and that 
of the subjectivizing subject, who deploys demands, is definitely not coextensive and yet 
Ranciere's writing on art tends to blur them together. 
Context 
The various 'problems' this thesis addresses can be seen to emerge from, without being 
reducible to, a particular British art scene of the late 1990's and early 2000's. This milieu 
provides a certain pre-history to the current project. I refer specifically to that loose 
affiliation of individuals who might be termed 'the alternative YBA' (Beech 2009, p. 9). The 
collective BANK, composed of an evolving core membership of artists could be said to 
occupy the centre of this constellation. They were responsible for a series of group shows, 
Wish You Were Here (1994), Cocaine Orgasm (1995) and Zombie Golf (1995) to name but a 
few, which held a certain mythic status for many British art-students of the time (1995- 
2001). These shows managed to filter into a collective consciousness, offering a template 
for what an exciting practice might look like. Worth mentioning too are the journals 
Everything Magazine, edited by Steve Rushton and John Timberlake, as well as the long 
established Art Monthly. These publications gave a voice to those artists and theorists 
contributing to this small 'scene'. Several Art Monthly articles - along with other 
contributions - came to form the basis of a book, The Philistine Controversy (Beech and 
Roberts 2002), an ambitious attempt to theorize a politics for 'alternative YBA' art. 
According to its authors this work had a certain critical traction, a conclusion I endorsed 
and upon which I attempted to construct my practice. However, this enthusiasm was - of 
course - not shared by everyone, Julian Stallabrass in High Art Lite: British Art in the 1990s 
accused Beech and Robert's of being "the Clement Greenbergs of Fuck, Suck, Wank, Spank" 
(1999, p. 118). 
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Also during this time - beginning around 2001 -I started reading and becoming invested in 
post-foundational political thought, being particularly interested in the work of Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2000; Laclau & Mouffe 2001). At this point 
a contradiction within my intellectual allegiances began to emerge. I found the residual 
influence of Pierre Bourdieu within philistine theory - represented in the book by the 
centrality of the concept of 'distinction', and the author's proposal of strategies of counter- 
distinction - contravened my growing commitment to a post-foundational understanding 
of politics. At the time, and more so now, Bourdieu's description of the encompassing 
nature of habitus and the implacable reproduction of the social status-quo, which inform 
his understanding of art, jarred with theories devoted to the political transformation of 
subjectivity and the thinking of social change. 
Furthermore the increasing visibility within the British art press of the Nicolas Bourriaud 
endorsed Relational Aesthetics (Bourriaud 2002) challenged my 'philistine' outlook. He 
theorized art's politicality as its ability to establish 'convivial' non-alienated social 
encounters. Although I did not subscribe to this perspective his ideas contributed to a shift 
In the debate concerning 'critical practice' away from issues of the 'antagonism' between 
high and low culture, a central stay of philistinism, and thereby fostered a growing belief 
that these previous touchstones might not represent the 'truth' of political art. (The British 
reception of Relational Aesthetics was very much a delayed affair, certainly this work 
played no, or at least very little part in studio discussions or critical seminars during my 
time at art school (1995-2001)). The thesis then can be seen as an attempt to figure a post- 
foundational politics of art partly as a reaction to certain inconsistencies or limitations 
within my previous theoretical affiliations. In selecting philosophical tools my focus shifted 
from Laclau and Mouffe to Jacques Ranciere. I quickly realised that his politico-aesthetic 
philosophy directly covered the intellectual territory that I wanted to understand and 
assimilate; from this point on my project preceded as a close engagement with and 
reaction to Ranciere's thought and is therefore not a general history or overview of art, 
politics and their interconnection. 
However, the central 'theoretical move' made by this thesis, that is, the attempt to unsettle 
the partition Ranciere draws between art-politics and the politics of subjectivization has 
not been conducted within a vacuum. My intervention has a broader significance relating 
to an argument within contemporary art discourse between those who advocate the 
position of emancipatory interpretation, often but not exclusively referencing Ranciere, 
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and those who advocate a different model for art's politics; let us call it the strategy of 'say- 
what-you-believe'. This latter approach is hostile to the Rancierian model, or what Rachael 
Garfield has termed radical ambiguity (2007), favouring instead the adoption of a 'clear' 
political position as well as a lucid expression of that stance. 
In establishing 'the demand' as a possible modality of aesthetic practice I introduce another 
co-ordinate into this debate. This new position offers - what I take to be -a more 'direct' 
politics than that available under the model of radical ambiguity, and also enables a 
distance from the second model, a place to judge specific political stances. Not all art which 
'takes a stand' and 'says what it means' is necessarily emancipating, in fact this tendency 
often seems bound-up with the authoritarian logic of 'message'. 
I now want to sketch-out this contemporary terrain: let us begin with that cultural 
barometer documenta. The most recent exhibition seems to have been influenced by 
Rancierian thought. (In fact he contributes a piece to the Documenta Magazine No-1-3, 
Reader (Ranciere 2007d)). Without analysing the bricks and mortar of the show, Ranciere's 
impact registers in the tone and vocabulary of Roger Buergel's catalogue essay which 
explains his curatorial strategy. Documenta 12 is organized so as to enable a very special 
type of education. The show, following in the footsteps of the first documenta, sought to 
treat its spectators to an "aesthetic lesson" (Buergel 2007, p. 30). This phrase would appear 
to reference Friedrich Schiller's On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters 
(1794: 1967). Schiller's concept of Spieltrieb (play-drive) has been important to Ranciere's 
political reading of aesthetic irresolution, or what Buergel calls "radical contingency" 
(Buergel 2007, p. 30). These ideas translate, in documenta 12, into the advocacy of a non- 
directed form of spectating, and accounts for the curator's rejection of an explicit theme 
for his show thus enabling each visitor to experience 'as they will'. 
Within the context of documenta, the public constituted itself on the 
groundless basis of aesthetic experience - the experience of objects 
whose identity cannot be identified. Here there was nothing to 
understand, in the true sense, no preconceptions, which is precisely 
why it was possible and essential to talk about everything, to 
communicate about everything. (Buergel 2007, p. 31). 
From a global to a local exhibition; After Shock: Conflict, violence and resolution in 
contemporary art (2007) is a particularly clear example of the politically inflected notion of 
ambiguousness. Yasmin Canvin explains the rationale behind her selection of practitioners: 
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The artists in After Shock have developed their own strategies to 
depict violence and suffering without shocking: they show us 
alternative histories, create dialogues between real and imagined 
narratives, re-contextualise images, use subtle, seductive or 
fragmented images and sometimes even employ humour. While the 
artists focus on the moments before and after violence has occurred, 
or on the effects of conflict, they do not take sides. (2007, p. 7) 
In both these shows then the curators attempt to create an 'open situation', the 
presentation of signifying material ("fragmented images") which refuses to "take sides". 
And, at least in the former case, this is seen as enabling a form of 'democratic spectating'. 
My next example takes the form of an argument played across the letters pages of Art 
Monthly. The disagreement involved 1J Charlesworth, his political position expressed in the 
curatorial project Fusion Now! More Light, More Power, More People held at Rokeby 
gallery, London in March 2008. His 'opponent' was Dean Kenning with a different take on 
environmental politics, described in Eco Art: Art Energy in an Age of Ecology (Kenning 2008). 
The exchange was impassioned, each intent on separating their version of politics from the 
other. Charlesworth accused Kenning of pushing an environmentalist dogma unaware of its 
own hegemonic status as an "unquestionable orthodoxy" (Charlesworth and Kenning 2008, 
p. 14). Kenning responded that Charlesworth had simply created a straw man 
environmentalist "a convenient fetish" bearing no relation to actual green-discourse, which 
continues to upset "mainstream consumerist and universalizing rhetoric" (Charlesworth and 
Kenning 2008, p. 15). 
However despite the ostensible distance between their positions there is a striking 
continuity to their understanding of politics as pertaining to art, in other words, they seem 
to agree on how art might be political. This is highlighted in the way they both find fault 
with the other's problematic 'instrumentalisation' of art. According to Kenning 
Charlesworth "begins from the position of a 'good' cause (... anti-environmental 
'humanism') and then proceeds to measure the value of art according to this universal 
yardstick". This method produces "drab illustrative artwork and self-aggrandising 
declarations of support" (Charlesworth and Kenning 2008, p. 15). For Charlesworth it is 
kenning who, in spite of himself, is guilty of such an approach. 
Far from championing art's special dislocation from politics, Kenning 
only manages to reveal that he is a political partisan... that he is an 
environmentalist, and I am not. (Charlesworth and Kenning 2008, 
p. 15). 
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Again, Charlesworth and Kenning both 'want' an artwork that achieves its political effect by 
not being dogmatic, or proscriptive, an efficacy based on open-endedness: "Art's inherent 
energies are dissipated as soon as it is called upon to support a cause. God forbid that there 
should be an'eco-art"' (Kenning 2008, p. 1). And for Charlesworth: "The irony is that Fusion 
Now! was not politically prescriptive, asking the art only to imagine "a world based on more 
energy, not less"" (Charlesworth and Kenning 2008, p. 15). 
Another case would be that thriving genre of art photography which eschews the 
representation of direct conflict to concentrate on the quiet-but-telling detail. Some names 
associated with this tendency are Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin who work 
collaboratively, Paul Seawright and perhaps most famously Simon Norfolk, who recently 
produced a series of large-scale prints of Afghan landscapes, replete with the scars of serial 
occupations and bombing raids. These artists were all included in The Sublime Image of 
Destruction, an exhibition that formed part of the Brighton Photography Biennial (2008). 
Another name we could add to the list is Sophie Ristelhueber. Ranciere, writing in Artforum, 
describes her work. 
Sophie Ristelhueber photographs barricades on Palestinian roads. But 
she doesn't photograph the great concrete wall that petrifies the 
gaze. She photographs from a distance, from above, the little 
handmade barricades made of piled stone, which look like rock slides 
in the middle of a tranquil landscape. That is one way of keeping 
one's distance from the shop-worn affect of indignation and instead 
exploring the political resource of a more discreet affect - curiosity. 
(2007a, pp. 259-261). 
Here, a political subject matter, the contentious Israeli occupation, is addressed obliquely. 
The road blocks do not immediately exhibit their purpose, looking natural rather than man 
made. They are not accompanied by a slogan or statement condemning or praising either 
side. They attempt a neutral presentation of an overlooked piece of physical evidence, 
which through its indeterminacy offers a thought provoking entry point into this conflict. 
What exactly do we see and why is it relevant? 
Two final examples, Paul Chan has written about his art-politics as involving a `productive 
tension' between compositional elements: "a ripped piece of black pastel paper... the 
metallic blue light of a video projector" all remain "equidistant from becoming form or 
content"(2007, pp. 261). Ambiguousl Similar sentiments are echoed, perhaps more explicitly 
by Liam Gillick, again describing his own practice. 
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Consider, for example, a body of work taking as its starting point the 
idea of a group of laid-off car workers returning to their abandoned 
factory, and who subsequently seek to create a resolved ecopolitical 
equation of totalizing relationships. Don't attempt to illustrate any of 
this directly but heap 440 pounds of red glitter on the floor. Red 
snow? Dispersed form? Ranciere's ideas might be understood as a 
structural justification in this case. (2007, pp. 265) 
In these instances art-politics is associated with indirect illusion, rather than upfront 
statement. Chan and Gillick produce art which 'suggests' political meaning, whilst at the 
same time blocking resolved meaning. Gillick does not support a particular group of laid off 
car workers, rather his work establishes - the now familiar - open situation. In this example 
political content is enveloped in a fictional scenario, itself expressed through extremely 
oblique metaphors (that red glitter) 3. 
The politicality of 'radical ambiguity' - with which many contemporary artists, writers and 
curators seek to align themselves - is premised on encouraging a continuing 're-thinking' of 
soclo-political 'scenes' (environmentalism, war, the Palestine 'issue', striking factory 
workers, etc). Unambiguous, determined images and their attendant discourses, on the 
other hand, petrify thought - stop it in its tracks. 
However this petrification or 'halting' is re-cast positively under the 'say-what-you-believe' 
model, representing a decisive moment of commitment, or action. Freee art collective 
make the point: "3. -No more ambiguity! No more irony! No more pussy-footing-around! 
Artists, it is time to say something and stand by what you sayl" (Freee Art Collective 2008, 
p. 7). 
This attitude is also demonstrated by Julian Stallabrass when he writes about Alan Sekula's 
slide installation Waiting for Tear Gas (white Globe to Black) (2000), which consists of 
several dozen photographs of anti-capitalist protestors involved in the famous Seattle 
demonstrations against the WTO in 1999. Stallabrass says of the installation: 
This work cuts against art-world conventions in being an overt piece 
of political propaganda, and in having a specific use that comments 
3I could go on because this 'ambiguity' Is now a hegemonic strategy in contemporary art. For Instance I could 
analyse art symptomatic of the so called 'documentary turn' much of which is almost defined by its refusal to 
'take sides'. Those exhibitions associated with this tendency, paradigmatically the Mark Nash curated 
Experiments with Truth at the Fabric Workshop and Museum in Philadelphia In 2004-5, have championed the 
practice of artists who subvert the codes of 'conventional documentary'. This code-busting contemporary work 
Is "Increasingly minimalist, refusing to tell you what to think about what you are seeing" (Nash 2008, no page 
numbers). 
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critically on art's apparent uselessness. While the fostering of 
ambiguity and the deferral of meaning is standard in works of art, 
and is constantly insisted upon in their interpretation, there is no 
doubt here about the meaning of the work or about Sekula's attitude 
to his subjects. The work is designed to serve the movement. 
(Stallabrass 2003-4, p. 3) 
Following Ranciere I view much of what passes for this latter, more directly committed 
model as the problematic reduction of art to univocality, or 'message'. The problem for me 
is one of the politics being expressed (political outlook) rather than (so much) an issue of 
the artistic means by which this politics is articulated. Of course I do not mean to down-play 
the importance of 'formal' factors in the production of meaning, but my point is that we 
must also be attentive to 'content': what is being said and by whom? A 'message' may lurk 
under an ostensibly ambiguous 'formal' appearance. For example, as analysed in Chapter 
Two, the 'uncertainty' which inhabits Andrea Fraser's performances, those moments when 
it is not at all clear whether she speaks as 'herself or in character is - in the last instance - 
recuperated as foundational political content. Also, as will become clear in Chapter Three 
forthright messages of commitment can be highly ambiguous. 
The problem then with 'messages', indeed what defines them as such, is that they are 
conceived metaphysically, that is foundationally. (For a full account of what constitutes a 
'foundational message' see chapters two and three). Both Freee Art Collective and Julian 
Stallabrass do seem to hold foundational commitments in politics and art. This is more 
straightforward in Stallabrass's case because his writing on art exhibits a strong form of 
economic determinism. Capitalism plays an un-nuanced foundational position in his 
pronouncements on art, and everything else. This issue is slightly more complex with Freee 
as their politics arises from diverse sources, including post-foundational references, thinkers 
such as Etienne Balibar. However this complex-mix often falls back onto a crudely Marxist 
and Bourdieuian appreciation of art and the aesthetic. These two slogans from their Three 
Functions banner series provide cases in point: "The economic function of public art is to 
increase the value of private property" (Freee 2004) and "The aesthetic function of public art 
is to codify social distinctions as natural ones" (Freee 2005). 
However, I would not want to damn all work made by Freee. The type of fine distinction I 
am attempting to draw between political messages and political demands requires a 
detailed and case by case analysis as undertaken in chapters two and three. This occurs in 
relation to the work of Andrea Fraser and Suzanne lacy respectively. And just because 
Stallabrass relies on a mode of authoritarian pronouncement does not necessarily mean 
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that Waiting for Tear Gas (White Globe to Black) is an equally founded expression. In fact 
the way that Sekula appears to be acting as part of a larger collective movement, or in 
solidarity with such a movement might suggest otherwise. 
'Messages' in art then are a problem. This is not to say that I do not sympathize with those 
who advocate for partisanship within artwork. The strategy of radical ambiguity can feel like 
a restriction of the agency of artists. Rancii re, when discussing the relationship between 
art-politics and the politics of subjectivization emphasizes the role of the spectator. It is she 
who, ultimately, 'realises' the latent politics of an artwork. (For a more detailed discussion 
of this issue see Chapter (b)) Aesthetic regime practices disorder sensible relations - 
revealing that the status quo might be other - but they cannot 'decide' how this knowledge 
might result in collective action: "It is up to the various forms of politics to appropriate, for 
their own proper use, the modes of presentation or the means of establishing explanatory 
sequences produced by artistic practices rather than the other way round" (Ranciere 2004c, 
p. 65). 
Although artists can 'disorder' in more or less politically effective ways this 'resistance' 
when compared with the action of a subjectivizing group can seem 'somewhat' passive. 
Gillick makes this point when he says: "The weak spot here might be regarding the 
acceptance of contemporary art as a valid activity per se. Ranciere leaves space for us to 
make judgements as to the efficacy of certain practices yet neglects (without ignoring) the 
questions of urgency, time, and of direct action" (Gillick 2007, p. 340). 
However what is the alternative? Are practitioners forced to choose between a politics of 
ambiguity or an authoritarian position of commitment? As already suggested there is 
another option. In Chapter Three I make room within Ranciere's system for certain activist 
art practices as critique; my example is Suzanne Lacy's extended work Three Weeks in May, 
specifically the public performance In Mourning and In Rage (1977). In this context a 
political message transforms into a political demand because the, ones who communicate 
are themselves indeterminate. As (previously lowly) now 'paradoxical' subjects they 
collectively express dissatisfaction with the current police order via a semantic demand for 
equality which removes them from their prior police positioning. 
Their 'paradoxical status' insures that their demands are not fully founded 'messages', but 
ones in formation, or in between. Therefore a demand within subjectivization cannot be 
rejected from the aesthetic experience; the force associated with Ranciere's theory of 
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collective political action whereby the police order is confronted with the evidence of its 
non-totality can be utilized as aesthetic practice. Free-play is not closed down via the 
demand made by the subjectivizing artist, as it is under Beech's and Stallabrass's calls for 
positive order and commitment. 
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Chapter 1. (a) 
Jacques Ranciere's Politics of Equality 
Introduction 
This chapter is a detailed exposition of Ranciere's theory of politics-as-collective-action, 
which I have bracketed from a description of his theory of art-politics (narrowly defined). 
This is done for the sake of clarity, allowing me to introduce his key terms and arguments 
before moving onto their relevance for contemporary art; this task is reserved for Chapter 
One. (b). I begin with Ranciere's conceptualization of power, what he calls 'the police 
order'4. I draw attention to the way this order substantiates its 'activity' by gesturing to an 
(apparently) pre-existing and necessary 'reality', or foundational principle (Ranciere 2000, 
pp. 123-124). Ranciere constructs an alternative model in which the casual chain that leads 
from foundation to state (and other) instances of power is presented as spurious. This 
'presentation' through collective action provides a virtual definition of Ranciere's 
understanding of politics (Ranciere 1999, p. 30). 
Secondly, I elucidate his notion of equality, which is shown to be a quasi-transcendental 
'medium' acting as the condition of possibility for the police order (Ranciere 2006b, p. 48), 
but also - and at the same time - serving to thwart the full realization of any instance of 
this hierarchic social arrangement (Rancii re 1999, p30). At this point I read Ranciere 
alongside Jacques Derrida, drawing comparisons between 'equality' and certain Derridean 
concepts-under-erasure, such as "the supplement"(Derrida 1997, p. 141-164,269-316). 
I also describe how politics operates byway of a form of collective dis-identification, which 
Ranciere calls subjectivization (1999, pp. 35-42). This activity performs equality and in-so- 
doing highlights the invalidity of police hierarchy. This demonstration represents the 
dissensual efficacy of Rancierian politics. Ranciere's understanding of equality is then 
4I refer to the police, or the police order to differentiate the Integrated nature of this phenomenon from that of 
'petty policing'. 
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favourably contrasted with a 'positive' and 'distributive' version, as manifested in the 
infamous Stalinist desastre (iiek 2000, p. 230). Finally, I defend against the accusation that 
Ranciere's 'political formula' is too inflexible by establishing the way its quasi- 
transcendental character affords a contextual sensitivity. 
The Police 
The police, or the police order, should not be reduced to the "petty police, the truncheon 
blows of the forces of law and order and the inquisitions of the secret police" (Ranciere 
1999, p. 28). Rather Ranciere follows that work of Michel Foucault, which posited a much 
broader definition. 
The evolution of western societies reveals... that the policeman is 
one element in a social mechanism linking medicine, welfare and 
culture. The policeman is destined to play the role of consultant and 
organiser as much as agent of public law and order. (Ranciere 1999, 
p. 28-29). 
All police orders are based on an 'arche' (foundational principle) which guarantees, or 
provides legitimation for a specific 'governmental' shaping of 'society'. An arche is a 
hegemonic societal belief in a natural, necessary and objective value or 'situation' upon 
which a society is based: "[first], an arche of community [is] a single principle as to what the 
community holds in common...; next, a precise measure which allows... the principle of the 
distribution of functions...; and, last, the idea of a virtue which can sustain the community" 
(Ranciere 1995, p. 75). For example this can be an idea of the 'good city' in which a rational 
philosopher-aristocracy oversees the social-strata; divine decree might provide another 
social map, or in our contemporary 'consensual' environment the belief in "a series of large 
scale economic, financial, demographic, and geostrategic equivalences" (Ranciere 2000, p. 
123) seem to provide a ground, for social organisation and political decision. 
If we think of theories of economic [foundationalism], for example, 
they first provide a set of principles (the economic 'laws') which are 
presented as the essence of politics (what politics is 'really' about) 
and, secondly, they locate this economic'base' outside of, or beyond, 
the intersubjective realm of politics, the latter being thus turned into 
a 'merely super-structural' affair. (Marchart 2007, p. 12). 
For all western 'liberal' governments the centrality of the economy is seen in an affirmative 
light. Capitalism is viewed as providing 'the best of all possible worlds' and supplying the 
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parameters, or measure for any questions of 'balance' or 'justice' upon which 
contemporary society is foundeds. 
An arche (seemingly) provides the basis for the police order's primary function, that 
is, the 
allotment of subjects to specific roles. Identities are given in conjunction with these roles 
and guaranteed by an understanding of the necessity of the shape of the whole. 
Every 
identity is entitled to a 'share' (or part) of the social; these include material reward, civil or 
legal rights, or the extent to which a person is able to register support or dissent for 
'the 
system' via voting. The 'rightness' of the link between specific subjects and their police 
identity is supported through a type of common sense, propagated in multiple ways 
through culture in its broadest sense. 
The principle of this kind of [police] being-together is simple: it gives 
to each the part that is his due according to the evidence of what he 
is. Ways of being, ways of doing, and ways of saying - or not saying - 
precisely reflect each person's due. (Ranciere 1999, p. 27). 
As part of this hegemonic perspective it is recognised that not everyone 'can be a winner, 
can enjoy the rewards offered under the system (Ranciere 2000, p. 123). There will be those 
who enjoy and those who suffer hierarchy. However, within western democracies this 
acceptance of inequality exists in uneasy tension with a certain principle of equality, which 
is embedded within society, written into constitutions and/or the first principle of law 
and/or the taken for granted foundation of civil society (May 2008, pp. 106-107). Also, as I 
will argue, a notion of equality is enshrined within our understanding of art. This 
enshrinement is useful to political activity because it provides a point of leverage against 
the domination of the police order (Rancie re 1995, p. 48). (I expand on this latter point 
towards the end of the chapter). 
There are good reasons to distrust the arche paradigm. It is possible to accuse it of a type 
of symbolic violence that can all too easily take on real consequences. A 'positive' guiding 
principle when applied to society will perform a type of exclusion, marginalizing those for 
whom that principle does not represent 'the good life'. In Ranciere's system this violence 
s There is another way of conceptualizing the metaphysical assertion of foundation: one can assert an arche as 
part of a critical procedure. For example, In classical Marxism, the economy is seen to be determining, but this 
time, the resulting social relations are viewed as exploitative and must be overcome. This critical position is 
problematic because lt shares the mistaken faith in a transcendental ground. This methodology also serves to 
exclude, but this time it is other forms of critique or resistance which are marginalized. Those reactions to 
domination which do not conform to the model of economic exploitation, for example domination based on 
gender, race etc, are ignored, or recast as organized and explained in terms of capitalist exploitation. This type 
of foundational thinking leads to the problematic of mastery and shall be fully discussed in Chapter Two. 
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can be understood as the production of hierarchy through the police allotment of subjects 
to roles. 
The distribution of the sensible is partitioned, across multiple fronts, into those 
symbolically sanctioned to 'govern' their lives, to have a hand in the formation of their own 
existence, and those not positioned to do sob. The latter are considered not 'equal to the 
task' and are thus voiceless, or invisible in this respect: "[the police] is an order of the 
visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity [or identity] is visible and another 
is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise" (Ranciere 1999, 
p. 29). In terms of our western representational democracies we might say that the majority 
of the population are cast in the passive role subject to the decisions made by a political 
elite. However within that broad sweep there are many micro divisions, hierarchy suffuses 
society in multiple ways: bosses often treat workers as if they are less equal, men might 
also behave in this way in relation to women, as might the ethnic majority with regard 
minorities. Also, one might be positioned on different sides of the divide in different facets 
of one's life, for instance, subject to heavy handed management in the workplace as well as 
propagator of misogynist private relationships. 
As we have seen an arche is presented within any police order as the foundation upon 
which governmental and other decisions rest, preceding and justifying. Ranciere's point is 
that this is an illusion, and that arche, society and individual, are all performed by police 
action in the creation of a shared "distribution of the sensible" (2004c, p. 12). 
The police is, essentially, the law, generally implicit, that defines a 
party's share or lack of it. But to define this, you first must define the 
configuration of the perceptible in which one [party] or the other 
(share] is inscribed. (1999, p. 29). 
In Dis-agreement (1999) Ranciere gives several examples of the ways that police 'perform' 
the social. The 'classic case' relates to particular period of Roman history and concerns a 
ruling class, 'patricians', and their plebeians. The patricians produced their social objectivity 
by performing the 'non-comprehension' of the plebs. To the patricians plebeian speech was 
simply 'noise' - 'not saying' - equivalent to the lowing of cattle rather than fully human 
speech. The plebs are positioned as purely physical beings, fit only to be ordered and 
6 Ranclere's understanding of self-determination, that ability to have a say in the 'government' of one's own 
life, is very different from a liberal understanding. For him self-determination is coextensive with emancipation 
from domination, whereas in the liberal model self-determination is enabled by maintaining a 'reasonable' 
distance from state power. "By adopting the view that freedom is closely linked with freedom from oppression, 
advocates of the emancipatory tradition set themselves apart from liberals, who tend to see freedom as 
absence from interference" (Hewlett 2007, p. 1). 
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instructed, unable to partake in power. The patricians natural right to govern, and to 
privilege is also produced in that 'non-comprehension'. 
Between the language of those who have a name and the lowing of 
nameless beings, no situation of linguistic exchange can possibly be 
set up, no rules or code of discussion. This verdict does not simply 
reflect the obstinacy of the dominant of their ideological blindness; it 
strictly expresses the sensory order that organises their domination, 
which is that domination itself. (1999, p. 24). 
The sensory order then is retroactively posited by the action of power, rather than the 
starting point which necessitates the action of power; Individuals become individuals 
through their assignment. The whole architecture of 'the social' is, in fact, constructed 
through these acts of performative 'positioning'. This is one core post-foundational insight, 
shared by a number of political theorists, who postulate that there can never be a 
preceding and stable arche, upon which a society can be constructed. Following Marchart 
we could name Jean-Luc Nancy (2006), Claude Lefort, Alain Badiou (2002) and Ernesto 
Laclau (2001; 2005). These thinkers subscribe to: "the impossibility of a final 
ground ... [implying]... an increased awareness of, on the one hand, contingency and, on the 
other, the political as the moment of partial and always, in the last instance, unsuccessful 
[performative] grounding" (Marchart 2007, p. 2). 
There is another important point in relation to police distributions; its effect is 'felt', or 
'sensed', as much as known. To be the victim of hierarchy is to live in a world which one 
intuitively apprehends as brute and unaccommodating. The sensory character of police 
orders is one reason why Ranciere uses the word 'aesthetic' in describing its effects. It is 
this understanding of 'the police' as producing a social order through the composition of 
bodies, beliefs, and sensory perceptions which leads us to the first connection Ranciere 
posits for art and politics; they are both aesthetic because they organise experience and 
thought through an arrangement of matter, perception, sense, etc. 
Ranciere, criticising those who think that the rise of modern politics, 
especially Nazism, introduced aesthetics into politics, [i. e. Walter 
Benjamin and his acolytes] responds that, "there has never been any 
aestheticization of politics in the modern age because politics is 
aesthetic in principle". (May 2008, p. 111, citing Ranciere 1999, p. 58). 
So here Ranciere uses the word aesthetic in a very broad fashion, meaning something like: 
pertaining to relationships or compositions which provoke experiential and conceptual 
effects in subjects. However he also uses the word aesthetic in a different way to name a 
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much more profound connection between these two terms. Art and politics both mobilise 
a notion of equality which is disruptive to the hierarchy of police. In Chapter One. (b) I will 
explain how equality operates within and through art, but first I need to unfold - at some 
length -the importance of this notion for Ranciere's system more generally. 
Equality 
Equality has already been haunting our discussion of the police. This is because any police 
order is actually premised upon equality, acting as its condition of possibility. We shall 
explore this rather counter intuitive statement in a moment when we compare Rancierian 
equality with certain pseudo-ontological figures within Jacques Derrida's 'deconstructive' 
philosophy. However, first I want to approach this issue using a less overtly philosophical 
vocabulary. 
Ranciere's system is premised upon a 'fundamental' equality of all with all. One way he 
evidences this supposition is through his thesis of the equality of intelligences; all people - 
in some respect - are equally intelligent. This assertion receives its most significant 
elaboration in The Ignorant School Master (1991), which describes the pedagogic theory of 
Joseph Jacotot, a French revolutionary forced to flee his country after the restoration of the 
monarchy. He finds himself in Flanders and despite not speaking Flemish secures a position 
as a school teacher. In this unusual 'learning environment' he finds his only teaching aid to 
be a dual language edition of Telemachus containing French and Flemish translations. The 
book is his only means of communicating with the students as they lack a shared language. 
In the course of the year he sets them an essay on Telemachus to be written in French. To 
his surprise the scripts are excellent, and he draws this conclusion: people are equally 
intelligent, the differences between them lies not in their intelligence but in their attention. 
Or as Rancii re writes: 'what stultifies the common people is not a lack of instruction, but 
the belief in the inferiority of their intelligence' (1991, p. 39). 
The task of the teacher is to promote the realisation within students that they possess 
intelligence the equal of anyone else's, to give them the confidence to go on intellectual 
adventures of their own. The standard teacher/student relationship is actually aggressive 
(stultifying) to such a realisation, because it is premised upon the difference between 
student and teacher (Ranciere 1991, p. 7). The student is forever trying to 'catch up' with 
the 'superior knowledge' of the teacher. The ignorance of Jacotot in relation to Flemish, his 
obvious lack of superiority (in this respect) emboldened the students, making them 
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confident in their own ability, and produced amazing results, papers written on classical 
mythology in an alien tongue. 
Let us be clear, the equality of intelligence that Ranciere is striving to uncover 
does not 
concern amounts of knowledge. He is not saying that we all have the same 
'stores-of- 
mental-information'. He is not even saying - fundamentally - that everyone is potentially 
equally able to perform certain 'gold standard' feats of intelligence, to become 
brain 
surgeons or astrophysicists, if only we believed in ourselves. (But it is clear from the 
narrative of Jacotot, that he thinks we would be more capable of achieving surprisingly 
'high level' intellectual results if we managed to re-order stultifying practices... ). No, 
fundamentally Ranciere is pushing an account of equal intelligence, in which we all share a 
minimal ability to make sense of our world, to negotiate reflectively problems in our 
life. 
And this intelligence makes us all capable of contributing to improvements in this life. In 
directly political terms Ranciere's notion of equal intelligence ask that we presuppose that 
all people are equally able to recognise if they are dominated, i. e. treated unequally, and 
then able to challenge this treatment. 
Therefore, people possess a certain shared intelligence which makes them 'equal'. 
However, to return to one sentence at the beginning of this section, how can this equal 
capacity be seen as the 'basis' for police orders, which as we have seen are hierarchical and 
exclusionary? Ranciere clearly states the reasoning for this outlook in the quotation below. 
Those who think they are clever and realist can always say that 
equality is only the fanciful dream of fools and tender souls. But 
unfortunately for them it is a reality that is constantly and 
everywhere attested to. There is no service that is carried out, no 
knowledge that is imparted, no authority that is established without 
the master having, however little, to speak 'equal to equal' with the 
one he commands or instructs. Inegalitarian society can only function 
thanks to a multitude of egalitarian relations. (2006b, p. 48). 
Therefore the practice of hierarchy depends on an inferior being able to understand the 
command of his superior. For the police to function it must be preceded by a type of 
minimal equality. However Ranciere is also clear that the basic similarity of people can also 
potentially undermine those police orders. In the next quotation Ranciere, as he often (but 
not exclusively) does, couches equality in terms of language use; speaking beings are equal 
beings. 
Political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the 
perceptible divisions of the police order by a basically heterogeneous 
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assumption... the equality of any speaking being with any other 
speaking being. (1999, p. 30) 
Therefore the police is both premised upon and undone by equality. The formulation seems 
incoherent or contradictory, how can one thing be both the basis for, and aggressive to the 
constitution of another? Contradictory it may sound, but also familiar, as this 
logic 
saturates the oeuvre of Jacques Derrida. 
We have seen that in Derrida what makes possible immediately 
makes impossible the purity of the phenomena made possible. What 
allows a letter to be sent and received, a postal network, 
simultaneously makes the non-arrival of this letter possible too. What 
makes a performative possibility (iterability) means that a 
performative can always be "unhappy". What allows language to be 
transmitted in a tradition opens meaning to a dissemination which 
always threatens any transmission of a thought. (Bennington 1999, 
p. 276). 
As we have said, for an inferior to understand the order of his superior he must share a 
minimal intelligence, that is, equality with his superior. However the relation of superior to 
inferior supposes a lack of equality. The terms superior and inferior would be irrelevant if 
equality was admitted. Therefore the condition of possibility for hierarchy seems to be the 
condition of impossibility for the validity of hierarchy. The incoherence of the desire of a 
person to be the superior of another is revealed by the fact that this other must be 
minimally equal for the desire to successfully express itself as command. 
Deconstruction 
now want to briefly map the, perhaps rather well trodden, theoretical territory of 
'deconstruction'. I do so to aid my explanation of Ranciere's conception of political action. 
According to the terminology used by Derrida and many of his commentators, perhaps 
most notably Rodolphe Gaschd, we can say that equality - in Ranciere's usage - is an 
'infrastructure' (Gaschd 1997, p. 7) or a 'quasi-transcendental': "And what if what cannot 
be assimilated, the absolute indigestible, played a fundamental role in the system, an 
abyssal role, rather, playing... a quasi-transcendental role" (Derrida 1990, p. 171-82a/151- 
62a). 
Equality, like 'absence, dissemination, detour, difference, writing' is quasi-transcendental 
because it In some way resembles a transcendental term, acting as a 'prime mover', a 
condition for the appearance of 'being', but It is not transcendental because it cannot 
achieve a 'positive' existence. Equality Is infrastructural because, like Duchamp's notion of 
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the infra-thin, it is an in-between 'notion', a non-total difference; It is the interval which 
thwarts the desire for the full determination of beings. 
We can see that a description of equality as weirdly for and against police orders 
does 
manage to describe the operation of hierarchy. This 'for and against' 
formulation in a 
sense 'works', but is it not still a rather paradoxical and contradictory logic to use? 
What is 
the justification for apparently tying oneself up in these logical knots? The point is that it 
may be a contradictory formulation according to common sense, or to 'classical' standards 
of philosophical logic, however the assertion of 'deconstructive' philosophy is that this 
formulation is premised on the necessary role of infrastructure and is the most 
philosophically astute way of explaining the operation of orders of all 
kinds, from 
conceptual frameworks (western metaphysics) to societal organisation (the police). 
The real dangers for thought and 'in fact' come from the absolutely habitual denial of this 
infrastructural relation. Contradiction actually exists on the side of metaphysics or the 
police, because in failing to recognise their own constitutive logic they have no choice but 
to engage in all sorts of inconsistencies or aporias. It is the 'classical' idea of concepts 
which becomes contradictory in its desire to avoid quasi-transcendental or Infrastructural 
logic. In terms of 'the police order' these inconsistencies have direct political ramifications, 
which I will explore anon. 
In recognition of the encompassing nature of the metaphysical tradition we should 
probably start, at this very moment, with presence. According to Derrida, following 
Heidegger, the western philosophical tradition (western metaphysics, onto-theology) is 
structured around the principle of presence (Derrida 1997, p. 23). Whichever way this 
value is figured the metaphysical mode attempts to uncover some supreme principle, 
which can be shown to be tied-up with this presence, no matter what its particular 
content might be. Presence has been conceived within this tradition in a huge variety of 
ways. The desired presence may be - perhaps is most often - presented as currently 
absent'. One might say that the term 'presence' operates as a privileged synonym within 
71 am referring here to the philosophical principle of telos. As an example let us draw on Plato's 'perfectly 
amalgamated' city (Plato 2007). Why is this 'good city' tied up with a value of presentness? The good city - 
projected as telos - cannot be improved upon. Although its realisation is 'around the corner', once attained, the 
city state will not progress as perfection will have been reached. In a sense the state would have no future, 
would exist in permanent present-tense perfection. The citizens within this ideal are necessarily present to 
themselves. Their identities and social roles are manifestations of the 'same', insulated against the possibility of 
differential hybridity or future change. They perform one function and one alone, and this is what generates the 
perfectly ordered social. This is why, as Ranciere has shown in The Philosopher and his Poor (2003) the 
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philosophical discourse for other terms which also express the impossible desire of 
metaphysics, for example homogeneity, self-sufficiency, autonomy, etc8. 
Why is this process of, let's say, conceptual 'figuring' or 'defining' problematic? Simply and 
rather schematically put, this desired 'cutting off' runs counter to the actual functioning of 
concepts. Philosophical concepts would be homogeneous and self-sufficient if they had a 
nucleus of meaning, of which they were exclusively in possession. They would then simply 
be conceptual atoms. However concepts exist in an economy of sorts, a system of 
differences, whereby they give and receive meaning from other concepts, most 
'fundamentally' by the relation to a term positioned as binary opposite. For Derrida, these 
parings, even if apparently without order of preference, are always hierarchical, the result 
of an "ethico-theoretical decision" (Bennington 2000, p. 8) that positions one term as first, 
that is present or logically prior, ontologically more valuable than the secondary, 
ontologically 'mundane' term. This implicit or explicit denigration should be seen as part 
of the attempt to realise one term as contra its pair. 
It is relatively easy to see how the metaphysical notion of the isolation of concepts is 
rocked by the proposal that concepts take their meaning from a "backdrop of others" 
(Gasche, 1997, p. 129). However simply noting that concepts are relational does not 
challenge metaphysical logic, which - as we have seen - recognises this relationality so long 
as it be thought of in terms of total opposition. Metaphysics admits that 'soul' needs 'body' 
so long as soul is thought as the opposite of body. Derrida's philosophy reaches beyond this 
binary relation by introducing a necessary third 'term', that is, the infrastructural medium 
in which positive meanings emerge, and which produces (contra metaphysics) non-opposite 
difference: '"There is no ethics without the presence of the other but also and 
consequently, without absence, dissemination, detour, difference, writing" (Derrida 1997, 
p. 139-140). 
polytechnic artisan, or sophist are such dangerous phenomenon for Plato because in performing multiple roles, 
they contravene the punctual singularity of identity that his perfect city requires (Rancl6re 2003b p. 16). 
a This similarity Is revealed if one tries to define presence. For something to be present means that It Is not 
spatially or temporally elsewhere. (The fact that any telos is not 'presently' realised does not problematize the 
fact that its value is conceived as an ideal presentness to come). The concept (of presence as well as all other 
concepts) Is premised upon cutting itself off in an idealised moment of here and now. It Is in this moment of 
realising Itself as a figure against a ground that presence names a homogeneity, self-sufficiency, autonomy, etc. 
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As we have already said in relation to binary pairs, the first part of the quotation refers to 
the concept of 'self' nd 'other' within the ethical relation; no one without another, no self 
without the presence of the 'other'. But these binary pairs are not mutually exclusive 
opposites, and this is why Derrida appends a list of quasi-transcendental terms (absence, 
dissemination, detour, difference and writing) to the 'face-off between self and other 
within the ethical relation. 'Self is made different to its supposed binary by an originary 
interval, which enables it to possess positive content, but also connects it to that supposed 
binary, disqualifying the stability of absolute opposition. The infrastructure enables a 
thought of difference that is not reducible to opposition. This difference, or infrastructure 
explains why thinking concepts as positive terms, which then inflect (face off against) each 
other, is inadequate. The difference is primary and makes the concepts what they are, any 
concept must be therefore thought as originally split via this difference to its other. 
There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite 
reference from one to the other, but no longer a source, a spring. 
There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split in itself 
and not only as an addition to itself of its image. (Derrida 1997, p. 36). 
Thereby no concept, including that of 'self' within the ethical relation can be rigorously 
thought without including the trace of its difference - the differing interval -from its other 
within itself. The contradiction or paradox of the 'autonomous' self determining concept is 
at its most stark in this formulation. The desire to individuate, or make a concept present 
as opposite, runs absolutely counter to the inherently relational, or split and non-opposite 
condition of concepts. 
This splitting or non-opposite relating is described or accounted for (Gaschd 1997, p. 142- 
151) by infrastructures, which are necessary for the production of 'concepts' and 
everywhere expelled in order to make them work'properly'. 
Yet that is as much to say that the concept - of ethics, for example, 
but all other concepts as well - includes within itself the trace of that 
to which it strives (teleologically) to oppose itself in simple and pure 
exteriority. As a result of this law constitutive of concepts, all 
concepts are in a sense paradoxical. (Gaschd, 1997, p. 129) 
Therefore, looked at in this way - from the perspective of 'deconstructive' philosophy - the 
quasi- transcendental explanation with its head scratching collapse of possibility and 
impossibility, is better able to explain concepts, or coherence, or meaning, or the bringing 
about of being, than the conventional model, with its respect for the 'integrity' of concepts 
or coherence, or meaning, or the bringing about of being. This 'respect' is its downfall, the 
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site of contradictions, paradoxes and sublimations. This 'respect' means that metaphysics 
will constantly deny that which makes it possible in order to attempt (the ultimately 
impossible task) of securing its purity. The inability to square its desire with the reality of its 
functioning is the site of contradiction, or paradox within metaphysics. Deconstructive 
philosophy avoids these contradictions by coming to terms with, formulating a theory 
which accounts for this reality of its functioning. 
Deconstruction as critique 
The demonstration of the paradox at the heart of metaphysics is associated with a type of 
critical procedure which shows the fallibility of metaphysical formulations. Deconstruction 
works on texts, reads them for slippages and asymmetries within their arguments. These 
are then taken as indicative of the constitutive contradiction of metaphysics. Or rather, the 
inconsistencies discovered in canonical texts led Derrida, (following Heidegger, following... ) 
to an awareness of the necessity of a (sublimated) infrastructure, and this process of 
sublimation is then registered and elaborated in every new reading. 
Famously in ... That Dangerous Supplement... (1997, p. 141-164) Derrida reads Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and focuses on the contortions of language and argument within his writing. 
Primarily, Derrida is interested in the problems Rousseau faces in his attempts to maintain 
a distinction between the concepts of speech and writing. 
That this binary cannot be maintained within Rousseau's argument - despite his desire - 
gestures towards a complicity between these terms and as we have seen this can be 
coherently accounted for by way of infrastructure. The oppositionality of the two terms is 
questioned; they are in fact shown to be connected by a certain non-opposite difference, 
which confers on them a minimal similarity. And it is the awareness of a certain complicity 
or likeness that completely undoes the attempt to dichotomise and hierarchize. As is 
consistent within Derrida's thought, each new 'discovery' of the necessary presence of 
infrastructure (to account for the contradictions within a text) is named differently. The 
denigrated positive term 'supplement' is pressurised by Derrida into gesturing towards that 
non-opposite infrastructural interval which ruins Rousseau's attempt to isolate and thus 
protect speech9. 
9 Rousseau not only tries to keep them apart but the main thrust of his argument endeavours to prioritise 
speech over writing and to protect speech from writing's corrupting influence. What is at stake for Rousseau is 
an attempt to defend a concept of a 'natural' or 'self present' Identity. Speech through its apparent immediacy 
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This undermining or 'shaking' of metaphysics, which proceeds through detailed readings 
and warns against "metaphysical purifications, essentialisations, totalisations and 
transcendentalisations" (Bennington 2000, p. 14) of all sorts might be said to be the critical 
imperative of deconstruction. Ranciere's understanding of the deconstructive principle of 
politics aims at outlining a more direct dissensual procedure. I will now outline this political 
'action' and chart its various structural similarities to deconstruction as critical procedure. 
Politics 
As we have seen a subject's place within the police order is based on her 'allotment' by 
various agencies, this produces a 'commonsense' understanding of who that person might 
be and consequently how they deserve to be treated. They are placed in a binary 
'framework' either as equals or unequals. Equality is also that interval which affords these 
relations of hierarchy and at the same time prevents their total realization. The police is 
therefore always vulnerable to evidence of the instability of its binary 'partitions'. Politics 
works against the police 'ordering' of society by producing a community, or group that 
does notfit into' the organisational schema, thus disrupting its neat arrangement. 
Subjectivization 
From now on I will use the term subjectivization or subjectivizing group to describe this 
community, which is really a becoming or between community, a collective in-formation: 
"What is a process of subjectivization? It is the formation of a one that is not a self but is 
the relation of a self to another" (Ranciere 1992, p. 66). 
The subjectivizing group is not definable in terms of ethnic properties; it is not identifiable 
with a sociologically determinable part of the population: "parties do not exist prior to the 
conflict they name" (Ranciere 1999, p. 27). For instance the Woman's Movement of the 
sixties and seventies might provide an example. Now, of course these feminists had 
and lack of mediation seems to guarantee self presence. However Derrida homes in on Rousseau's continual 
uses of the word 'supplement', highlighting a certain definitional slipperiness to this term that undermines the 
co-ordinates of Rousseau's argument. To supplement something can mean both to add an 'extra' to an existing 
'whole' or an addition to an absence within a 'non-whole'; "... it is not simply added to the positivity of a 
presence ... its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness" 
(Derrida 1997, p. 144-145) The 
very language Rousseau employs works against his arguments' explicit aim. To describe writing as supplemental 
to speech is to both describe it as exterior but also to inadvertently claim a kind of necessary relationship, 
speech needs writing. Throughout the chapter Derrida charts the convolutions and even reversals that 
Rousseau's arguments undergo. 
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women's bodies, belonged to a biological description of womanhood, but Ranciere has 
claimed that the types of subjectivity they mobilised - when demonstrating equality - 
broke with the previous societal understanding of women: who they were, what they 
wanted, and of what they were capable. In this way they formed an extra community - 
existing between positive identities - that had never before been reckoned with: a new 
non-identity without a role in the existing order (Ranciere 1999, p. 36). 
This demand for equality must be understood as both motivating for the group in question, 
but also and at the same time declarative, or public, an attempt to confront elites, those 
who tacitly benefit from the unequal ordering of society with the contradiction of their 
position (Ranciere 1995, p. 48). As already mentioned, this contradiction is perhaps more 
likely to be revealed in democratic societies where there is both the enshrinement of a 
value of equality - the notion of equal rights is written into constitutions and/or the first 
principle of law and/or the taken for granted foundation of civil society - and a widespread 
flouting of that enshrined value. 
The contradiction exists within commitments or between commitments and actions. A 
belief in equality is held, whilst at the same time being denied. And this contradiction is 
made manifest by political 'action'. This contradiction of commitments is a (more explicit) 
manifestation of one common to all police orders whereby a basic equality must be denied 
so as to partition 'the sensible' into inferiors and superiors. This making more explicit is the 
'gift' of western democracies to political action. 
This 'social' reality is a reality of inequality. On the other hand, a 
legal/political relation exists: the inscription of equality, as it appears 
in the founding texts, from the Declaration of the Rights of Man... 
This second relation has the force to engender a different social 
reality, one founded on equality. (Ranciere 1995, p. 48). 
Another example that Ranciere uses in this respect is a French Tailors' strike of the 1800s. 
In this instance, the legal moves made against workers to criminalise their efforts to 
'unionise' are shown to contradict the preamble to the French charter of 1830, which 
stated that all people are equal before the law. The owners were allowed to act 
collectively, but not their employees. The workers, through statements and argumentation, 
began to point out the contradictory position of the public prosecutors (Monsieur Persil 
and Schwartz) who continued to deny workers had an 'equal status'. 
31 
If Monsieur Persil or Monsieur Schwartz is right to say what he does 
and do what he does, the preamble of the charter should be deleted. 
It should read: the French people are not equal. If by contrast [the 
preamble] is upheld, then Monsieur Persil or Monsieur Schwartz 
must speak or act differently. (Ranciere 1995, p. 47). 
Again the political actors presuppose and demonstrate their own equality demanding it be 
recognized by the police. The argument made by 'the subordinated' is not straightforwardly 
recognised, because one consequence of their lowly status is that they are not heard, or 
not taken seriously. To return to a previous example: "To find out if plebs can speak is to 
find out if there is anything 'between' the parties. For the patricians, there can be no 
political stage because there are no parties. There are no parties because the 
plebeians... are not" (Ranciere 1999 p. 26). Therefore political action as the posing of 
equality, through speech and activity, is the contestation of this muteness or invisibility. In 
the case of the French Tailor's statement, they are posing an argument for their equality at 
the level of form, as well as content. That they are speaking out, addressing their 'betters', 
engaging them man-to-man as it were, is another way of registering their equality. A 
contentious equal relation is established where before there was none. 
This posing of equality then forces the contradiction of the police order to be confronted by 
those who benefit from that order. In a manner identifiable with deconstruction 
subjectivization therefore emphasizes the minimal similarity (equality) of the inferiors and 
their betters undoing their apparent binary opposition and thus the ethico-hierarchic 
decision tied to that dichotomy. This minimal similarity (equality) should thus be theorised 
as infrastructural, that is, as the non-opposite difference of identities within a social 
objectivity. The collective activity of political subjects, wherein they behave unlike 
themselves and demand rights in excess of their recognised allowance, gestures to a 
necessary beyond of the conceptual categories of police and should be recognized as 
another modality of emphasizing, or accounting for, infrastructure. This 'accounting' only 
makes sense if expressed as 'we'. It is the assertion of a collectivity which precedes all 
limited orders. Therefore to point at this via 'activity' means that this activity must be 
collective. To demand the equality of all with all individually would seem a performative 
contradiction. (This is one reason why the collective invention of subjectivization is 
different from the self-creation of the autonomous liberal subject, which it in some ways 
otherwise resembles). 
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Finally, whilst this accounting for the quasi-transcendental of equality takes place the police 
order is shown to be - to both the members of the group and beneficiaries of hierarchy - 
entirely invalid, without any necessary foundation, a fallacy, a sham, a fraud. This is the 
point where the dissensual efficacy of Rancierian politics resides, demonstrating the 
invalidity of any social totality. 
Political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the 
perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a basically 
heterogenous assumption, that of a part of those who have no part, 
an assumption that, at the end of the day, itself demonstrates the 
sheer contingency of any order, the equality of any speaking being 
with any other speaking being10. (Ranciere 1999, p. 30). 
Solidarity 
At this juncture, I want to make the point that the beneficiaries of hierarchy are not 
necessarily precluded from involvement In subjectivization. It is possible to act in solidarity 
with those who demand equal treatment. 
Those who participate in a solidarity movement are not among the 
part that has no part. They are men who demonstrate for women's 
rights, straights who demonstrate on behalf of gays, Americans and 
Europeans which stand with the Palestinians, North Americans who 
oppose exploitation of South America, people who support the 
struggle of the Zapatistas and the indigenous populations of Mexico 
(May 2008 p. 55). 
The dis-identification that the subject-of-solidarity undergoes is the inverse of the one 
already described. The former disengages with their given position as superior to assert 
10 This highlighting of police contingency or non-totality can be conceptualized In three ways. First the 
demonstration of equality shows the police order that there Is a group, the contentiously equal constituency, 
who had previously been unaccounted. Before subjectivization there are simply individuals unproblematically 
allotted to a lowly role. During subjectivization these individuals emerge as a group in excess of their previous 
role, thus confronting the police with the Inadequacy of their system of social organisation. 
Secondly this group justifies their emergence from their lowly position on the basis of the demonstration of 
equality. The claim made by the victim of hierarchy is "I am your equal because all people are equal", not "I am 
your equal because we are the superiors of everyone else". This would not be a political claim. Therefore what 
is highlighted for the police is that, contra the logic of hierarchy, everyone is in fact equivalent-in-equality. 
And finally, as we have seen, the political agent in the process of engaging his supposed better as equal 
dramatizes a peculiar feature of police order, that is, its hierarchies depend on the minimal equality of all 
people. The inferior must understand the order, and understand that she must follow that order, and therefore 
is minimally equal to the superior. 
In my 'second conceptualization' equality is highlighted as the condition of impossibility of hierarchy; if all are 
equal then hierarchy is an invalid social arrangement. But in the third example hierarchy is also shown to be 
premised on equality; equality is its minimal condition of possibility. Both realisations serve to utterly repudiate 
hierarchy revealing it to be non-total, unable to accommodate the quasi-transcendental principle of equality. 
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their equality with those who are judged inferior. In spite of this 'reversal' the familiar 
political sequence is retained: there is a declassifying effect premised on the performance 
of equality which is antagonistic to police hierarchy. 
When the dissidents of the eastern bloc adopted the term 'hooligans' 
with which they were stigmatized by the heads of these regimes, 
when demonstrators in the Paris of 1968 declared, against all police 
evidence, 'We are all German Jews, ' they exposed for all to see the 
gap between political [subjectivisation]... and any kind of 
identification"... [Acting in solidarity] is not to claim that one is the 
object of a particular inequality, but rather that one is unwilling to 
accept the police order of which one is a beneficiary. Therefore one 
opts to stand alongside those who have no part in the police order in 
the formation of a political subject that undercuts the very 
classification of that order. (May 2008, pp. 55-56 citing Ranciere 1999, 
p. 59). 
Political efficacy 
The police can bring a political sequence to an end via a (non-dialectical) accommodation of 
the collective group - meeting their aims - and to a certain extent re-categorising them. 
This is not necessarily an instantaneous process, but might take years of 'disagreement'. 
(Alternatively the police can ignore the demand and carry on in contradiction). The result of 
'accommodation' is that society is made more equal for that particular group, now 
possessive of a new role, and afforded a greater share. However this does not wipe out 
inequality but simply redraws the lines ready for a new unpredictable contestation of 
power, and - importantly - each mobilization of political action pushes to the surface the 
constitutive contradiction of police orders, making it available for further utilisation in 
political action" 
'Equality' then operates on several different but interconnected conceptual levels within 
Ranciere's thought. It is a 'positive' concept given within and by our metaphysical western 
tradition, capable of being enshrined within western democracies as a principle of law or 
parliamentary politics. And yet it is capable of being pressurised by Ranciere, and under 
political action, in a way analogous to Derrida's 'use' of the term supplement (writing, trace 
etc). Under this pressure equality gestures towards the necessary condition for 'being' 
(police order), and therefore the impossibility of its being total. 
11 In Chapter Three I address the issue of (non-dialectical) accommodation of politics by police in more detail. 
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Clarifications 
Distributive equality 
I think it is reasonable to, at this point, bring up the spectre of a type of social order which 
utilizes a notion of equality in a way radically different to Ranciere; these police formations 
re-positivize this 'figure', turning it into an arche and, in many infamous cases, widespread 
authoritarian violence occurs. Below 2iiek lays out this argument, to which, increasingly, he 
does not adhere: 
Of course, the... answer (shared even by Badiou) would be that any 
direct identification of police (the Order of Being) with politics (the 
Truth-Event) [in my discussion 'equality-as-infrastructure'], any 
procedure by means of which the Truth posits itself directly as the 
constitutive structuring principle of the socio-political Order of Being, 
leads to its opposite, to the 'politics of police', to revolutionary 
Terror, whose exemplary case is the Stalinist desastre. (2iiek 2000, 
p. 230). 
In relation to this example I am thinking of those moments within Stalinism where 
'dissidents' were killed because, as supposed counter revolutionaries, they were seen as 
inherently against the communistic principle of equality. 
The differences between Ranciere's system and any attempt to posit equality as social 
foundation begin in the fact that in the latter framework equality is wielded by power in a 
distributive fashion, which necessitates that it be supplemented by a further term, or 
positive feature. Through this addition equality comes to stand for a common-sense idea of 
the category 'people', or 'citizen' etc, against which it is possible to position those 
'dangerous others' who cannot be assimilated into the distributive project. For instance all 
communist comrades are equal against dissidents. In the register of 'intelligence' these 
dissidents might be labelled 'other' because they possess a degenerate intelligence, which 
is outside and thus subverts the healthy mythical mean intelligence of an average citizen. 
These 'others' are then subject to the full aggressive force of power. In this scenario, 
whereby power allots equality, equality must be supplemented by a positive feature, 'a 
something' so that it can be distributed. Ranciere's version cannot operate in this way 
because to allot equality immediately splits the social into those who distribute and those 
who receive. This is why equality must be 'pre-supposed', as the beginning of any political 
sequence, because if it comes at the end via a distribution it automatically negates itself. 
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Ranciere's notion escapes the fate of positivization, its transformation into just another 
arche, because it is an 'empty' term. The political actor does not stipulate a particular type 
of equality. Rather the equality of all with all is an empty pseudo-universal yardstick against 
which particular exclusions from the police order might be measured. It cannot be a 
particular 'version' without risking its efficacy because the police order is only rocked by its 
encounter with a figure radically incommensurable with itself. The 'positive' version of 
equality is simply another police order. Furthermore owing to the architecture of 
Ranciere's model, equality can only be mobilized by the weak against the strong. For 
politics to be politics it must be performed by the victim of hierarchy (or by those in 
solidarity) against its beneficiaries. There may be violence in this encounter but it can never 
be of the centralised 'devastating' variety whereby equality is distributed as norm. 
Inflexible politics? 
Another anxiety expressed about Ranciere's political framework concerns a perception of 
its rigidity; the argument is that he imposes a set of political rules, or conditions, which are 
insufficiently sensitive to particular contexts. I think this unease motivates Peter Hallward 
to ask of Ranciere: 
Isn't there a quasi-transcendental or at least trans-historical aspect to 
your idea that the political actor, the universal actor, is always to be 
found on the side of those who aren't accounted for in the 
organisation of society?... What leads you to believe that this remains 
the rule in today's and tomorrow's political conflicts? (Ranciere and 
Hallward 2003a, p. 198). 
Hallward is right that the structure of dissensus always remains the same, the inferior 
demanding recognition (or a subject dis-identifying in solidarity with this demand). 
However I think he is wrong to worry that this is a sign of contextual insensitivity. Ranciere 
evades the problem suffered by other 'general systems' of politics which rely on a positive 
determining feature by which politics will always proceed and be recognised. For instance 
this might be represented by the 'crude' Marxist view that action with any hope of effecting 
progressive social change will always be that which attempts to appropriate the means of 
production. Activity that does not reach for this goal can be dismissed as miss-directed, the 
result of false consciousness. 
He manages this evasion because equality is not a properly transcendental term containing 
a positive content, which would set a singular criterion for the practice of dissensus. Under 
Ranciere's system there is a structural similarity to each performance of critique, but 
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because of his systems' quasi-transcendental logic, the 'content' of each iteration must 
always be different. As we have seen equality cannot be imposed. Rather, strictly speaking, 
it is nothing other than an interval which is the condition of positive social orders in the 
first place. These differing 'orders' are obviously massively varied in relation to their 
historical and cultural contexts, but also in terms of the multiplicitous relations of hierarchy 
existing within one context. 
Therefore, in every political action the particular character of the hierarchic relation will 
colour the demand made by the subjectivizing subject, the identity they contest (worker, 
gender, racial, or `other) and the scene of their appearance (from agora to suburban 
home). These are not particularistic `identity' struggles if their demand centres on equality 
and not special dispensation: "[Equality] If it is a transcendental category, its only 
substance lies in the acts which manifest its effectiveness". (Ranciere and Hallward 2003a, 
p. 198). 
Conclusion 
Ranciere's thought - along with that of notable contemporaries - is undoubtedly appealing, 
providing what Todd May describes as a philosophy of hope (2008, p. 144). In a similar vein 
Nick Hewlett places Ranciere in the context of an 'enlightenment' thought devoted to 
emancipation. 
Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar and Jacques Ranciere each work within 
the intellectual and political tradition which embraces the notion of 
human emancipation. Associated with political struggle, resistance, 
and freedom from oppression, the emancipatory paradigm is inspired 
by the philosophy of Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx... such 
an approach to ideas and politics became less influential in France 
from the mid-1970's onwards, having been highly prevalent for two 
hundred years. But Badiou, Balibar and Ranciere have each 
vigorously resisted the trend towards the various types of liberal 
thought that have become so much more current in France. (Hewlett 
2007, p. 1). 
Ranciere manages to re-energise this emancipatory tradition by mobilizing a very particular 
notion of equality, one which enables the thinking of dissensual political action whilst 
guarding against 'falling back' onto more 'reassuring' models of politics, those dependent 
upon a founded world view. We have seen that this achievement is reliant on a 
'deconstructive' understanding of equality as a quasi-transcendental `principle'. 
'Foundations' are the preserve of the police, justifying the unequal distribution of the 
sensible; however this ground is always susceptible to tectonic shifts. Police order can 
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never be 'complete' or 'total' and is always vulnerable to the radical egalitarian action of 
subjectivization. 
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Chapter 1. (b) 
Emancipatory Art and Equality 
Question: What do you do? 
Answer: Nothing much 
Question: Nothing? Just try giving us an answer 
Answer: Nothing... Erm... Sometimes someone gets a weird idea into 
their heads and they just start to carry it out 
Question: Weird ideas? 
Answer: Well the other evening someone kicked over a bottle 
Question: What do you do when you just knock around the streets? 
Answer: Nothing 
Question: What sort of things do you do on an average evening? 
Answer: Nothing 
Question: Nothing, like what? 
Answer: Err, lark about, no nothing 
Question: Lark about how? 
Answer: Nothing really 
(Campbell 2003). 
Introduction 
This spare dialogue between interviewer and unresponsive interviewee is part of a 
monologue voice-over to Duncan Campbell's 16mm film Falls Burns Malone Fiddles (2003). 
This chapter begins and ends with a Rancierian interpretation of Campbell's film; the 
reading serves both to continue that explanation of emancipatory art, which I began in the 
introduction, and to argue that Falls Burns... is an exemplary example of such practice. 
Ranclere's model is compared and contrasted with another version of critical art, that of 
'dialectical clash' (Ranciere, 2005c, p. 6). 
The 'promise' of emancipatory aesthetic practices is then shown to be deeply imbricated 
with the quasi-principle of equality, and it is this which establishes the most profound link 
between art and politics within Ranciere's philosophy. Following his lead their connection is 
traced to a shared history; the birth of the aesthetic regime coincides with a certain 
democratization of Europe, marked, if not inaugurated by, the French revolution (Ranciere 
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2002; Ranciere 2003b, p. 197-202). Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgement (1790: 1972) is a 
vitally important text for the aesthetic regime, moving beyond mere influence achieving 
what Ranciere calls the "efficacy of a plot - one that reframes the division of the 
forms of 
our experience. This plot has taken shape in theoretical discourses and in practical 
attitudes, in modes of individual perception and in social institutions - museums 
[and] 
libraries... " (2002, p. 133-134). Ranciere reads the third critique in the context of 1789 and 
its aftermath. (This historical reading is taken up again in Chapter Two when I excavate one 
philosophical context for the emergence of Kant's text). 
Finally, I outline several political consequences of the "aesthetic revolution" (Ranciere 
2002). I propose that the institution of art (broadly understood) operates as an 'untenable 
foundation', and that it enables the 'demonstration of equality', as well as the 
aforementioned 'emancipatory interpretation'. But first I want to return to Campbell's film. 
Falls Burns Malone Fiddles (a) 
A disembodied narration by Scottish actor Ewen Bremner accompanies mostly still but 
sometimes moving images, which provide the core material of Falls Burns... Shot in the 70s 
and 80s and appropriated by the artist from the archives of community photography 
organisations in West Belfast, the images show the youth of the time captured against a 
backdrop of housing estates, and other urban locations. These figures drift past high-rises, 
lean against graffitied walls, sit proudly in customised bedrooms, play guitar; one girl in 
two-inch white heels and carrying a bag of chips is caught in mid air, leaping across a 
pavement. 
The interview questions, quoted above, are posed by a sociologist, directed at a member of 
an ethnographic cohort, which possibly corresponds to the individuals who appear in the 
photographs. The dialogue acts as a synecdoche for the entire film. The sociologist wants 
to understand the motivation of his interviewee, but the non-descriptive answers can only 
be met with disappointment, which is expressed in the film by the narrator's return to first 
person singular, and his frustrated comment: "What a dismal effort" (Campbell 2003). The 
failure of the interview interrupts the desired smooth flow of information, in much the 
same way that the film interrupts the presentation of clear meaning. For example the 
voice-over is spoken in an almost unintelligibly thick Scottish accent, resolutely elliptical not 
conclusive. The indexical veracity of the photographs is questioned by the fictional nature 
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of the voice-over, which acts in this instance as a recognisably dramatic device, delivered as 
it is by a well known actor. 
Sociologist and spectator are left without answers, or not the ones they were expecting. 
The film does not attempt to explain, even less to provide the key to the puzzle of these 
people on these estates in that place at that time. 
That we expect, or half hope for this clarification is not unreasonable, the film itself 
provokes this desire. Simply by choosing these photographs, so loaded with socio-political 
resonance Campbell is positioning his spectator, prompting them to believe he has 
something to say on the issues of, 'The Troubles', or 'social deprivation', or the 'contribution 
of social deprivation to The Troubles'... I will go on to argue that he manages to suggest 
much about this material but refrains from offering a singular analytical framework. in fact 
the voice-over is about the very conundrum of forming such a framework: "How can I hope 
to deal with such complexity? " (Campbell 2003). 
This question is not indicative of a stance of resignation, or quietism within the film. The 
narrator finds that silence is not an option either. He keeps trying to build an analysis, but 
each new method for encountering these images seems to confound the previous one. He 
starts with a description of the sensations evoked by their material presence, and continues 
with the application of sociology. Each method leads in new directions. 
At this point a number of questions arise: Is this refusal of conclusion a failure to 
communicate? And in this instance a failure to deliver political content? Also, is this a 
disruption to the efficacy of any political ambition the work might have, for example to 
mobilise action? 
Not according to that model of emancipatory art that Ranciere (sometimes tacitly, 
sometimes more explicitly) supports. The commonsense understanding of interruption, or 
disruption as incapacitating the transmission of 'some type' of political content is rejected. 
Ranciere's model is in fact a salvaging and reshaping of a very recognisable form of critique, 
one which has a rich historical heritage and which we shall call 'dialectical clash' (Ranciere, 
2005c, p. 6). A few very famous examples would include Eisenstein's montage, Heartfield's 
collages and Brecht's theatre... The premise of this technique is that political content can 
only be expressed through processes of interruption. Disruption is the necessary condition 
of political artwork. 
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[Dialectical clash attempts] to produce a sensory form of strangeness, 
a clash of heterogeneous elements prompting a change in 
perception... When Brecht represented the Nazi leaders as 
cauliflower sellers and had them discuss their vegetable business in 
classical verse, the clash of heterogeneous situations and 
heterogeneous languages was supposed to bring about the 
awareness of both the merchant relations hidden behind the hymns 
to the race and the nation and the forms of economical and political 
domination hidden behind the dignity of high Art. When Martha 
Roster intertwined photographs of the War in Vietnam with ads for 
petty-bourgeois furniture and household, epitomizing American 
happiness, that photo-montage was supposed to evince the reality of 
the imperialist war behind standardized individual happiness and the 
empire of the commodity behind the wars for the defence of the 
'free world'. (Ranciere 2008a, p. 11-12). 
The artwork with political ambitions needs to first disrupt the usual, conventional manner 
of relating to the world, which is understood as deeply involved with power. To perceive 
and think conventionally is to be in the service of the police order. This habitual mode is 
displaced through 'clashes of heterogeneity'. One frame of reference for image, word, 
sound is interrupted by material conventionally outside that frame. Classical verse 
interrupted by cauliflowers. It is only through this clash that the political message can be 
transmitted. And in the great majority of work in this tradition, the message reveals a 
hidden content which exists behind, or below conventional perceiving and thinking, acting 
as its secret foundation. For Brecht, it is only after breaking the hypnotic effect of theatre, 
for instance its temptation of character-identification, that an audience can begin to 
appreciate dramatic action politically. Therefore the lack of naturalism in The Resistible Rise 
of Arturo Ui (1941) prevents mobster cauliflower sellers being merely mobster cauliflower 
sellers, revealing them to be ciphers of Nazism, specifically Nazism as the progeny of 
capitalism, and reveals high art to be complicitous with power. The dark heart of Nazism 
and art is capital. 
However Campbell's work, unlike that made under the logic of dialectical clash does not 
come to rest in the revelation of any secret foundation for 'everyday experience'. Rather 
Falls Burns... strives towards a type of suggestive irresolution. And this apparent 'failure' is 
why the film can be described under Ranciere's retooled notion of critical art. The problem 
with dialectical clash is that it operates under an internal contradiction; its break-of-sense, 
which enables spectators to tear themselves away from conventional representations, 
cannot be made to come to rest in the stability of a singular explanation without betraying 
its originary disorder (Ranciere 2008a, p11-12). Ranciere on the other hand has developed a 
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model of criticality which supports art that manages to mobilise recognisably 
'political' 
content but yet does not tie this content to one conclusion. In the quotation 
below his 
refusal of Brechtian terminology should be seen as an attempt to position his model as 
different from 'recuperative' critique. 
Paul Chan spoke of an "empathetic estrangement, " referring to 
Brecht. As for me, I would speak of a lightening, an alleviation, 
rather than a distancing. The problem, first of all, is to create some 
breathing room, to loosen the bonds that enclose spectacles 
within a form of visibility, bodies within an estimation of their 
capacity, and possibility within the machine that makes the "state 
of things" seem evident, unquestionable. (Ranciere, Carnevale and 
Kelsey 2007a, p. 261). 
The Egalitarian Politics of Aesthetics 
Now we are in the position to ascertain that more precise connection between art and 
politics. They are not only the same because they are both 'compositional' provoking 
experiential and conceptual effects in subjects. Aesthetic regime art is inherently tied up 
with an equality analogous to that Infrastructural notion of equality (equality under the 
armature of Ranciere's system, the 'pure' equality of all with all) already discussed. 
The 'aesthetic regime' is Rancierian terminology for that historical characterisation of 'art', 
which receives a significant manifestation in Kant's analysis of aesthetic experience, the 
Critique of Judgement (1790: 1972)12. 
Aesthetics is not the science or philosophy of art in general. 
Aesthetics is a historical regime of identification of art which was 
born between the end of the 18th century and the beginning of 
the 19th [and it continues today] (Ranciere 2005c, p. 2). 
It is no coincidence that the beginning of this characterisation of art occurred during a time 
roughly commensurable with that 'democratic shift' within Western Europe, marked in the 
French context by the revolution of 1789 and including the workers' movements and 
upheavals of the 1830s and 40s. Both these 'events' (democratic shift/ new understanding 
of art) act to enshrine a concept of equality within the social; art via its new 'aesthetic' 
12 Ranclere is clear that different conceptions-of-art are historically and politically conditioned, but his notion of 
constitutive 'regimes' retains a certain flexibility: "I differ from Foucault insofar as his archaeology seems to me 
to follow a schema of historical necessity according to which, beyond a certain chasm, something is no-longer 
thinkable, can no longer be formulated. In this way, the aesthetic regime of art, for example, is a system of 
possibilities that is historically constituted but... does not abolish the representational regime, which was 
previously dominant. At a given point In time, several regimes coexist and Intermingle in the works themselves" 
(2004c p. 50). 
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status, and democratic government via the successive drawing of constitutions which 
affirmed citizens' rights (Ranciere 2002; Ranciere 2003b, p. 197-202). It would not be too 
much of an exaggeration to say that Ranciere views aesthetic regime art and modern 
democracy as involved in a 'common project'. 
But what exactly is this aesthetic status and how is it related to equality? To answer this 
question I must explain how the aesthetic regime supersedes (without abolishing) the 
previous 'representational' one. This older characterisation of art was premised upon 
certain social hierarchies, which supported and confirmed inegalitarian social relations. The 
aesthetic regime on the other hand, if not immune to hierarchy, is at least - in principle - 
aggressive to it. This is because this new regime is, in some sense, premised upon Kant's 
theory of aesthetic judgement as elaborated in the third critique (1790: 1972). 
According to Ranciere 'art' (singular) in its aesthetic manifestation depends upon the 
untying of the hierarchic rule-bound understanding of 'the arts' 13. Under the hegemony of 
the representational regime there were clear rules as to what constituted the borderline 
between art and life, the strict separations between 'art forms', as well as those relations 
between any subject-matter and its appropriate means of expression. 
Rather than reproducing reality, works within the 
representational regime obey a series of axioms that define 
art's proper forms: the hierarchy of genres and subject matter, 
the principle of appropriateness that adapts forms of 
expression and action to the subjects represented and to the 
proper genre. (Rockhill 2004, p. 91). 
This system of hierarchization is premised on one final binary distinction; there are those 
who know enough to participate, who know about the appropriate form to subject 
relationship etc, and are therefore able to respond to 'the arts' appropriately, and there 
are those who lack this proper knowledge responding by way of mere animal sense. 
As we have seen in relation to police procedures of power, domination is primarily a 
symbolic process. Before any form of 'actual' exploitation (slavery, the payment of below 
subsistence wages, etc) there is the cultural positioning of those slaves/workers as 
'unequal', therefore in some sense deserving of their exploitation. This symbolic positioning 
13 Ranciere often refers to 'representational' art In the plural to suggest that regimes' insistence on the 
separation of different art-forms from one another (2004c, pp. 21-22). 
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is based on a conceptualisation of 'the social' as being composed of the deserving and 
undeserving, the active and the passive, the knowledgeable and the ignorant. 
Therefore the hierarchies inherent to the representational regime of art participate in that 
'distribution of the sensible' which forms the basis of police domination or, as Ranciere has 
put it: 
All those oppositions, looking/knowing... activity/passivity are very 
much more than logical oppositions. They are what I can call a 
partition of the sensible, a distribution of the places and of the 
capacities or incapacities attached to those places. Put in other 
terms, they are allegories of inequality. (Ranciere 2007b, p. 277). 
'The arts' are absolutely tied into the police distribution of inequality; a belief in the 
fundamental hierarchic binary of social relations is confirmed by the division within art 
between those who have knowledge or capacity necessary for inclusion and those who do 
not. 
However under the aesthetic regime all these stable relations are challenged, there are no- 
longer orders of merit among genres - and most importantly - among spectators. Why is 
this? As already suggested one can understand art's definition and status under the new 
regime as a manifestation of the Kantian theorization of aesthetic experience, which 
Ranciere summarizes thus: 
The spectator who experiences the free play of the aesthetic in front 
of the 'free appearance' enjoys an autonomy of a very special kind. It 
is not the autonomy of free Reason, subduing the anarchy of 
sensation. It is the suspension of that kind of autonomy. It is an 
autonomy strictly related to a withdrawal of power. The 'free 
appearance' stands in front of us, unapproachable, unavailable to our 
knowledge, our aims and desires... The free play and the free 
appearance, are caught up together in a specific sensorium, 
cancelling the opposition of activity and passivity, will and resistance. 
(Ranciere 2002, p. 136). 
The aesthetic experience then is the adequation of knowledge (activity) and sense 
(passivity), creating a specific sensorium responsible for suspending the 'autonomy of 
reason', equating to a 'withdrawal of power'. This manifests as a relinquishing of 
determined stable 'meaning' (provided under the dominance of 'reason'), an opening onto 
a tumbling irresolvable 'free-play'. The aesthetic experience is a conceptual realm which 
endlessly disqualifies categorization and thus hierarchy. The new art becomes something 
like an internally undifferentiated - but importantly dynamic and unstable - concept. This is 
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the move from the arts to 'art'. Artists can mix and match low subjects with authoritative 
styles, also art's new categorization Is necessarily impossible to finally categorise because 
those rules which would clearly distinguish between art and life are also jeopardised by the 
new regime; prosaic materials are included where once their exclusion had helped define 
'the arts'. The expert loses his traction in this fluid situation. However, most importantly, 
this new institution of art premised upon the Kantian sensorium unsettles those symbolic 
categorisations responsible for establishing equals and unequals. 
The power of the high classes was supposed to be the power of 
activity over passivity, of understanding over sensation, of the 
educated senses over the raw senses, etc. By dismissing that power, 
the aesthetic experience framed an "equality" (Ranciere 2005c, p. 3). 
This understanding of art as disruptive to conceptual categories is incompatible with the 
ranked and orderly relations governing the representational regime. If the older regime is 
co-substantial with repressive police logic then we must understand Kantian aesthetic 
experience as in some sense 'progressive', 'egalitarian', even political. This interpretation 
runs counter to many 'leftist' readings of 'the aesthetic'. For example Pierre Bourdieu 
believes it operates as a false universal imposed by an elite - for their own gains - on the 
rest of the population. (Chapter Two provides a detailed critical examination of the 
Bourdieuian perspective). In the Philosopher and his Poor (2003b) Ranciere accuses 
Bourdieu of failing to read Kant's critique of judgement historically. 
Kant, however, gives the question of "aesthetic common sense" a 
larger and more precisely dated theatre. One year after the 
beginning of the French Revolution, his aesthetics presents itself as 
the contemporary of a century and of populations confronted with 
the problem of "uniting freedom (and equality) with compulsion 
(rather of respect and submission from a sense of duty than of fear)". 
(Ranciere 2003b, p. 197 citing Kant 1972, p. 201) 
To understand Kantian aesthetics within its historical context is to appreciate his theory of 
aesthetic judgment as a philosophical attempt to find an `arena of experience' in which the 
new democratic principle of equal rights might be realized in the face of so much obvious 
inequality. For Ranciere Kantian aesthetic experience and its later Schillerian development 
is an attempt to break the common sense understanding that these new democratic 
principles of equality are worthless because actual reality is striated with difference and 
rank: The question can be posed thus: "through what means can an equality of sentiment 
be brought about that gives the proclaimed equality of rights the conditions of their real 
exercise"? (Ranciere 2003b, p. 198). 
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Ranciere claims that those who were against this new enshrined freedom justify their 
resistance to the 'new ideal' because they say it cannot be realized; people are simply 
unequal. There are those with different competences and social capacity: "the gulf 
separating working class brutality from bourgeois civility" (Ranciere 2003b, p. 198) cannot 
be closed. 
The very ones who say that the people are incapable of ever making 
a reasonable use of freedom claim that the beautiful is a matter of 
either learned criteria or the pleasure of refined senses (which are, in 
both cases, outside the sphere of the common people). (Ranciisre 
2003b, p. 198). 
These enemies of equality do not only make the claim that the new freedoms are 
impossible because of essential differences, but also point to differences in educational 
accomplishment. In the second chapter I will pursue Bourdieu's theory of art and culture as 
an instance of this 'stultifying' discourse. 
I now want to unpack, in more detail, the political consequences of this 'aesthetic 
revolution'. I have conceptualized these in three interrelated ways. The first is what I will 
call a structural ramification ('untenable foundation') whereas the second and third can be 
thought as modes of political spectatorship ('aesthetic demonstration' and - the already 
discussed - 'emancipatory interpretation'). In outlining these consequences I shall 
elaborate Ranciere's understanding of the aesthetic regime as 'historical dynamic'. 
Untenable foundation 
'The Aesthetic' operates as an untenable foundation. Owing to the 'unstable equalisation' 
at its heart it cannot act as a conceptual framework on which to found police order. There 
is no hierarchic dichotomous relation within the aesthetic experience, therefore a social 
hierarchy cannot be built upon its blueprint; people cannot be ordered according to 
relations of capacity and incapacity. Therefore a structural separation occurs between the 
category of art and any police order. This is radically unlike the representational regime 
which is entirely co-opted, where the same beliefs and assumptions about "innate" 
hierarchies underlie understandings of art, as well as society more generally. The aesthetic 
regime is characterised by dissimilarity between art and the police social. The equality 
within the 'institution of art and the aesthetic' is symmetrical to the enshrined principle of 
equality already described as operating within western legal or parliamentary institutions. 
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Aesthetic history 
However this situation - art and the aesthetic framing an experience of equality - is subject 
to historical change. Rancie re has constructed a detailed narrative which charts the art 
history (as well as history more generally) of the last two hundred years as constituting 
different trajectories through a 'basic emplotment'. These 'navigate' the conceptual 
coordinates provided by Kant's theorization of the aesthetic: 
Militant workers of the 1840s break out of the circle of domination 
by reading and writing not popular and militant, but 'high' literature. 
The bourgeois critics of the 1860s denounce Flaubert's posture of 'art 
for art's sake' as the embodiment of democracy. Mallarmd wants to 
separate the 'essential language' of poetry from common speech, yet 
claims that it is poetry that gives the community the 'seal' it lacks. 
Rodchenko takes his photographs of Soviet workers or gymnasts 
from an overhead angle which squashes their bodies and 
movements, to construct the surface of an egalitarian equivalence of 
art and life. Adorno says that art must be entirely self-contained ... We could extend the list ad infinitum. All these positions reveal the 
same basic emplotment of an and, the same knot binding together 
autonomy and heteronomy. (Ranciere 2002, p. 134) 
These historical manifestations can vouchsafe the promise of equality, maintaining art's 
position as untenable foundation (and making emancipatory spectatorial experience more 
likely) or they can betray that promise. Before analyzing particular manifestations let us 
introduce the terminology that Ranciere uses when translating Kant's formulation into the 
historical narrative of the aesthetic regime. Kant's adequation of "rationality and sense" is 
re-formulated by Ranciere as the dynamic between heteronomy and autonomy (Ranciere 
2002, p. 134). 
Heteronomy is associated with a "life in common", "the fabric of collective meaning" 
(Ranciere 2004b, p. 80) and autonomy with a disruption to that 'commonality' and shared 
meaning, introducing separation and disjuncture. Heteronomy refers to that movement 
within adequation towards stable meaning. Autonomy rather is that movement of 
separation which thwarts the full realisation of 'social meaning'. It is when heteronomy 
and autonomy are held in 'productive tension' within any particular historical framing that 
art and the aesthetic can be said to enable an emancipatory experience of equality. But 
before I discuss what might be called the properly (improper) functioning of aesthetic 
regime art I want to describe those historical manifestations - plots, or trajectories - 
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where the productive tension is not maintained; those moments when a particularly 
influential 'reading' of art serves to halt the movement between the two poles. 
This denial of non-opposite relationality is achieved in two main ways. Firstly through the 
assertion of the absolute sameness of these two poles, and secondly through the assertion 
of their absolute opposition. These 'moves' give us two plots or political (read police) logics. 
In the first heteronomy and autonomy, life and art are collapsed. 
[The] common of the community will be woven thus into the fabric of 
the lived world. This means that the separateness of aesthetic 
equality and freedom has to be achieved by its self-suppression. It 
has to be achieved in an unseparate form of common life when art 
and politics, work and leisure, public and private life are one and the 
same. (Ranciere 2005c, p. 3) 
In many of the manifestations of this logic art is identified with providing the vessel, or 
habitus for a new and final form of life. One might see the desires of Russian Constructivist 
artists as complicit with this plot: art as a category is subsumed within or subordinated to 
the social, restaging a 'representational' situation where art is complicit with police power. 
One manifestation of this is that the desired (absolute) melding of art and life acts as an 
arche, or telos, the (dreamed for) realisation of a perfect world beyond alienation. 
This is why there could be a juncture between the Marxist vanguard 
and the artistic avant-garde in the 1920s, as each side was attached 
to the same programme: the construction of new forms of life, in 
which the self-suppression of politics would match the self- 
suppression of art. Pushed to this extreme the originary logic of the 
'aesthetic state' is reversed... Now the fulfilment of that promise is 
identified with the act of a subject who does away with all such 
appearances, which were only the dream of something he must now 
possess as reality. (Ranciere 2002, p. 138). 
This desire for a final politico-aesthetic reality dissolves aesthetic art's role as a continuing 
space of critical separation, which might contribute endless 'inspiration' for social 
alternatives. 
The contra move - as embodied in the work of Adorno (2004b) - is also criticised by 
RanciPre. The attempt to completely disengage art from life - to present them as 
completely opposite - results in a similar ossification. 
The second form, on the contrary, disconnects the two equalities. It 
disconnects the free and equal space of aesthetic experience from 
the infinite field of equivalence of art and life. To the self-suppressing 
49 
politics of art becoming life, it opposes a politics of the resistant 
form. (Ranciere 2005c, p. 3). 
Ranciere is dismissive of Adorno's or Greenberg's characterisation of modernism as an 
attempt to give art a proper place and body by excluding its relationship to everything else. 
In the privileging of art as opposite to life, the category of art is held absolutely (impossibly) 
separate, denying the constitutive tension of the aesthetic experience: "The claim may be 
made purely for the sake of art itself, but it may also be made for the sake of the 
emancipatory power of art. In either case, it is the same basic claim: the sensoria are to be 
separated" (Ranciere 2002, p. 147). Structurally art becomes complicit with police authority 
renouncing any possibility that art might (even indirectly) 'inspire' emancipatory 
interpretation. Strictly speaking the politics of resistant form is no politics at all, rather a 
police manifestation. 
What occurs within these plots is a separation and privileging of one term over the other, 
'life' in the first and 'art' in the second. These discourses therefore represent a form of 
metaphysical violence which attempts to contain the 'aesthetic adequation' and the status 
of art as minimally separate from the social. 
The equality of aesthetic art - generated through unstable adequation - should be thought 
as the condition of possibility (and impossibility) of the two other plots, and when not 
suppressed provides the rationale for the dissensual non-total structural separation of the 
category art from politics. This means that Kant's thought, and later Schiller's (1794: 1967) 
development of that thought - as well as all 'properly' aesthetic art - supports and plays a 
role in the new discursive 'text' that is the aesthetic regime. This text includes any 
democratic political action. Writers, thinkers, and political actors produce through their 
anti-hierarchical efforts, an unstable quasi-ground, an enshrinement which is 
accommodating to further anti-hierarchical efforts. 
Emancipatory spectating 
I will now elucidate those two ways that a subject may encounter this promise-of-equality 
via the aesthetic. (Under the hegemony of either 'autonomy' or 'heteronomy' these 
encounters must be understood as constricted) 
First there is what I call the aesthetic demonstration of equality. We can exemplify this 
demonstration via an episode in the life of Gabriel Gauny a philosopher-floor layer involved 
in the French worker's movement of the 1830s and 40s. In an article uncovered by Ranciere 
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Gauny describes that whilst working on renovations to a property he was able to enjoy "a 
garden and picturesque horizon" (Gauny 1983, p. 45-46 cited in Ranciere 2003b, p. 199) as 
well as those who owned the house and land, thus demonstrating an equality with his 
supposed betters. This is again a consequence of the adequation of knowledge and sense. 
Knowledge does not enable the aesthetic experience, it may colour it, but expertise is not a 
necessary requirement. Thereby it is a site where anyone, despite their possible 
educational 'shortfall', can reveal themselves equally 'able'. 
Secondly and as already discussed in the introduction and at the beginning of this chapter, 
the aesthetic experience produces 'emancipatory interpretation'. I have described this as a 
form of continuing, fluid 'evaluation' which is wedded to socio-political content. (As we 
have seen in Ranciere's characterization of 'heteronomy as tied-up with 'life in common', 
this 'social content' is not an addendum to the aesthetic experience, but absolutely integral 
to its dynamic functioning). For example in speaking of And Sala's work he says: 
[He does not teach] us about a world calling for change or restoring a 
supposedly lost common world, the similarities and dissimilarities he 
pursues interrogate the very criteria that allow us to recognise what 
it is that is common. They ask us: what is it we are dealing with? 
What can we say about it? What can we do about it? The aesthetic 
link between aesthetics and politics is to be found here first and 
foremost (2004b p. 82, my italics). 
Sala is political to the extent that his work does not resolve into the presentation of a 
'common world', but encourages a spectator to question said commonality. 
Both these encounters then serve to undermine foundations. In the deconstructive terms 
of Chapter One. (a) the adequation of aesthetic experience, the dynamic mutual 
interruption of concept and sense enables awareness of equality as infrastructure. (Here 
then equality means two things; it is a method, sense and rationality equalized, and that 
which is revealed - equality as infrastructure - through this method). This awareness of 
infrastructure is a negative one. What is apprehended is the lack at the heart of common 
sense ways of framing the world. This awareness generates an understanding of how these 
framings might be other, for instance, a world where Gauny possesses the rights of those 
for whom he works. 
However these 'encounters' with cannot fully 'realize' equality; emancipatory 
interpretation cannot fix upon one positive 'social arrangement'. And the equality which 
Gauny demonstrates cannot be positivized as some general utopian social arrangement. In 
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both cases what we would then encounter would be the collapse of art into life, that is, the 
hegemony of the politics of heteronomy; Gauny would be the author of a new positive 
arche, which is always the basis of police order. 
We should not underestimate the politicality of the continuing de-grounding process fed 
both by collective political action, and aesthetic cultural practices. This activity undermines 
the foundations upon which police order depends, revealing them to be frail. My 
description of the 'aesthetic institution of art' as 'untenable foundation' is an attempt to 
name how aesthetic art is, in principle, inherently antagonistic to hierarchy. 
But similarly we should be careful not to over-exaggerate the political 'effects' of this 
situation. It is not that the aesthetic regime releases a 'wave of equality' which 
supernaturally - or in some absolutely determinist fashion - wipes out actually existing 
inequality. No, equality in either its aesthetic or political manifestations is simply a 
condition of possibility, a non-ground which as such enables dissensual interpretation and 
action. 
The distinction between interpretation and action within Ranciere's thought is productively 
blurred. He is very clear that supposedly passive interpretation is a form of action (2007b). 
Aesthetic spectating if it is properly improper necessarily contributes to the process of un- 
grounding, and is such political. However, as we have seen, this politics of aesthetics- 
according to Rancit re - is not the politics-of-subjectivization. This latter form of action, 
which directly confronts the police over a specific instance of inequality, placing an onus on 
said order to acknowledge the contradiction of hierarchy, cannot be aesthetic practice 
(Rancit re 2007a, p. 264). 
A question then arises here; can the 'disorderly' politics of aesthetics, those of 
'emancipated spectating', be defined without reference to a futural collective politics 
which directly addresses the police order? It is my position that the politics of radical 
ambiguity only make sense if considered in light of providing the conditions for (the "first 
word" in14) an eventual subjectivization. Otherwise the aesthetic politics of 'modifying the 
fabric of the sensible', or provided by the promise of 'untenable foundation', would seem 
to be rather toothless, or circular: modifications upon modifications upon modifications... I 
14 I take this expression from Rancii re's description of the 'aesthetic demonstration of equality' by Gauny and 
other worker-poets of the 1830s and 40s as "the first word of heretical discourse" (2003b, p. 200), a discourse 
which included those direct encounters with the police order exemplified in my discussion of the French tailor's 
strike. 
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understand that aesthetic experiences can be personally liberating; Gauny feels 
less 
crushed by the weight of the concrete world after the aesthetic demonstration of equality, 
because under that experience the world reveals itself to be non-necessary, precisely not 
concrete. However, if we conceive of this emancipation as always remaining private then 
do we not reduce Ranciere's thought to a species of 'self help'; aesthetic emancipatory 
politics as a private 'positive thinking' whereby the indignities and exploitations suffered in 
life are made more bearable because one can imaginatively recast them? No, the 
politicality of emancipatory practice is premised on the notion that at some point 
modifications in the fabric of the sensible will lead to a direct encounter with hierarchy, a 
meeting between the logic of equality and that of the police. And this is not an end, but a 
new beginning because subjectivization itself produces 'aesthetic modifications'. This is 
obviously not to say that emancipatory practice which does not immediately or measurably 
lead to this encounter is not political, but its politicality should be conceived in terms of this 
possible futural relation to subjectivization. This makes sense conceptually and Ranciere 
very often links the two political logics in this way, presenting the 'disorderly experience of 
art' as a resource for future collective political action. (See Ranciere 2007a, p. 264; 2004c 
pp. 64-65). 
Finally I want to introduce a distinction here between the types of art that contribute to 
the aesthetic regime 'text'. There are artworks and discourses which make a more 'passive' 
contribution, and there are those which accelerate the political potential of dynamic 
irresolution. There is some work which "stages the tensions" (Ranciere 2004b, p. 80) within 
the aesthetic regime in an exemplary fashion making spectatorial emancipatory 
interpretation more likely. 
This distinction between 'more passive' and 'more active' aesthetic regime works might be 
difficult to maintain, but Ranciere does frequently attempt to divide practice in this way. 
(He also frequently denies that he does so, not wanting to appear proscriptive)15. More 
is An exchange which took place between Ranciere and Jonathan Dronsfield at the conference Aesthetics and 
Politics: With and around Jacques Ranciere, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 20-21 June 2006, has contributed to 
my position on this point. The following exchange Is taken from an edited transcript which appeared in Art and 
Research: a Journal o Ideas, Contexts and Methods (Rancii re et al 2008b). 
JD: I would like to ask a question of you [1R] if I may, and it goes back to your saying that the invocation of the 
ideal effect was ironic on your part. Do you think it is possible for an artwork to present itself without any 
ostensible political content and still be political? An artwork which makes no appeal of the sort that is being 
made by this art, for example, to any political event, to any state of affairs, any desired outcome, any change 
that it wants to bring to bear upon the world, and which perhaps could just be sheer materiality, in a certain 
descriptive sense, would you allow for the possibility that that artwork could be political, a political artwork, 
despite its not having any, as you put it, 'readable political signification'? 
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active or emancipatory art is that which includes some kind of non-totalizing political 
content, because this then acts as an incentive into the questioning of police orders. The 
content minimally directs interpretation. Examples would include his positive reading of 
And Sala's videos, Paul Chan's work and the photography of Sophie Ristelhueber. This 
quotation comes from an essay on Sala: "Those artists are political in the fullest sense of 
the word who are able to stage this tension between the collective feeling anticipated in 
the forms and the mute apolitical nature of these forms" (2004b, p. 80). 
This is not to say that other aesthetic regime work is not political, in that by 'encouraging' 
wayward interpretations it is generally aggressive to stable 'common sense' categories, and 
therefore supports the notion of art as a space for such interpretations. Whether this 
operation leads to a particular questioning of socio-political structure cannot be stated in 
advance. However my point is that certain artworks seem more likely to lead in this 
direction, that is, towards the politics of subjectivization. 
Falls Burns Malone Fiddles (b) 
I can now expand upon that reading of Falls Burns... (2003) as a piece of critical art with 
which I began the chapter. The film's title is an appropriation of a piece of graffiti, which 
refers to two places in Belfast, Falls road, a site of some of the worst violence of 'The 
Troubles' and Malone, a more affluent area whose denizens were thought indifferent to 
their fellow Catholic's plight (Herbert 2008, no page). In this subtle fashion then Campbell 
can be seen to introduce the socio-political situation that provides the backdrop for his film. 
There are Indicators of this 'backdrop' everywhere in the film, the Republican murals which 
cannot but set off chains of associations; 'conditions of near apartheid', 'infringements of 
Rancli re evaded the question... 
JD: Do I take that as a yes? [Laughter] Are you saying yes? 
JR: In Itself, no. You ask me to consider It just In Itself but the point for me Is: what does it mean an artwork'in 
Itself? 
take his evasion to be symptomatic of the way Ranci6re actively avoids proscription, not wanting to speak as a 
'master'. However nearly all those examples of contemporary practice which he describes as 'political' do 
contain 'readable political signification', and therefore, (and because he was unable to agree with Dronsfield) 
take the liberty of describing this 'readable signification' as a condition of exemplary political aesthetic art. 
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civil liberties', 'extreme dogmatic position taking', 'exploding bombs', 'cycles of hatred... ' 
Similarly images of run-down estates, stained brutalist architecture, litter, weeds and 
broken paving stones seem indelibly linked to the failure of post-war social projects. We 
find allusions then, which might inspire us to build our own analytical frameworks; two 
places to start might be a historical overview of British imperialism or an appreciation of the 
changing nature of capitalism. However the film does not provide this for us, taking a more 
indirect route. An attempt is made to release meaning from this material in multiple 
different ways, rather than chase one perspective to its conclusion. 
The film begins with details from photographs, almost unreadable as representations, 
presenting rather as pattern and texture. The voice-over tries to explain or situate these 
abstractions. I have mentioned the thwarted attempt to apply sociology to understand the 
lives of those depicted, but not the section which immediately follows. Here the voice-over 
turns to storytelling. The lives of those within the photographs become animated by 
fictional projection: "She walked along the balcony to the lonely stairwell, her childhood 
had been spent in a nearby house, since then things had changed... He was intrigued and 
drawn to her... " (Campbell 2003). This narration, which is surprisingly involving and uttered 
over an un-peopled shot of tower blocks is aborted by Bremner, chastising himself, maybe 
for reducing the material again; literary conventions replacing the already problematized 
sociological method. 
The three methods grapple with the material, and in different ways draw a spectator into 
an encounter with these people, their lives and the broader history which envelopes them. 
But each strategy is ultimately rejected, the information or sensation provoked, 
immediately questioned or relativized by its replacement with another. This understanding 
of the constructive, rather than strictly archaeological nature of interpretation is 
particularly evident in Campbell's use of animated overlays: flat rectangular forms inserted 
into and across the picture-plane, or diagrams which disintegrate into abstract patterns as 
well as symbolic elements. At one point strands of barbed wire rendered in silhouette 
snake from left to right across the screen. These literally interfere with the archive material 
in their attempt to direct a spectator along different avenues of meaning. 
Simply through the decision to work with these loaded images, as well as his thoroughgoing 
attempt to mine them for meaning, Campbell directs our reading towards that type of 
understanding described by Ranciere as 'collective' or 'social'. However this movement 
never arrives at the hegemony of the collapse of art and life, in this instance represented 
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by a fully determined 'political stance'. This is because one is constantly pulled away from 
any conclusion, blocked by the introduction of a different analysis and taken in a new 
direction, the net result of which is a movement towards the pole of 'autonomy', or 
complete abstraction. 
I could imagine a criticism of Falls Burns... that would centre on its overemphasis on 'style' 
and would denigrate Campbell's concentration on the details of clothes and hair-cuts. It 
would challenge the cropping of image to focus on a classic Adidas striped-leaf-logo, or 
question the choice of an image which draws attention to a piece of 80's knitwear, simply 
because its tessellating rectangular pattern rhymes some nearby brickwork. 
Also the figures that populate the film are often fastidious in their self presentation. One 
particularly memorable image: a young man wears an immaculate side-parting, dressed in 
pale denim, cut off white T-shirt with thin braces matching a slim watchstrap. He poses 
angularly in his parents' red armchair; it is no surprise that Campbell has made videos using 
images from fashion magazines. 
Is this attention to surface superficial? Does it detract from the seriousness of the subject 
matter? Under a model of dialectical clash I think one could answer in the affirmative. The 
(socio-economic) bedrock produces and is concealed by these alienated surfaces of the 
everyday. However for Ranciere, these surfaces do not cover some 'secret', rather it is how 
they are divided or partitioned that is important. Where do the boundaries fall in the 
production of the distribution of the sensible? Ranciere maybe allows us another 
perspective on these issues of style. Writing about the film Vanda's Room by Pedro Costa, 
Ranciere has said: 
Pedro Costa paradoxically focuses on the possibilities of life and art 
specific to that situation of misery: from the strange coloured 
architectures that result from the degradation of the houses and 
from demolition itself to the effort made by the inhabitants to 
recover a voice and a capacity of telling their own story, amidst the 
effects of drugs and despair. I would like to focus on a little extract 
that shows three squatters preparing their move. One of the 
squatters is scratching the stains on the table with his knife; his 
fellows get nervous and tell him to stop because they will not take 
the table with them anyway. But he goes on because he cannot stand 
dirtiness. Perhaps the complicity between the aesthetic sense of the 
film maker that does not hesitate to exploit all the 'beauty' available 
in the shanty town and the aesthetic sense of the poor addict 
gets... to the heart of the question... (Ranciere 2008a p. 14). 
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Although the youth of West Belfast would seem less marginalized than those occupying the 
almost medieval scenes of poverty depicted in Costa's film, there is still a sense that they 
are considered 'other', in relation to artist and spectator, suitable for attention because 
they are considered marginalized. And I would argue that this type of suitability is most 
often conveyed via documentary form. There is complicity between documentary modes 
and a form of othering, perhaps. Campbell's film avoids this temptation. And this is 
achieved, partially, through the application of a 'superficial' form of attention. By 
concentrating on the 'surfaces' of his subjects, he challenges that division between the 
artistry, or aesthetic sense of the artist on the one hand, and 'photographed subject' as 
passive, on the other. There are a high proportion of bands, and aspiring musicians in the 
film. Again in concentrating on these attempts at self expression, or self-definition 
Campbell asserts an equality between his desires, theirs and those of his spectators, 
producing an exemplary aesthetic effect. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how within 'the aesthetic' the adequation of rationality and sense, 
or in other terminology the dynamic of heteronomy and autonomy, frames an experience 
of equality. 
We have seen how, although heteronomy and autonomy are absolutely connected they 
exhibit different political 'effects', what Ranciere calls two different politics, plots, etc. 
Heteronomy, the in-distinction of art and life, the fabric of collective meaning, is necessary 
to think 'forms of community', to imagine how society might be different or better. 
Autonomy, the non-total extraction of art from life, the interruption or muting of collective 
meaning and thinking, is necessary to 'find space' away from existing communal logic, 
with its inevitable inscription of inequality. 
These two terms are intimately connected, tied up with one another; they cannot in fact 
be separated. And yet as we have seen, Ranciere, pursuing a similar logic to Derrida's work 
on the dichotomising and hierarchic tendencies within 'western metaphysics' identifies 
that a misreading which does in fact 'isolate' and validate one term at the expense of its 
(not quite) other has often occurred within the aesthetic regime. Attitudes for interpreting 
or confronting 'life' as apparently divergent as Marxism, the Constructivist art movement 
and the avant-gardist separatism of Adorno are determined by the dominance of one of 
the two politics of art and life; art as separate from life, or art as indistinguishable from life. 
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We can also place the model of dialectical clash, examined at the start of the chapter, in 
this territory. Brecht and Roster attempt to reveal the secret foundation of 'the everyday' 
and as such their artwork proposes one political interpretation, which amounts to the 
presentation of an alternative arche, the collapse of art and life. (This 'issue' is examined in 
depth in the next chapter in relation to Ranciere's concept of 'mastery'). 
However for an emancipatory interpretation to emerge the connection between these two 
plots must be revealed. This properly (improper) aesthetic experience causes Gauny to 
suppose his equality, and, so long as that equality is not read as a utopian telos to be 
realised, his supposition is emancipating. 
Also we have seen how, what I have called exemplary aesthetic work, for instance 
Campbell's Falls Burns... manages to "stage the tensions" within the aesthetic; throughout 
his film the viewer is pulled between an experience of heteronomy, figured in this instance 
as an attempt to establish a determined political response to the provocative, loaded 
images, and that of autonomy which interrupts this 'meaning-making'. This does not 
amount to a stance of resignation or passivity but produces an active and fluid 
Interpretation: The subject of Schiller's (and Ranciere's) aesthetic 'play' is not so much 
impersonal or dis-interested as re-interested, or interested in new, more imaginative and 
less restrictive ways (Hallward 2005, p. 39). 
Or, in a slightly different register, this 'play' serves to disrupt the social order framed by the 
artwork, showing it to be less concrete than previously imagined. In this instance what is 
apprehended is the 'lack', or infrastructure (equality) at the heart of the everyday; which 
reveals itself to be a non-total construction of ways of saying, doing and making, and thus 
can always be re-formed. 
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Chapter 2 
Unveiling the Aesthetic; Pierre Bourdieu and Mastery 
Introduction 
Bourdieu and Ranciere both share a preoccupation with `the aesthetic'. Both view the 
Critique of Judgment (1790: 1972) to have a continuing influence on the way modern 
western societies are organized. As I have outlined in Chapter One. (b) Ranciere views 
Kant's formulation of the aesthetic experience as parcelled up with the democratic shift of 
the 18`h century, which represented a move away from the political organization of the 
European ancient regime. Kantian aesthetic theory marked, or gave credence to, a theory 
of 'experiential disorder' which fed into and contributed to the broader disorganization of 
authority during this period (Ranciere 2003b, p. 197-202). And aesthetic regime art 
continues to retain this capacity for disorder and dissensus in our contemporary world. 
Bourdieu reads this narrative very differently. The aesthetic experience is not connected to 
the democratic zeal of the late 18th Century, but rather represents the 'character' of the 
bourgeois class which emerged as dominant in this period (Bourdieu 2004, p. 493). For him 
the aesthetic experience is entirely reducible to a form of 'social power', dedicated to the 
reproduction of an unequal hierarchic status quo: "that is why art and cultural 
consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfil a social function 
of legitimating social differences" (2004, p. 7). Bourdieu's argument against the aesthetic 
focuses on the Kantian assertion of its universality; this claim is factually incorrect as the 
aesthetic experience 'belongs' to a particular section of society, contributing to this group's 
class perspective (Bourdieu 2004, p. 493). Also the claim for universality is not an innocent 
mistake, but a motivated lie, an ideology. The secret specificity of the aesthetic and the 
ideological use to which this secret specificity is put serves to reproduce social hierarchy, 
which for Bourdieu is always premised upon cultural inheritance. Aesthetic practice and 
judgment, which is co-extensive with the field of legitimate culture (including the field of 
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art) always serves - through displays of 'distinction' - (Bourdieu 2004, p. 56) to reinforce the 
unequal distribution of 'cultures' or 'class lifestyles' which in turn feeds into the 
reproduction of social inequality within the economic or political fields (2004, p. 165). The 
aesthetic can be entirely reduced to this reproduction, which therefore represents the 
'truth' of aesthetic practice and judgment. For the purposes of my project Bourdieu's 
critique has to be dealt with because it is suspicious of 'the aesthetic' to the extent that it 
wants to debunk any'promise' that it might hold. 
The primary aim of this chapter will be to argue that there are two fundamental problems 
with Bourdieu's interpretation. Both result from the perhaps surprising way that he utilizes 
a species of metaphysical logic within his sociology, and both relate ultimately to his 
consequent theoretical circumscription of the aesthetic as a site for resistance or dissensus. 
First, I will claim that in attempting to debunk the false universality he sees in Kant's 
characterisation of disinterestedness Bourdieu actually re-installs another metaphysical 
term. Bourdieu's use of the word "reproduction" (2000) (of the hierarchy of cultural 
inheritance) represents an instance of what, following Derrida, I will call "transcendental 
contraband" (1990, p. 244a). 
A second problem or problem-set arises around Bourdieu's own formulation of 'resistance', 
or critique, which is premised upon his scientific method, and which ultimately secures for 
him a position of - what Rancie re terms - "mastery" (Ranciere 1991). 
To set the scene for my first criticism I should say that Bourdieu broadly conceives of 
'discourse' as ideological (2002 p. 43), a realm of 'miss-recognition' (2004 p. 172), within 
which subjects cannot realize the ways in which their words and actions are imbricated 
with power. For instance, to believe in the operation of the aesthetic, as described by Kant, 
whereby disinterest might enable 'some' discontinuity with 'everyday' experience (for all) 
is to already be in the implacable grip of social reproduction. To hold this belief is to 
immediately expel oneself from the possibility of recognising, rearticulating, or intervening 
against power; to attempt to do so 'aesthetically' is indeed a contradiction in terms for 
Bourdieu. 
My discovery of transcendental contraband within the sociologist's system is supported by 
Judith Butler's reading of Language and Symbolic Power (Bourdieu 2002), in which she 
claims that Bourdieu 'resurrects' a base/superstructure model (Butler 1997, p. 57). Butler 
highlights the way Bourdieu's positing of power as separate from the mere epiphenomena 
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of speech and other performative action, makes resistance through symbolic means 
difficult to conceptualise. In terms of my argument this 'conceptual inhibition' is a 
consequence of Bourdieu's metaphysical thinking, a fallacious reduction of agency 
premised on an impossible extra-discursivity of power as reproduction. I therefore accuse 
Bourdieu of overestimating the 'strength' of power. 
However Bourdieu does envisage one escape from social reproduction; there is a 
knowledge (a scientific discourse beyond discourse) which manages to pierce the 
superficial, obfuscating, symbolically violent effect of the aesthetic: "[the] science of taste 
and of cultural consumption begins with a transgression that is in no way aesthetic: it has 
to abolish the sacred frontier which makes legitimate culture a separate universe" 
(Bourdieu 2004, p. 6). If the focus of the first section of this chapter is to challenge the way 
Bourdieu denigrates the possibility of resisting power from within discourse - of which 
'aesthetic discourse' provides one example - then the second section focuses on 
Bourdieu's work as critical practice. The sociologist both observes the functioning of 
reproduction and can implement correctives, to mitigate, or halt this social machine 
(Bourdieu 2004, p. XIV, p. 1). The 'knowledge and action' of the sociologist might seem to 
throw-a-spanner-in-the-works of social power in a manner similar to Ranciere's political 
action in dissensus with the police. However an Important difference registers around 
Bourdieu's continuing metaphysical attachment. For him the issue of social reproduction 
tends to be viewed singularly, a matter of cultural-economic inheritance (ultimately a 
matter of class). This is where we encounter the power relation of mastery. The master 
supposes the singular nature of power and utilises a methodological approach which 
Ranciere calls a 'hermeneutics of suspicion', or a 'science of the hidden' (Ranciere 2004c, 
p. 49). This method is calibrated to uncover the metaphysically conceived source of power. 
The relation of master to non-master is adopted when a person with the special knowledge 
of singular power seeks to reveal said power, exposing its motivation and functioning so as 
to educate a public. Within this discourse 'the people' once armed with the 'key 
knowledge' might be able to resist, breaking from power. The problem arises because 
mastery functions by splitting a social constituency into two, those capable of resisting and 
those incapable, thus stultifying the potential of all to emancipate themselves (Ranciere 
2007b, p. 275). I therefore accuse Bourdieu of also underestimating the multiplicity of 
power, and in so doing instantiating a relationship of mastery with the public he wishes to 
emancipate. This is a version of Ranciere's criticism of Bourdieu in The Philosopher and his 
61 
Poor neatly expressed thus: "It seemed to me essential that I denounce the complicity 
between sociological demystifications of aesthetic "distinction" and the old philosophy of 
"everyone in his place" (2003b, p. 221). 
then read the practice and discourse of artist Andrea Fraser as representing a form of 
Bourdieuian mastery. I understand that Fraser's work cannot be entirely 'reduced' to the 
sociology of Bourdieu. However she strongly self-identifies as a follower of his ideas on art 
and culture, and her work represents a sustained attempt to translate/develop his theory 
into an art practice. She has written of the important role the sociologist has played in her 
development. 
I credit Bourdieu with freeing me, or helping me free myself, from 
the sense of illegitimacy - what he later called symbolic violence - 
imposed by legitimate culture, "a product of domination predisposed 
to express or legitimate domination". (Fraser 2005b, p. 83). 
Fraser is famous for performances which intervene into museum and gallery spaces and 
parody the multiple pretensions of art. Here Bourdieu describes Fraser's work, 
reciprocating her dedication to his sociology with praise: 
What we have here [in Fraser's practice] is thus a perfectly exemplary 
intellectual act, lucid and courageous, which breaks with all the 
complicities and complacencies of the ordinary routine of artistic life 
and casts a brutal, cold, and sometimes blinding light on the 
sacrosanct mysteries of the cult of the artwork'. (Bourdieu 2005c, 
p. XIV). 
I will analyse one such intervention Official Welcome, a monologue by the artist, 
commissioned by the MICA Foundation and first performed in 2001, which functions as a 
parody of those inaugural welcome speeches that artists and their supporters are asked to 
give at the opening of exhibitions. 
Reading Bourdieu and Fraser together allows me to introduce the figure of the artist who 
communicates as master, providing a transition between my criticism of Bourdieu's 
reading of the aesthetic and a more general discussion of mastery within much so called 
critical art. I will argue that Fraser's adoption of a position of mastery has two main 
consequences. 
Firstly, she communicates with her audience in 'determined messages'. in fact to utilise a 
hermeneutics of suspicion (Ranciere 2004c, p. 49), so as to reveal the secret emanation of 
power to an audience, can only produce a determined message. She communicates from 
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outside the discourse of the aesthetic, her work performing as a 'reflexive reveal' onto the 
true nature of art, she 'reveals' thereby showing her audience how power can be 
intervened upon16. But this intervention must follow a set route, and aim to arrive at a 
determined point. Again the audience is performatively separated, as followers, from the 
master artist. 
Secondly she is led to denigrate the validity of activist practices within art. Ultimately these 
'well meaning' attempts to advocate for minority groups operate as distractions from the 
central reproduction of power within art. And worse still in producing a 'distraction' they 
feed the implacable reproduction of inequality (Fraser 2005b, p. 40). 
At this point I broaden my discussion to include two examples of work representative of 
much critical practice within art, which unwittingly adopts an attitude of mastery. Stephan 
Dillemuth and Nils Norman's video I'm Short Your House (2007) is used to illustrate the 
'standard reveal' which devotes itself to uncovering the secret determining workings of 
capitalism, the spectacle, or any other structural bedrock. Renzo Martens' Episode III: Enjoy 
Poverty (2008) stands for the 'overidentifying reveal' which does the same as the standard 
one but dispenses with its supposedly sanctimonious distance17. 
In conclusion I return to the historical narrative which underpins Ranciere's 
characterisation of the aesthetic, however this time the terrain is slightly different from 
that navigated in Chapter One. (b) as it is composed of the thought of Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, 3`d Earl of Shaftesbury (1617-1713), Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and those 
attempts at distributive emancipation by the German state during the contemporaneous 
process of Bildung (Bennett 2007). This is done both to 'chase down' the crux of Bourdieu's 
mistaken reading of Kantian aesthetic judgement, and to again recommend the alternative 
proposed by Ranciere. Here the 'functionality' of Ranciere's 'story of art', the way it 
manages to elegantly account for the entwining of art with political projects over the last 
200 years, recommends his dissensual understanding of 'the aesthetic' over and above 
16 1 have borrowed the term 'reflexive' from Bourdieu as applied to his sociological method, where critical 
attention Is returned to Itself ("re-flectere means to "bend back"" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2005a p. 36)) so as 
to analyse the social conditions of possibility which precede practice, including intellectual practice. 
17 Art practices which use 'the reveal' share much with dialectical clash art as described in Chapter One. (b). 
However the examples chosen to illustrate the attitude of mastery which is endemic to contemporary critical 
art dispense with the methodology of colliding heterogeneous 'materials', and proceed rather more directly to 
the revelation of "profound secrets". 
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Bourdieu's stultified reading. 
Ranciere's notion of critical art does not 'reveal'. The critical artist is committed to the 
destabilization of all false assertions of totality, even her own. However I part company 
with Rancie re over exactly how this non-foundational commitment might be pursued in art, 
perceiving his tacit rejection of a type of activist art practice as an unjustifiable narrowing 
of the category of 'political art'. In Chapter Three I expand the category of non foundational 
critique by accommodating the artist as direct 'political subject'. Commitment when 
expressed within political subjectivization is not the revelation of a secret, but a 
questioning of the very existence of all secret, or otherwise, totalizations of power. 
Messages within art if communicated by a subjectivising subject must escape the co- 
ordinates of mastery. 
Reading Bourdieu 
Let us begin with'habitus'. 
The conditions associated with a particular class of conditions of 
existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and 
organise practises and representations. (Bourdieu 1990, p. 53). 
Habitus describes the effect of cultural conditioning, producing what Bourdieu terms 
"durable dispositions", "practices" and "representations". These effects might be described 
using other terminology as the attitudes, beliefs or opinions held by a subject, which for 
Bourdieu express themselves not only in discourse but also physically in bodily postures, 
gestures and gaits. However habitus is also that symbolic amniotic and those 'practices' 
which produce these effects; 'dispositions et al' are "structuring structures" which 
"generate and organise practices and representations". Habitus as both 'process' and 
'result' of social conditioning itself operates within a set of coordinates "the conditions 
associated with a particular class... " For Bourdieu, these objective conditions - which at 
times in his descriptions blur into the category of habitus - consist of complex interrelations 
between wealth, both economic and symbolic, and educational background. From now on I 
will call these co-ordinates responsible for the production of specific habitus types a 
subject's 'cultural inheritance'. 
There is a sense in which one's habitus is constantly performed. For instance each 
expression of a class specific 'opinion' or judgement serves to entrench habitus. Therefore 
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this 'opinion' does not relate to a 'natural' core of identity, which is then simply expressed, 
but this identity is, and needs to be, constantly re-iterated so as to remain an operative 
categoryls. This reiteration is therefore a process of construction, or in Bourdieu's 
terminology "reproduction" (2000). 
One mode of the expression and reproduction of habitus occurs through judgements of 
taste. In Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (2004) Bourdieu famously 
attempts to build a picture of class 'identity' based on these cultural preferences, asserting 
that Kantian aesthetic judgement is inextricably tied up with the habitus of the dominant. 
In fact the 'aesthetic disposition' provides the cornerstone of legitimate bourgeois culture. 
And this assertion necessarily proceeds via a critique of Kant. 
[Like] all philosophical thought worthy of the name... perfectly 
ethnocentric, since it takes for its sole datum the lived experience of 
a homo aestheticus who is none other than the subject of aesthetic 
discourse constituted as the universal subject of aesthetic experience 
- Kant's analysis of the judgement of taste finds its real basis in a set 
of aesthetic principles which are the universalization of the 
dispositions associated with a particular social and economic 
condition. (Bourdieu 2004, p. 493). 
Kant as a typical philosopher fails to realize that the aesthetic experience, which he 
expressly theorizes as a formal universal, capable of being experienced by anyone, is in fact 
a facet of the 'lived experience' or 'disposition' of his own class; the newly powerful ruling 
bourgeoisie. 
The 'disposition' of disinterest, is the product of an 'objective feature' out of which the 
habitus or culture of the dominant emerges. Bourdieu describes this as a distance from the 
material necessities of life. It is in fact a disposition which comes from affluence: "the 
paradoxical product of conditioning by negative economic necessities -a life of ease - that 
tends to induce an active distance from necessity" (2004 p. 5). The upper classes, detached 
from necessity, are afforded a "playful seriousness" (2004, p. 54). This aesthetic sense is 
part of a confident relation to the world, a sense of distinction. 
it seems that the 'objective condition' of affluence should be understood as the foundation 
for the generation of 'homo aestheticus'. However this statement needs to be 
supplemented. Firstly we must understand this notion of affluence includes a type of 
18 For Judith Butler Bourdieu's theorization of 'performativity' Is problematically 'static'. Each enactment exactly 
repeats a prior model given by and within habitus. Butler criticises Bourdieu for not recognising how repetition 
necessarily produces 'semiotic slippage' and therefore change, and movement. 
65 
'memory-of-affluence', and does not necessarily refer to the wealth a particular agent 
currently has 'in the bank'. This 'wealth' is just as likely to be the possession of a 
'symbolic 
capital' gained by one's class through history, the memory of which is carried unconsciously 
within the dominant habitus19. 
Also everyone needs to be educated into the aesthetic disposition. The objective condition 
of a 'life of ease' (one facet of a cultural inheritance), out of which the aesthetic disposition 
'evolved' is channelled by education. Again, contra the explicit content of Kant's theory, 
which views aesthetic experience as 'decentering' normally dominant rational knowledge, 
Bourdieu views the aesthetic as secretly reliant upon knowledge. 
To perceive a work in a specifically aesthetic way, that is, as a 
signifier meaning nothing other than itself, consists not, as is 
sometimes suggested, of regarding it without relating it to 
anything other than itself, either emotionally or intellectually, in 
other words surrendering oneself to the work taken in its 
irreducible uniqueness, but in picking out its distinctive stylistic 
characteristics by relating to the works constituting the class of 
which it is a part, and to these works alone. (1991, p. 40). 
At the other end of the scale are the working class who are less able to adopt an aesthetic 
attitude than those classes and class factions above them. This is because they are formed 
via their own habitus, which dictates particular cultural preferences. Bourdieu characterises 
the working class relation to culture as the "choice of the necessary" (2004, p. 372). This 
means that the working-class are less likely to make aesthetic-type choices, their 
relationship with 'objects' is marked by 'practicality' or a type of ethical simplicity. Owing to 
their close relation to necessity they find the distanciation and abstraction necessary for 
aesthetic contemplation difficult, or without merit20. Therefore, according to Bourdieu, the 
universality of the aesthetic experience is simply wrong, there are those who are socially 
19 This is one reason why artists and Intellectuals as the dominated sector of the dominant class, although 
perhaps materially poor still live according to the attitudes which evolved from the conditions of a life of ease. 
However judging by the example of the parvenu, which we shall look at in more depth later, lt Is possible, 
however unlikely, that the aesthetic disposition might be gained by a member of the working class who, both at 
present and within their collective class memory, has never 'experienced' a life of economic ease. Therefore the 
aesthetic disposition evolved from the economically affluent position of the upper classes but can be adopted 
or won - albeit with great effort - in the absence of affluence. 
20 For 'them' all choice has to fulfil some purpose whether practical or ethical. This is because the limitation of 
their resources creates a particular relationship to -a horror of - waste. Even wasted energy, for instance 
'play', is looked at with suspicion. To 'waste' time, energy and resources through deliberating the non-essential 
is to risk destitution. The Kantian aesthetic disposition seen in this context then is by definition a form of wasted 
energy, because it requires a suspension of material or ethical concerns and is thus foreign to the working class: 
"nothing Is more alien to working class women than the typically bourgeois idea of making each object in the 
home the occasion for an aesthetic choice" (2004, p. 379). 
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and educationally more likely to be able to experience in this way being `better 
constructed' than others. 
That the working class habitus is predisposed to eschew aesthetic attitudes has more wide- 
ranging consequences than a simple if unfortunate narrowing of their cultural outlook. 
Most insidiously the aesthetic acts as a powerful ideology securing the 'naturalness' of 
hierarchy and in so doing reproducing the unequal status quo. To understand this 
important point we must return to Bourdieu's critique of Kant. 
The Aesthetic as Ideology 
The universality of the aesthetic is not only wrong, an 'innocent' positing of the particular 
as universal, but it is also a motivated lie designed to reproduce the existing distribution of 
bodies in particular habitus arrangements. 
Firstly, the ideology falsely 'legitimizes' dominant culture, placing it at the apex of a 
hierarchy. The culture of the wealthy and powerful (historically and at present) is not 
intrinsically better than the culture of the 'poor', but is seen as such simply because it is the 
culture of the wealthy and the powerful. The working class - as well as all other classes - 
miss-recognize legitimate culture's privileged position seeing it as essentially valuable, 
when, in fact, its value is simply the corollary of the economic and political position of the 
class to which it 'belongs'. For Bourdieu culture is essentially arbitrary because there exists 
no universal yardstick with which to measure the quality of one culture against another 
(Bourdieu, Darbel and Schnapper 1991, p. 109). 
Secondly, as I have shown, for Bourdieu the 'working class' fail to participate successfully in 
legitimate culture because they possess the 'wrong' habitus. However this reason, which is 
rooted in the inequality of social positions, is presented within aesthetic ideology as their 
own innate flaw. Under the Kantian illusion, aesthetic experience is theorized as a formal 
universality; all humanity can experience in this way. And yet there are sections of society 
who seem unable or unwilling to do so. Under the Kantian logic then, there must be 
something essentially in-human about those groups. They are the victims of ignoble and 
insensitive natures. 
The privileged classes of bourgeois society replace the difference 
between two cultures, products of history reproduced by education, 
with the basic difference between two natures, one nature naturally 
cultivated, another nature naturally natural... Thus the sanctification 
of art... fulfils a vital function by contributing to the consecration of 
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the social order. (Bourdieu 1991, p. 111). 
Therefore every performance of 'the aesthetic disposition' - every act of distinction - is also 
a manifestation of working class exclusion, as well as and at the same time a justification of 
that exclusion. Therefore performances of distinction possess a 'force', both demonstrating 
the 'natural' difference between the dominant and dominated and therefore exerting this 
hierarchical difference. 
The established order, and the distribution of capital which is its basis, 
contribute to their own perpetuation [reproduction] through their very 
existence, through the symbolic effect that they exert as soon as they 
are publicly and officially declared and are thereby misrecognized. 
(Bourdieu 1990, p. 135). 
Also and at the same time the exclusion prevents the working classes from accruing the 
high-value cultural capital associated with legitimate culture therefore further limiting their 
social mobility. 
This layer of ideology associated with art and the aesthetic means that whatever course 
you take within the field, if acting in accordance with a belief in the 'worth' of the aesthetic 
you will simply reproduce power. This inability of an agent to escape the reproduction of 
power from within the discourse of 'the aesthetic' can be clearly seen in Bourdieu's 
understanding of 'art appreciation'. 
The correct reading of a painting by Jackson Pollock, for instance, would be to pick out the 
meaningful relations between this piece of modernist expressionism and its significant 
forebears, perhaps works by Picasso or 'the Surrealists'. This knowledge enables one to 
recognize the lineage and therefore value of such a work. And in Bourdieu's terms this 
show of "distinction" can only mark and enforce a difference between constituencies: 
"[taste] is an acquired disposition to 'differentiate' and 'appreciate', as Kant says - in other 
words, to establish and mark differences by a process of distinction" (2004, p. 466). 
Bourdieu argues that the failure to perform the 'correct reading' also invariably leads to 
reproduction. A member of the working class then who is ignorant of the specific type of 
'abstract' understanding which the 'educated' aesthete has acquired, will read artwork 
inappropriately, perhaps through the lens of their own prosaic experiences, ethics or 
desires. The unfortunate spectator will feel alienated and dissatisfied with their encounter: 
"A beholder who lacks the specific code feels lost in a chaos of sounds and rhythms, colours 
and lines, without rhyme or reason" (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 2). And this misfiring proves to the 
spectator and anyone else witnessing his faltering performance that he is inferior. Again 
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reproduction follows. 
The Parvenu 
However Bourdieu does allow for a type of atypical agency within his system, whereby a 
subject moves against those expectations and 'lifestyle choices' encoded in their habitus. 
"Thus the dominated have only two options: loyalty to self and the group (always liable to 
relapse into shame), or the individual effort to assimilate the dominant ideal" (Bourdieu 
2004 p. 384). 
The latter option represents the tale of the parvenu, a dominated subject who so strongly 
identifies with the values of the dominant that she manages to escape her own habitus, 
unmooring herself so as to re-dock with another more profitable one, thereby entirely 
transcending her cultural inheritance. This movement explains the aesthete or artist with 
working class roots21. Does not this counter-hierarchic movement escape the coordinates 
of reproduction? Not for Bourdieu, the same problematic reoccurs; the parvenu simply by 
misrecognizing the worth of art and the aesthetic and by performing in concert with that 
belief can only re-inscribe the hierarchic social split. 
The argument goes like this: In order to truly become part of the 'aesthetic class', one must 
buy-into the ideology of art that obfuscates the importance of cultural inheritance and the 
learnt expertise necessary to actually become part of 'the club'. "Culture is only achieved 
by denying itself as such, namely as artificial and artificially acquired" (Bourdieu, Darbel and 
Schnapper 1991, p. 110). The parvenu must misrecognise the blood sweat and tears which 
have enabled her access to dominant taste, because dominant taste 'requires' it be 
conceived of as the result of innate sensitivity. The parvenu comes to believe that she could 
only have covered the distance from her natural culture to the culture of the dominant, if 
she had already been innately suited to the possession of an aesthetic sensibility. She 
always was a diamond in the rough. The parvenu's cultural journey then far from revealing 
the logic of 'inheritance' under the veneer of aesthetic equality, actually shores-up this 
21 Bourdieu's theory then does allow for the parvenu's atypical social journey. However to read some of his 
critics one would think that he disqualifies all such movement, that he posits the habitus as an absolute 'iron- 
cage' from which individuals can never escape: "The fact that such dispositions (of habitus] still leave room for 
agents to be better or worse at achieving their strategic goals does not alter the fact that they take their own 
identity and the definition of the situation as limits within which to act. Just as a player cannot stop playing one 
game and suddenly play another, agents can become good at their social role, but not adopt some other role or 
identity" (Bohman 1999, p. 134). It seems to me that the parvenu is indeed an agent who has started to 'play 
another game'. Therefore the determinism within Bourdieu's system cannot be traced back to his concept of 
habitus (narrowly defined) but, as I argue below, is a feature of his theorization of 'reproduction'. 
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facade through the self-repression of her own herculean effort to break with `social 
constraints'. 
The result of her effort is to change her personal relationship to the domination of 'the 
social system'. She can now enjoy the symbolic capital denied that class from which she 
escaped. However the system is reproduced, the status quo claims another adherent. The 
structure of hierarchy is not challenged, and she becomes a part of that aesthetic ideology 
which is responsible directly for obscuring the real reason for the cultural exclusion of other 
members of her class; i. e. that they were born to the wrong parents. 
The "parvenu" of education appears doubly as a traitor to his class: 
individually, in forcing himself to acquire the "dispositions" that allow 
the privileged classes to assimilate legitimate culture; and 
collectively, in masking with his own success the global effect of 
elimination. (Ranciere 2003b, p. 175-6). 
Therefore the victories and defeats within games of distinction are but epiphenomena, fully 
determined by the 'reproduction of the hierarchy of cultural inheritance'. This reproduction 
of power is presented by Bourdieu as beyond the 'discourse' of the aesthetic, and as such 
represents the site of 'transcendental contraband' (Derrida 1990,244a). 
Transcendental Contraband 
In Structure Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences (2001, p. 351-370) Derrida 
addresses structuralism, drawing attention to the problematic status of the concept of 
'centre' within this tradition. 
The concept of centred structure - although it represents coherence 
itself, the condition of the episteme as philosophy or science-is 
contradictorily coherent. And as always, coherence in contradiction 
expresses the force of a desire. The concept of centred structure is in 
fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play 
constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a 
reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the reach of play. (2001, 
p. 352). 
Bourdieu's conception of 'reproduction' would seem to represent a 'classical' or 
metaphysical understanding of 'centre', "which is by definition unique, constitut[ing] that 
very thing within a structure which while governing the structure, escapes structurality" 
(Derrida 2001, p. 352). As already discussed in Chapter One. (a), and reiterated in the 
quotation above this notion of a concept beyond 'play' is self contradictory, a metaphysical 
or transcendental 'illusion'. 
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Derrida has also drawn attention to another discourse within the philosophical tradition 
which attempts to critique the hubris of transcendental thinking, but which fails to 
adequately account for its own position. 
[Each] time a discourse contra the transcendental is held, a matrix - 
the (con)striction itself constrains the discourse to place the non- 
transcendental, the outside of the transcendental field, the excluded 
in the structuring position. The matrix in question constitutes the 
excluded as transcendental of the transcendental, as imitation 
transcendental: transcendental contraband. (1990,244a). 
In terms of my problematic, there is an attempt to explain the transcendental term, to 
reveal its pretensions with reference to a resolutely material force (the fundamental 
ground). However this 'material force' cannot be the antidote to the philosophical 
transcendental because it is transcendental itself. Bennington has clearly outlined this 
conceptual situation in relation to the 'human sciences': 
Let us imagine that one attempt to criticize, as is often the case, 
transcendental discourse in the name of the concrete realities of life, 
by saying for example that this discourse is an attempt at legitimation 
on the part of one class (or its representatives) trying to maintain its 
concrete domination over another class. And so one would say that 
the transcendental discourse is in reality the ideological product of an 
historical situation whose truth would be found, for example, in the 
economy. In doing so, one has quite simply put the economic in a 
transcendental position without being able to think that fact-This is 
what we earlier called transcendental contraband. (Bennington and 
Derrida 1999, p. 281). 
Bourdieu relies on the logic of transcendental contraband to denounce the false 
universality of Kantian aesthetic experience. His contraband is not represented by the 
economy (narrowly defined) but by the 'reproduction of the hierarchy of cultural 
inheritance'. In his denunciation of Kant he commits a form of symbolic violence, resolutely 
occluding 'that' which cannot be accommodated under his master discourse. In my reading 
this manifests as an unjustifiable circumscription of aesthetic dissensual agency; that ability 
of the agent to 'resist' power from within this discourse is occluded by Bourdieu's 
sociology. 
Before moving on I want to briefly invoke Judith Butler's reading of Bourdieu in Excitable 
Speech (1997). This is done because her interpretation supports my own, adding weight to 
the evaluation of Bourdieu as a metaphysical thinker. Also she offers another vocabulary, 
which complements Ranciere's, for theorizing aesthetic practices as performative ones. 
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Butler, Bourdieu and Performativity 
Butler finds that Bourdieu's system cannot adequately theorise those moments when 
individuals or groups without the prior 'backing' of power are able to challenge that very 
power which marginalises them via a speech, or another act. 
[Bourdieu's] conservative account of the speech act presumes that 
the conventions that will authorize the performative are already in 
place, thus failing to account for the Derridean "break" with context 
that utterances perform (Butler 1997, p. 142). 
My complaint about Bourdieu's contraband (reproduction) is of the same order as Butler's 
critique of his notion of "delegation" (Butler 1997, p. 156 citing Bourdieu 2002, p. 115), as 
that which implacably precedes and determines performative action. 
Butler describes how Bourdieu in Authorized language: The social conditions for the 
effectiveness of Ritual Discourse (Bourdieu 2002, p. 107-116) seeks to supplement J. L. 
Austin's seminal account of the performative force of speech acts (1976) with a theory of 
social power. Bourdieu believes that Austin fails to supply an adequate explanation of how 
certain utterances manage to command or successfully facilitate a set of results. 
For the sociologist Austin's account of performativity remains incipiently formalist, too 
focussed on convention as a linguistic formulation, a matter of the internal rules and 
functions of language. This focus is at the expense of developing a theory of how forms of 
power, external to language impinge on its functioning. The partial obfuscation of 'the 
social' in Austin's account is problematic because it is precisely this extra-linguistic site that 
provides a rationale for why some performances possess force and others do not. 
[Austin] thinks that he has found in discourse itself - in the 
specifically linguistic substance of speech, as it were - the key to the 
efficacy of speech. By trying to understand the power of linguistic 
manifestations linguistically, by looking at language for the principle 
underlying the logic and effectiveness of the language of institutions, 
one forgets that authority comes to language from 
outside... Language at most represents this authority, manifests and 
symbolizes it. (Bourdieu 2002, p. 109). 
For Bourdieu then the effectiveness of a speech act depends on the positioning of any 
speaker in an appropriate position of power which precedes his linguistic act; It is the pre- 
constituted 'social placement' which serves to force through the effect of any statement. 
As Butler rightly identifies Bourdieu's understanding of the "base structure" (Butler 1997, 
p. 157) of power which precedes and determines 'performances', seems to suggest that he 
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conceives of this power structure, or in my terms, the process of power reproduction, as 
fundamentally not symbolic consisting of a different more 'concrete' material. 
Butler claims that even if performative acts may (most) often attain their force, as Bourdieu 
describes, by way of their prior 'backing', his tendency to view that backing as untouchable 
by ideological 'discourse' means that his system is not sensitive to the way resistance or 
dissensus produces change. That words and actions can sometimes 'rock' power suggests 
that power cannot be metaphysically 'separate', but is premised upon symbolic and 
'sensible' relations, which can be contested by symbolic and sensible means. (As I outlined 
in Chapter One. (b) this does not mean that Ranciere, or Butler for that matter, are 
proposing a liberal model of freedom in which subjects act independently from power. 
Power provides the multiplicitous terrain of action; however this does not necessitate a 
theorisation of power as inaccessible to discourse). 
Several other commentators have criticised this 'blind spot' in Bourdieu. For a critique of 
the absence of an account of political agency in his work see J. McLeod, (2005). Also 
Bohman (1999) has argued that subjects cannot be so mired in misidentification that social 
constraints will never be recognised in (and challenged by) non-sociological forms of 
discourse. 
There is no reason to believe that practical and public reasoning 
cannot detect at least some of these cultural biases and constraints, 
and that at least some reflective agents may be able to convince 
others that suppressed forms of expression and alternatives absent 
from deliberation ought to be seriously considered on their merits. 
(1999, p. 147). 
These critiques along with Butler's rebuttal as well as my discovery of 'transcendental 
contraband' translates as a severe challenge to Bourdieu's postulate that 'aesthetic 
judgement', or as I would prefer 'aesthetic interpretation' always serves to reproduce 
power. Following Butler's comments, there seems to be no reason to suggest that the 
performance of aesthetic experience, or its failure, should always implacably be 
determined by - and reproduce - power. With a minor alteration we can cite Butler again in 
support of this point; "Such experiences [as the aesthetic] are not property; they assume a 
life and a purpose for which they were never intended. They are not to be seen as merely 
tainted goods" (1997, p. 161). This argument concerning the always possible 're- 
articulation' of words, and I would add interpretations and experiences as well, when 
combined with Ranciere's alternative reading of the emergence of the aesthetic regime 
73 
produces a convincing critique of, and alternative vision to Bourdieu's metaphysical, 
determinist understanding of the 'aesthetic experience'. 
Mastery 
However, there is another twist within Bourdieu's thinking with which we must contend. 
Bourdieu does formulate a way out of the reproduction of power. In fact his sociology is 
designed to cut through ideological miasma (2004, p. 1) to reveal the functioning of power 
so as to mitigate its effects. This revelation and mitigation would ultimately manifest as a 
cultural situation devoid of domination. 
At all events, there is nothing more universal than the project of 
objectifying the mental structures associated with the particularity of 
a social structure... the critique... of culture invites each reader... to 
reproduce on his or her own behalf the critical break... For this 
reason it is perhaps the only rational basis for a truly universal 
culture. (Bourdieu 2004, p. XIV, my italics). 
However this escape route, provided by the "critical break" does not invalidate my criticism 
of Bourdieu as a metaphysical thinker. His method for revealing and intervening into power 
retains a problematic premise, that of power's singularity. Again this metaphysical logic 
results in the theoretical and performative circumscription of agency-as-resistance. 
However in this case the 'violence' is best described using Ranciere's term mastery. 
"There is no science [... ] but of the hidden" is a phrase by Bachelard 
that had been taken up by the Althusserians. Thus, it was an ironic 
quotation [by Ranciere] against the vision that presupposes the 
necessity of finding or constructing the hidden. It was an ironic 
quotation directed at Althusser's philosophy as well as at Bourdieu's 
sociology or the history of the Annales School. I by no means think, 
for my part, that there is no science but of the hidden. I always try to 
think in terms of horizontal distributions, combinations between 
systems of possibilities, not in terms of surface and substratum. 
Where one searches for the hidden beneath the apparent, a position 
of mastery is established. (Ranciere 2004c, p. 49). 
'The science of the hidden' or the 'hermeneutics of suspicion', is premised on the 
assumption of the singular emanation of power and acts as a methodology to discover this 
'source'. As we have seen Bourdieu understands power in this way, as always enforcing 
hierarchy along the one axis of cultural inheritance. Within this tradition power is 
conceived as existing below, in fact hidden by, ordinary discourse and action. In terms of 
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my discussion of Bourdieu, the rhetoric of aesthetic experience obfuscates the way in 
which performances of distinction perpetuate hierarchy. The obscured and singular 
operation of power provides a rationale for an expert, or experts to uncover its secret and 
become specialists in its functioning, so as to educate a public in the character of their 
exploitation. This is the very process of becoming a master. 
The 'classic' example of mastery within the conventional arena of politics can be found in 
the relationship between a singular notion of the 'economy', the avant-garde party, and 
'the people'. 
If the fundamental site of oppression lies in the economy, it perhaps 
falls to those who are adept at economic analysis to take up the task 
of directing the revolution. It is they who understand how the 
economy works, therefore how history unfolds, therefore how 
struggle ought to occur. There is an alliance between a politics that 
privileges a certain type of oppression and the creation of an avant- 
garde party. (May 2008, pp. 80-81). 
The 'avant-garde party' is an axiomatic instance of 'mastery', in that the party is considered 
necessary to educate, mould and direct those that do not know how to liberate 
themselves. Party members are tacitly regarded as possessing the knowledge-of-liberation. 
And this knowledge is what separates them from those outside the party structure. 
One might ask why this is a problem? Why describe mastery as an unnecessary power 
relation? If a minority have discovered the source of power, do they not have a duty to 
lead? However, what is in dispute is precisely this 'unitary source'. Once this singularity is 
assumed then resistance to said power must also be unitary and the logic of mastery 
becomes unavoidable; there will always be those who have expertise in the 'topic' of 
unitary power, over and above those who do not. There is no justifiable way of rejecting 
the expertise of the master without challenging the idea that power is singular, otherwise 
the master's claims are entirely reasonable. Therefore to get to grips with the unnecessary, 
arbitrary nature of mastery and to think alternatives, we need to challenge this notion. 
First a deconstructive argument can be made. The positing of power as singular is simply a 
different perspective upon the problem of conceiving any concept as beyond 
infrastructure. Therefore the construal of power as impossibly singular is of a piece with 
what I have already described as the impossible positing of power's total separateness. 
However the fallacious positing of power as singular - rather than the fallacious positing of 
power as separate (which I have already addressed) - is the motor for the specific violence 
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of mastery. Here Bourdieu underestimates the multiplicitous nature of power. 
Secondly, the feminist reception of Bourdieuian thought exemplifies my point, as this 
theory has often focussed on the 'narrowness' of his conception of social constraint: 
"Bourdieu's work is most vulnerable to criticism here by feminist challenges to the 
centrality he accords class as the source of the unity of habitus" (Bennett 2007, p. 226). And 
although Bourdieu has been extensively utilised by feminist inspired sociology (see most 
obviously Feminism after Bourdieu (Adkins and Skeggs 2005)), they have often significantly 
recalibrated his 'class focus'. This is the particular concern of Elizabeth Silva's Cultural 
Capital and Visual Art in the Contemporary UK (2008). Considerable lengths are taken to 
make the Bourdieuian perspective sensitive to exclusions organised around gender and 
ethnicity. Her study suggest both that power creates hierarchies across many fronts and 
that Bourdieu's sociology, because it posits power as the hierarchy of cultural inheritance, 
is unable to recognise - without significant critique and reworking - this multiplicity. 
However before we can identify the specific violence of mastery we need to unsettle 
another related justification for its imposition; 'there are some people who are simply 
unable to emancipate themselves'. Firstly, Ranciere simply pre-supposes that this is 
incorrect, surmising that all people can (this doesn't mean that they necessarily will) both 
recognise when they are dominated and respond to this domination. This is a consequence 
of his thesis of equal intelligence, which does not distinguish between those supposedly 
'duped' by ideology, and those capable of objective scientific rationalizing: "From the 
ignorant person to the scientist who builds hypotheses, it is always the same intelligence 
that is at work: an intelligence that makes figures and comparisons to communicate its 
intellectual adventures and to understand what another intelligence is trying to 
communicate to it in turn" (2007b p. 275). 
And secondly, if power is multiplicitous it is therefore likely that those most affected by a 
particular binary hierarchy are best situated to respond to that inequality. If power 
operates multiplicitously around the issue of equality then it is less likely that there will be 
one person, or group who are, or can claim to be experts in all possible 'topics' of power, 
therefore able to lead others against power on multiple fronts. 
And as we have already discussed, in contradistinction to that impossible strength-in- 
separation that Bourdieu reserves for reproduction, Ranciere does not overestimate 
power. Not only are police distributions created of that 'symbolic stuff that we can all 
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manipulate, power's attempt to binarize is also imperfect, falling into contradiction as its 
attempted polarisations of equals and unequals falter. As we have seen hierarchy cannot 
be maintained because it is not the total autonomous opposite of equality, but depends on 
and is thus thwarted by equality as its condition of im-possibility. Social hierarchy therefore 
is never secure and always bears the marks of equality on its very surface. Every order 
given by a superior that is understood by a supposed inferior exhibits this contradiction 
which is not hidden, but available to anyone. As we have seen these contradictions become 
emphasized to the point of crisis under political action. 
These insights taken together reveal the non-necessary nature of the relation of mastery. 
And as such we are in a position to examine that violence that the master imposes, which Is 
based on the performative effect of his actions. Simply in presupposing the singularity and 
hidden nature of power he divides himself from those who do not possess his privileged 
knowledge, those who are not privy to the emanation of power. Every encounter with his 
'ignorant' constituency serves to reinforce the idea that this expert must be followed to 
achieve emancipation. This following is misconstrued, because power does not operate 
singularly. To follow a master is not necessarily to be lead on a wild goose chase, but the 
process of following - being positioned as follower - does tend to stultify an awareness that 
power might be recognized by anyone, not only a master. It is the obfuscation of 
everyone's capacity to identify and react to inequality that is the 'crime' of mastery. Below 
Ranciisre addresses this theme through the lens of conventional pedagogy. 
The primary knowledge that the master owns is the "knowledge of 
ignorance". It is the presupposition of a radical break between two 
forms of intelligence. This is also the primary knowledge that he 
transmits to the student: the knowledge that he must have things 
explained to him in order to understand, the knowledge that he 
cannot understand on his own. It is the knowledge of his incapacity. 
In this way... Instruction is the endless verification of its starting 
point: inequality. That endless verification of inequality is what 
Jacotot calls the process of stultification. (Ranciere 2007b, p. 275). 
Bourdieu adopts a position of mastery in relation to art and the aesthetic; in positing the 
one genuine escape-route from reproduction within art, that is, the sociological 
demystification of the 'ideology of the aesthetic' he limits the possibility of artwork, artists 
and art institutions operating as sites of resistance or dissent. 
The Artist as Master 
now want to discuss how Andrea Fraser's Official Welcome (2001) translates Bourdieu's 
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theoretical position into an artwork; Fraser's practice of the 'reflexive reveal' secures for 
herself the position of master which at the same time 'stultifies' her spectators. 
The performance begins with Fraser standing at a lectern and addressing an invited crowd. 
The format is that of an inaugural presentation for an exhibition or other event. In the 
version I have seen, her speech is ostensibly to welcome the first visitors to her solo 
exhibition Works 1983 to 2003 (2003) at Hamburg Kunstverein. However it soon becomes 
clear that her expressions of apparent heartfelt thanks to the museum director, support 
staff and well wishers should not be taken at face value. She abruptly adopts a different 
voice and mannerisms, and after a few minutes changes again. In all she passes through 
roughly ten different characterizations, which alternate between roles which represent 
'artists' and those that might be labelled their 'supporters', the latter heaping praise on the 
former. 
Fraser's scripted monologue consists entirely of direct quotations. These are primarily the 
words of art world figures (artists, critics, curators and collectors) and have been 
appropriated from journal articles, interviews, catalogue essays and other assorted 
sources. The characters crafted by Fraser, although anonymous represent certain 'types'; 
the sincere, sensitive practitioner, who offers up emotional truths; the bad boy rebel, 
revelling in breaking taboos ('How about, "kiss my fucking ass! " That's a great statement 
anywhere, right? '(Fraser 2005b, p. 220)); the inarticulate 'maker' of objects, more at home 
in his studio habitat than on the public stage and the authoritative theorist who rails 
against hegemonic spectacle culture. One can track down the sources and see which real 
world figures provide the templates for the characters. The bad-boy is a Hirst/Ofili 
composite, and Buchloh provides the basis for the Debordian theorist. However there is no 
sense that Fraser's characterisations are portraits of particular figures, being too general, 
without individual detail. They are more stereotypes than naturalistic representations. 
During her presentation Fraser performs a striptease, removing her dress, then brassier, 
then Gucci Thong and heels, straightforwardly and with minimal fuss. She then redresses 
before the end of her monologue. The performance of stripping operates at a curious 
meta-level within Official Welcome, acting as an analogy for her critical practice. Her 
method which conceives of itself as revealing the hidden reality behind the obfuscating 
surface of 'the art world' is redoubled in her public disrobing. 
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Fraser's acting technique is close to impersonation. For the majority of the performance 
she doesn't strive to suspend an audience's disbelief, so that we may become completely 
absorbed in theatrical fiction. Rather, we are aware of her techniques of characterisation, 
as when an impressionist morphs into a celebrity. Similarly with Official Welcome we 
recognise the 'types' portrayed without investing in the characters. As in standard 
'impressionism' an awareness of the 'means' by which a character has been created is 
pushed to the forefront. 
However there is one set of circumstances which unsettles the audience's ability to 
discriminate between actor and character. When Fraser appears to play herself, or at least 
someone with a practice very similar to her own a strange thing happens, the distinction 
between the performer and the character performed collapses. Here the voice and 
gestures witnessed on stage become the apparently authentic expressions of an 
individual's personality. Official Welcome begins with one such situation in which Fraser 
presents herself, straightforwardly as herself. These moments of collapse are absolutely 
key, the performance becomes dangerously flooded with fiction and the distinction 
between actor and acting bleeds away; ultimately the actor becomes fictionalised. 
Her technique of impersonation attunes us to the artificiality and constructed quality of the 
voices and gestures we see behind the lectern. Thereby when she apparently drops the 
charade and plays herself we are left with a niggling doubt, we are attuned to view her 
'genuine actions' as equally artificial. 
What this means is that the difference between 'real art world' figures and the parodic 
impersonations become blurred. This happens locally, in terms of the real Fraser as 
indistinct from the fictional Fraser, but ultimately we are encouraged to see the entire 
intersubjective fabric of the art world, its cast, script, and directions, as equally staged. 
And this is precisely Fraser's desired effect, she wants to show the beliefs, opinions, and 
posturing of artists and art professionals to be aspects of highly managed personas. 
She also wants to reveal how the performance of these 'dispositions' serves a secret and 
insidious purpose which she cleverly foregrounds by using the 'inaugural speech' format, 
which is most often characterised by a form of congratulatory rhetoric. In Official Welcome 
each artist character is lauded, flattered and praised by a 'well wisher', 'friend', 'fellow 
traveller', or 'fan'. These explicit legitimations or conferrals of value highlight the way that 
every performance behind the lectern is a parody of an attempt to secure this type of 
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validation, that which Bourdieu calls distinction. Therefore every performance of 'that 
specialised canonical knowledge' both excludes a certain constituency, and justifies their 
exclusion. 
Fraser's characters must be understood as parodies of myriad forms of performance 
designed to secure legitimacy. For Fraser the attitudes expressed by these art world types: 
the sincere sensitive artist, the bad boy, the authoritative critic are of a piece with 
Bourdieu's definition of 'the aesthetic'. Despite superficial differences the postures she 
performs are similar to the aesthetic in that they are both erroneously valuable and 
exclude, whilst pretending that they do-not. They represent specialised forms of 'cultural 
competence', often naturalised in shows of 'innate ability (the natural genius or wild and 
intuitive rebel) but are in fact the product of socialisation. Perhaps these attitudes 
mobilised by Fraser should be described as variations on the aesthetic theme. 
Through a combination of parody and a clever choice of format Fraser reveals the 'natural 
order' of art-world-speak, those apparent spontaneous expressions by talented individuals, 
to be performances of distinction. And more than this 'distinction = reproduction'. This is 
the ultimate truth revealed by Official Welcome (2001), and in revealing this truth she 
interrupts the efficacy of the performances. For instance the exaggerated claims made on 
behalf of art and artists are made to seem pompous, faintly ridiculous and laughable. This 
ritual of legitimation is undermined, revealed to be empty, an arbitrary socio-symbolic 
process. 
Being convinced that, "like symptoms", museums "cover over 
conflicts with displaced representations" she is able, like a sorcerer's 
apprentice, to trigger a social mechanism, a sort of machine infernale 
whose operation causes the hidden truth of social reality to reveal 
itself, exposing or calling up underlying power relationships and 
confronting human agents with an unblinking view of what they are 
doing. (Bourdieu 2005c p. XIV). 
However from our deconstructive perspective the assertion that art and the aesthetic will 
always reproduce (or be prevented from reproducing by the activity of the master) along 
the front of 'distinction' is an overly determined, and therefore unrealistic model. Ranciere 
describes the 'rigidity' of reproduction thus: "It is impossible that an order, as long as it still 
exists, will ever cease to work "through its very existence" towards its own perpetuation" 
(2003b, p. 179). When one takes into account the fluidity of signification, including the 
fluidity of power, how can one confidently predict that a particular performance will always 
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result in the same problematic? As we have seen, in fact, Ranciere offers a very convincing 
analysis of how demonstrations of distinction, when performed by those considered 
'unequal', do not reproduce power but question the very basis for its functioning. And 
because this form of resistance is premised on the 'empty' principle of equality, a positive 
term (like class reproduction) is not reintroduced, as it is with Bourdieu and Fraser's 
'master discourse'. 
Fraser's 'reveal' seeks to move an audience from a position of ignorance into a place of 
"unblinking" enlightenment, that is, into possession of the objective knowledge of the true 
front of power. And in so doing she also provides the necessary solution to fight that 
power, to push the front back, mitigating its insidious effects. This 'total knowledge' is a 
fantasy" and introduces a problematic mono-focus which, in the now familiar logic, 
'stultifies'; the obsession with 'one source of power' and 'one course of action against that 
power' constricts awareness of other power fronts, or the mutation of existing ones. And 
again, simply encountering the master who wields the authority-of-certainty therefore 
positions the spectator as follower, performatively deterring her from personally 
identifying and reacting to inequality. 
The biggest laugh of Official Welcome is provided by Fraser's mimicry of a critic who 
effusively describes an artist's work as open-ended, rich in meanings, to the extent that we 
don't need to know "exactly what they mean" (Fraser 2005b, p. 216). This advocacy for a 
'grey area' within interpretation can only seem ridiculous as well as suspicious to Fraser, 
who following Bourdieu sees artworks as precisely 'coded'. As we have seen, either a 
spectator understands the code and achieves distinction, or is blocked by the code. In both 
cases reproduction follows. That the 'confusion' provided by 'difficult' or 'aesthetic' 
22 Although the exploitation identified by Fraser and Bourdieu is not the fantasmatic centre of power, this does 
not mean that Bourdieu's theory is necessarily entirely invalid. Using the terms laid out by Todd May in the 
quotation below, it should be possible to recast Bourdieu's theory of 'exploitation' in a broader context of 
'domination'. 
We might say that the central concept for Ranciere is not that of exploitation but of 
domination, and, in keeping with this, define domination as the instantiation of the 
presupposition of inequality in a police order. This does not require him, of course, 
to abandon the claim that exploitation exists. Exploitation is a type of domination, 
but seen thus, it is a political rather than an economic concept. The wrong of 
exploitation is not that it extracts surplus value from the worker, but that it refuses 
to recognize the equality of the worker. The extraction of surplus value is a symptom 
of this refusal. (May 2008, p. 81) 
This means that it might be theoretically possible to combine a Bourdieuian perspective with a Rancierian one. 
However this task is not within the scope of my current project. 
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artwork might spur resistance - to an instance of power - via 'fluid interpretation' is not 
countenanced. 
Finally, the clearest statement of Fraser's exclusion of non sanctioned forms of resistance 
within art has been made in relation to activist practice. Her denigration of this work is 
again the logical outcome of her position of Bourdieuian mastery. 
Contemporary politicized forms of such cultural production [activist 
art]... do not, I would say, depart much from the history of artistic 
activity as the site of struggles by artists to reproduce their 
legitimacy. While these struggles formerly revolved around status as 
determined by economic conditions and distance from social norms 
of behaviour, they now encompass other forms of domination- 
according to gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation. But to the 
extent that they are located primarily in the field of art (as opposed 
to collectively based cultural activism working on representations 
and media in non-artistic sites), such symbolic struggles largely 
reproduce the hierarchical structuring they ostensibly oppose. This is 
because they often conceal or misrecognize the domination imposed 
by the specialization of cultural production and monopolization of 
cultural competence the artistic field itself represents. And while one 
may be happier about some groups representing and reproducing 
themselves than others, the logic of such preferences-and the 
politics that orient them-has very little bearing on the structure, 
function, and effects of legitimate cultural production itself. (2005b, 
p. 40). 
Firstly, simply by conducting their "struggles" within the field of art, as opposed to across 
"media, or non-art sites" these activist are guilty of engaging in a type of specialist "cultural 
competence". To perform in this way is to necessarily "reproduce the hierarchical 
structuring they ostensibly oppose". A practitioner might think that they are fighting for 
equality or in solidarity with some marginalised group, but actually they are always already 
winning points within a cruel game loaded to maintain class hierarchy. Therefore it is her 
positing of power as only functioning on the front of class hierarchy which causes Fraser to 
denigrate art activism. Her attitude of mastery bleeds the category of art and the aesthetic 
of the possibility of causing any (non-sanctioned) political dissensus with power. 
Modes of Mastery 
I now want to broaden my discussion to briefly examine the ways in which much 
contemporary art seems embroiled with relations of mastery. In this I follow Ranciere when 
he says: 
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There is a whole school of so-called critical thought and art that, 
despite its oppositional rhetoric, is entirely integrated within the 
space of consensus. I'm thinking of all those works that pretend to 
reveal to us the omnipotence of market flows, the reign of the 
spectacle, the pornography of power. I think of the statufication of 
media icons a la Jeff Koons's Michael Jackson and Bubbles (1988). 
think of Paul McCarthy and Jason Rhoades's spectacular 2002 
installation Shit Plug, which placed the excrement of visitors to 
Documents 11 in containers to show us the gigantic waste of the 
society of the spectacle and to reveal the participation of art In the 
empire of merchandise and spectacle... If there is a circulation that 
should be stopped at this point, it's this circulation of stereotypes 
that critique stereotypes. (2007a, p. 264-265). 
Again the crux of Ranciere's criticism would seem to be that these artists 'stereotype' 
power. In the vocabulary I have been using this represents a reduction of the multiplicitous 
functioning of the police, to a few tired old terms beloved by the critiquer, for instance, the 
"omnipotence of market flows" and the "society of the spectacle", etc. These names 
represent fully determined conceptualizations which serve to obscure the true frailty of the 
police, that is, its non-totality. The critiquer imagines he uncovers 'objective conditions' 
which precede and account for our 'alienated', 'ideological' status quo. For instance 
McCarthy shows the reality of economic and political exploitation as underpinning the 
hegemony of American popular culture. He collapses these two levels together showing the 
'perversity' of naked power Intertwined with the family values of Disney et al. Mickey 
mouse now visibly propped by the "pornography of power". 
Again, Ranciere is not saying that these forms of exploitation do not exist, simply that they 
do not represent the final site of power. And also there very ubiquity as well as their mono- 
focus serves to 'dazzle' spectators, preventing them from apprehending and dissenting 
from those constraints which might weigh more immediately on their own life-worlds. 
Let us add two more examples. The first performs what I shall describe as the classic reveal. 
I'm Short Your House is a video by Stephan Dillemuth and Nils Norman which was shown at 
Vilma Gold in 2007 and accompanied by an installation. This mise-en-scene consisted of a 
sound piece broadcast from the gallery's intercom, a sculptural figure and an LED display 
situated above a papier-mache entrance archway, through which one had to pass to view 
the film. The video in many ways is a fascinating piece of work, constructed from rough 
documentary footage of the urban area surrounding the gallery, off-the-cuff character 
acting, allusions to other films and a scripted voice-over dense with complex terminology 
and analysis. Shot in 2007 the film takes the contemporaneous financial bubble as its 
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subject. The script is partially composed of quotations from financial newspapers and 
begins in an upbeat fashion. The whispering narrator, who we suppose to be a beneficiary 
of 'the bubble', lays down criteria to help those wishing to invest in art; "look for an 
established art-star with a five year track record"(Dillemuth and Norman 2007). All the 
while the camera pans and pauses over stretches of East End London capturing those sites 
undergoing rapid development, including the fungal growth of galleries. The video exhibits 
the links between art, the economic boom and gentrification. Retrospectively the 
prescience of the artists' analysis is impressive. Before 'the crunch' truly took hold in 
popular consciousness with the run on Northern Rock, Norman and Dillemuth were 
ruminating on the possible effects of subprime mortgages, predicting a large-scale 
"financial event" (Dillemuth and Norman 2007). Also the video is pretty funny and vaguely 
menacing all at once. A humpback figure, wearing an elongated nose, repeatedly circles 
shadowy hackney back streets accompanied by a tense and dramatic score that Melanie 
Gilligan identifies as "the music from Luchino Visconti's film The Damned" (2007b). The 
same music confers a humorous effect on several vapid mobile conversations between an 
artist figure and his dealer: "Blah blah... fantastic... blah, blah, blah... see you in Basel" 
(Dillemuth and Norman 2007). These scenes parody the blatant, empty consumerism at the 
heart of certain art-world relationships. But the obviousness, even laziness of the critical 
gesture neatly contrasts with the melodramatic music. I laughed. Also clever is the dog-like 
shadow puppet cast from a hand which appears on location in several shots. This character 
also supplies a narration of sorts, at one point citing John Maynard Keynes' term for naive 
market optimism, that is, 'animal spirits'. Thereby the shadow puppet reveals itself to be a 
low-rent metaphor for the type of unsustainable logic that underpinned the boom. 
However, entertaining as I found the video its critical procedure is problematic, producing 
relations of mastery. First there is the fetishization of 'the economy' as the secret hand 
behind all social affairs. We might endorse the analysis of markets as per their relationship 
to property and art prices, which - behind the sometimes complex terminology - is, in the 
end, quite straight forward. However the final pronouncement of the 'animal spirit' reveals 
the ultimate message of the work to be 'fully determined'. 
The shadow puppet quoting from the Australian conceptual artist Ian Burn (Gilligan 2007b) 
states: 
While it may once have seemed an exaggeration of economic 
determinism to regard works of art as merely commodities in an 
economic exchange it is now pretty plain that our entire lives have 
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become extensively constituted in these terms that we cannot any 
longer pretend otherwise. Not only do works of art end up as 
commodities but there is also an overwhelming sense in which works 
of art start off as commodities. (Dillemuth and Norman 2007) 
Again a metaphoric spotlight is shone in the eyes of any spectator; the analysis is clear, a 
rather generalised macro-conception of capitalism "extensively constitutes" our "entire 
lives". There is little room here for discussion of those possibilities or framings not 
exhausted by economic relations. And their strategy of 'reveal' is also 'reflexive'. 'Art' is 
shown to be entirely incorporated both at the point of production and reception. Their 
audience is indoctrinated into this knowledge of the 'one-front-of-power' not only by the 
video, but also via the sound piece and LED display. These helpfully define the financial 
terminology used in the video, and in so doing draw each viewer, step-by-step, along the 
path toward enlightenment. However, as we have seen, for Ranciere this enlightenment is 
rather a form of stultification: "emancipation can't be expected from forms of art that 
presuppose the imbecility of the viewer while anticipating their precise effect on that 
viewer: for example, exhibitions that capitalize on the denunciation of the "society of the 
spectacle" or of "consumer society"--bugbears that have already been denounced a 
hundred times"(2007a, p. 258) Dillemuth and Norman's efforts in I'm Short Your House 
should be seen as adding their voices to this chorus. 
I now want to address what I have called the 'overidentifying reveal', specifically Renzo 
Martins' recent film Episode III: Enjoy Poverty (2008). 1 borrow the term overidentification 
from Slavoj 211ek 23 (1997) but am primarily interested in the way it can be used to describe 
23 For 2ifek this procedure reverses what is normally understood by 'the critical procedure'. Judith Butler's 
theory of performative parody provides him with an example of the conventional model. His reading suggests 
that Butler advocates a form of distanclation, whereby the critical subject 'divorces' itself from, for instance, 
heteronormative identities so as to inhabit a borderline position where critical parody of these symbolic norms 
can begin. 211ek turns this notion on its head and asserts that it is precisely this distance from 'norms' - set in 
place by a power structure - which enables said structure to effectively function. For ideology to interpolate 
'subjects' there must first be 'beings' who believe they are in the natural possession of certain 'qualities'. biek's 
examples of these 'qualities' are: "the belief that behind the ideological mask there is a 'rich human person'" 
who holds dear "notions and sentiments of solidarity, justice, belonging to a community, etc" (1997, p. 21). For 
2ifek, without prior subjects-with-qualities there can be no ideology. For ideology to work there must be a 'bit' 
of one's personality that cannot be reduced to the ideology. That 'bit' was there before inculcation and will 
remain in place after, there is a distance between 'it' (naturally pre-given qualities) and the discourse of power. 
They are not conjoined. This 'gap' not only provides the basis for ideology but at one and the same time makes 
its imposition bearable for the subject. Giving oneself to a particular power discourse, being placed in a position 
within a symbolic order becomes acceptable because one holds something in reserve. The true 'you' is kept 
private, not reducible to the values, opinions and expectations of the 'official you'. For the subject this distance 
appears as freedom. However this freedom is false, because it enables the (constraining) system to function. So 
on this basis overidentifying with any social order, by jettisoning that part on which it 'binds', causes problems 
for said order, which becomes like a building without foundations. Secondly to rid oneself of that freedom 
offered by the system is to be positioned in an unbearable place. Here 2iiek's wager is that something 
cataclysmic will occur, the social order will be severely challenged by this 'pressurized' subject. He gives the 
example of the trainee soldier in the film Full Metal Jacket who so identifies with his role as merciless killing 
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a popular critical-art strategy. (Santiago Sierra is perhaps the most famous example). It is 
this version that I want to examine through a Rancierian lens. The 'overidentifying reveal' is 
like the standard version in that it does 'divine' and attempt to expose the singular source 
of power, but it differs in its methods of revelation. As we have seen Bourdieu achieves a 
critical break with the miss-identification endemic to conventional social relations, enabling 
access to 'scientific knowledge'. This knowledge allows the newly liberated subject to step 
outside the endless circle of reproduction and to begin to reveal this truth to others. On the 
other hand, in the case of overidentification the critical break is followed by an accurate 
imitation of power. The critiquer does not step outside the circuits of exploitation but 
adopts the clothes, attitudes and practices of the most callous beneficiaries of that social 
order. This is not a conservative ploy, an attempt to suture the incision opened by the 
critical break. No, this move is performed with such exuberance and enthusiasm that the 
exploitation or repression which is taken for granted under the usual functioning of 'the 
social' is exacerbated, doubled, revealed and therefore shown to be intolerable. 
We can see that Dillemuth and Norman's film fits squarely into the category of the 
'standard reveal'. Their detailed analysis of capitalism identifies the adversary as external. 
The intent of those scenes that parody vacuous art-world figures is absolutely clear, 
Dillemuth and Norman do not identify with these characters. A spectator is left in no doubt 
which side the artists are on, their commitments and affiliations are as clear as the target of 
their critique. Fraser's work on the other hand would seem to exhibit elements of 
overidentification. For instance those moments when one is unable to tell if she performs as 
herself or parodies another exhibit the sort of queasy dissolution of interpretive stability 
characteristic of this strategy. It is destabilizing because spectators are left unsure where 
the performer's affiliations lie. The viewer, as when watching a morally ambiguous film, is 
unsure who to 'root for. 
This brings us to Martin's film Enjoy Poverty, which records his expedition to The 
Democratic Republic of Congo. His footage functions as a video diary of the places he visits 
and the people he meets. He interviews desperately poor plantation workers, their bosses - 
getting into a discussion about the acceptable level of child mortality among the children of 
machine that he suffers a psychotic breakdown embarking on a killing spree in which he murders members of 
his unit. This is a passage ä 1'acte (211ek 1997, p. 21) which effectively damages the immediate 'social order', 
that of the U. S army. 2ifek's formulation would seem to be incompatible not only with Butler's theory of 
performativity but also Ranciere's understanding of subjectivization. Unfortunately it is not within the scope of 
my current project to cross compare these different models. (However, if I were to analyse Mek formulation I 
would begin by examining the exact nature of that extra-ideological kernel upon which a 'power-discourse' 
rests; how can this'bit' not in itself be constructed through Ideology..? ) 
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those who work the fields - as well as speaking to members of NGOs. He notices how these 
organizations are obsessed with branding. They hand out blankets and supplies all neatly 
imprinted with their logo. The early part of the film resembles a fairly conventional 'socially 
responsible' documentary. But as Martins begins to 'overidentify' things start to take a 
more unsettling path. He deliberately plays the role of the 'haughty colonial'. In most of his 
dealings with Congolese people he exhibits a superior attitude. For instance, he offers 
unasked for advice in an authoritative tone, chastising fisherman for continuing in their 
profession when their catches are so meagre. Similarly he insists on stitching logos onto the 
ragged cloths of a small child before taking her photograph, thus mirroring the NGO's 
practice. This is the intersubjective version of Santiago Sierra tattooing exploited sections of 
society, a doubling of indignity to expose indignity. 
But most significantly he generates a situation whereby he can act as a 'personification' of 
the rigidity of those relations of power which hold the Congolese poor in their place. Let me 
explain; in the crucial central section of the film he attempts to rescue a local photography 
business that belongs to several young men. Martins conceives a new business strategy for 
his protegees. They are to take photographs of their own 'desperate situation', pictures of 
undernourished children, the corpses of those killed in guerrilla fighting, etc. Martins' 
reasons that if western photographers get well paid for their newsworthy images of these 
scenes, why shouldn't the same apply to those native to the land? Why should these young 
men not 'enjoy' the benefits of their own poverty and exploit it like a natural resource? But, 
obviously, the project fails; the Congolese photographers lack the specific skill and 
equipment necessary. Ultimately no one will buy their work. The hope which Martins' 
project engenders is almost immediately dashed. The artist wanders away from the 
photographers declaring that the project - after all - is hopeless. This incident thus 
dramatizes the implacable nature of exploitation, the vicious circumscription of Congolese 
desires. Martins is the very agent of these men's dashed hope, the project is an instance of 
failed aspiration and acts metaphorically signifying the general condition of these men's 
lives as without any prospect of change or improvement. 
The film concludes with the artist erecting a neon sign emblazoned with the words 'enjoy 
poverty'. The occasion results in a party, villagers crowd around. Martins explains to anyone 
who asks that this sign means that they, the Congolese poor, must learn to resign 
themselves to their fate. There is no escape from their entrapment in absolute poverty. 
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The problem with Martin's strategy is that it still rests upon a metaphysical assumption. 
Overidentification, at least in this version, divines the source of power, 'western economic 
exploitation', which is then revealed through a performance which demonstrates an 
excessive enthusiasm for the 'figures' and subjective relations which manifest this power; 
playing the 'haughty colonial', etc. Unlike the Bourdieuian model this 'critical break', which 
uncovers the 'secret centre of power' is not presented as providing a potential escape 
route from the cycle of domination. In fact Martin's universe is one in which alternatives to 
the current order are presented as strictly impossible. 
By 'playing at exploitation', by folding his critical position back into that which is being 
criticized he contributes to the 'apprehension' that this power is absolutely impervious-to- 
change; in this way his work exhibits the logic, already discussed in relation to Bourdieu, 
whereby the strength of power is overestimated. This is a consequence of its metaphysical 
formulation as a concrete reality beyond performative intervention. I'm obviously not 
saying that relations of capitalist exploitation are 'easy to overthrow' - damn near 
impossible I'm sure - but any attempt to challenge particular instances of inequality must 
begin within an understanding that the social order can change. It is this minimal 'hope' 
which I'm accusing Enjoy Poverty... of quashing. 
It is a point of pride for the artist that he has managed to capture 'unvarnished reality'. In a 
conversation with J. J. Charlesworth at Wilkinson gallery he constantly emphasizes the 
objectivity of his film, the way it dispenses with Aristotelian catharsis to present us with the 
truth of exploitation. Unlike standard documentaries which most often conclude on a note 
of optimism Martins is clear that things 'will not get any better' and his film reflects this 
unflinching 'realism' (Martins 2009). In these instances his opinion differs little from that 
expressed by the 'Renzo Martin's persona' within the film. I'm thinking of those moments 
when he lectures the Congolese poor, arguing that they must accept and come to terms 
with their 'objective condition' as eternal victims. 
The crux of the problem is that Martins' efforts to reveal this situation to be 'unbearable', 
'untenable' and as such necessitating change precisely coincides with his presentation of 
the situation as entirely concrete, and impossibly strong. The critical intent of the piece 
breaks down because it at one and the same time represents a police logic, the 
presentation of the current order as the only possible one. The film succeeds in highlighting 
a sickening level of exploitation, whilst at the same time disabling any "confidence" that 
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this situation might be other. In this way it exhibits, in an excessively exaggerated way, that 
'contradiction' which plagues much 'critical art'. 
In its most general expression, critical art is a type of art that sets out 
to build an awareness of the mechanisms of domination to turn the 
spectator into a conscious agent of world transformation. The 
quandary that plagues the project is well known. On the one hand, 
understanding does not, in and of itself, help to transform intellectual 
attitudes and situations. The exploited rarely require an explanation 
of the laws of subordination because they misunderstand the existing 
state of affairs but because they lack the confidence in their capacity 
to transform it. (Ranciere 2009, p. 45) 
Now, the 'Martins persona' is clear that this film is not to be shown to a Congolese 
audience. He tells a bemused villager that the video has been made only for a European art 
crowd. Therefore we can assume that there will not be a meeting between this piece of 
critical art and those whose domination it describes, and, I would add, to which it 
performatively contributes. However the western audience is potentially one of solidarity, 
one that could respond to the intolerability of the scenes presented. However the same 
problematic emerges. Judging by the responses of people who attended the artist Q&A 
session the overwhelming sensation provoked by the film was one of guilty powerlessness, 
an anxious handwringing in the face of an impossible situation and as such Martins film is 
an example of a very effective stultifying practice. 
I now return to the central focus of this discussion, that is, the critique of Bourdieu's 
stultifying account of 'the aesthetic'. 
Kant in Context 
In this chapter, until now, I have argued in favour of Ranciere's'take' on the aesthetic from 
an a-historical perspective, claiming that his 'deconstructive' theory represents a 
philosophically and politically productive 'solution' to the issue of dissensus within the 
aesthetic. However Ranciere's claim is not simply that art can be interpreted 'politically' (in 
Ranciere's specific sense of politics as dissensus) but that the historical impact of Kantian 
aesthetic theory on our western social objectivity is inherently political. Therefore 
Bourdieu's metaphysical 'mistake' of reading art as entirely co-opted by power must be a 
problem of historical interpretation. In fact this error would seem to be one that Ranciere 
predicts. Bourdieu's sociological critique of Kant is, in fact, one possible 'emplotment' 
provided by the conceptual matrix of the aesthetic regime. And the sociologist's 
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conclusions are the result of the 'stultifying' course he plots, one which fails to remain 
faithful to the dynamism and unpredictability of 'the aesthetic'. 
I now want to trace the reasons for that error to the way Bourdieu's neglects key features 
of the socio-cultural and political context in which the Critique of Judgement (1790) was 
produced, and thereby generates a lopsided reading. 
As both Ranciere and Jean-Phillippe Uzel have noted, this occlusion 
[of important features of Kantian aesthetic theory] is fostered by 
Bourdieu's failure to take account of the date of publication of Kant's 
Critique of Judgement (1790) and the contemporary political and 
cultural controversies with which it engaged. (Bennett 2007, p. 216). 
In Chapter One. (b) I addressed Ranciere's commentary of the Critique of Judgement as an 
attempt to think through the egalitarian impulses released by the French Revolution and its 
immediate aftermath. Now I want to focus more closely on the philosophical context which 
provided a backdrop for Kant's aesthetic theory so as to isolate the exact nature of the 
'occlusion' fostered by Bourdieu24. In this I follow Tony Bennett's account of Kant's relation 
to two contemporaneous 'bodies' of thought: "first, the role played by the eighteenth- 
century British civic humanist literature on taste, particularly represented by 
Shaftsbury... and second, the connections that had been forged between aesthetics and 
poliziewissenschaften in the context of the Prussian state" (Bennett 2007 p. 217). 
The crux of Bourdieu's error relates to his reading of disinterestedness, he underestimates 
the complexity of the linkages between what Ranciere terms 'autonomy and heteronomy' 
within the Kantian concept of disinterestedness: "Bourdieu's account of the relations 
between autonomy and heteronomy [views them] as opposing principles defined in a 
relationship of simple antagonism to one another" (Bennett 2007, p. 218). 
Let us begin by recapping Bourdieu's argument against disinterestedness, as it pertains to 
Ranciere's terminology of autonomy and heteronomy. 
[Bourdieu reads Kantian] disinterestedness... as the emblem of [his] 
critique of the respects in which claims to disinterestedness in 
aesthetic judgement serve as a cover for a class interest in distancing 
bourgeois taste from the interestedness manifest in working-class 
taste for the necessary. (Bennett 2007, p. 216). 
For Bourdieu a disinterested attitude is a rejection of the culture of the dominated, which 
secures distinction for the dominant and a continuing lowly positing for the working class. 
24 In so doing I will necessarily have to retread some of the territory covered in Chapter One. (b). 
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Disinterestedness secures reproduction. This rejection translates as an eschewal of that 
which exists outside the self-referential discourse that is the positive content of 
disinterestedness. In other terminology the autonomy of disinterestedness is secured by 
the rejection of heteronomy. For example, judgements which relate to the `agreeability' of 
sensual pleasure, judgements which relate to the ethical, or useful and relatedly (and most 
importantly for our discussion), judgements pertaining to political good, or social order, are 
all ostracized from disinterestedness under Bourdieu's interpretation. 
Therefore it is his characterisation of disinterestedness as the rejection of all this 
'heteronomy' which is the basis for his understanding of the aesthetic as the simple 
securing of distinction. His polarisation of disinterestedness (autonomy) and heteronomy is 
therefore at the heart of, if not solely responsible for, his metaphysical reduction of the 
aesthetic as always responsible for reproduction. Contesting the accuracy of Bourdieu's 
interpretation of Kant as performing this polarization therefore disables the logic of his 
reductive reading. Similarly, his attitude of mastery in relation to the aesthetic as founded 
upon art-as-reproduction must also be undermined in this move. 
This is precisely what Ranciere's reading accomplishes since he does not interpret Kantian 
aesthetic disinterestedness as simply the expulsion of heteronomy, but as a form of 
autonomy which is bound-up with those 'ways of doing and making' which might be 
considered 'beyond' its proper 'sphere'; the crux of the issue is that under the Kantian 
formulation art and the aesthetic no longer have a proper sphere, that is, a stable, 
determined category that might be called 'its own'. It is the instability of the parameters of 
art and the aesthetic which account for its paradoxical sounding relation to an outside; the 
autonomy of art is its heteronomy as well (Ranciere 2002, p. 134-5). 
As we have seen Ranciere explains the character of the Kantian aesthetic through a 
narrative of its emergence from a previous hegemonic understanding, the representational 
regime. In this regime art was categorically separate from other forms of doing and making; 
the products and practices of art, paintings of war horses, and sculpting in marble were 
categorized as distinct from, for instance, the mechanical arts. There were strict rules which 
distinguished the practices of the arts from other practices. 
This separation belied a more significant unity between 'the arts' and that which was 
beyond its borders. In fact the separation of the arts from other 'ways of doing' was 
responsible for that underlying unity. Because art was securely categorized, posited as 
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'separate practice' it served the distribution of the sensible responsible for inequality and 
hierarchy. Art and the aesthetic as separate functioned as part of the general operation of 
the police order. 
This can be explained with reference to British civic humanist literature on taste, 
from now 
on termed 'the Shaftesbury model'. In this theorisation the separation of art as a particular 
category of objects and practices translated as the separation of those who could 
appreciate these cultural pursuits from those who could not. This partition within the 
'cultural constituency' mimicked and reinforced that political division within society more 
generally whereby some, by dint of their occupations (which afforded them time, as well as 
the capacity to care, and take responsibility for the common good), were seen as 
fit to 
govern. Those on the other side of the partition were seen as suitable only to 
be ruled. In 
Ranciere's parlance both partitions are manifestations of the same distribution of the 
sensible. 
[The) "distribution of the sensible" operates similarly in the relations 
between liberal and mechanical occupations within the discourse of 
eighteenth-century civic humanism - in Joshua Reynolds's theory of 
painting for example. In this discourse civic entitlements, just as 
much as the capacity to appreciate beauty disinterestedly, were 
restricted to those whose ownership of the land and/or pursuit of 
liberal occupations both freed their minds from the routine drudgery 
of mechanical occupations so as to be able to take a "disinterested" 
interest in the common good. (Bennett 2007 p. 217). 
It is Shaftesbury's model - before the Kantian intervention - that closely resembles 
Bourdieu's characterisation of disinterestedness within aesthetic judgement: 
disinterestedness as that 'mode of attention' specific to that recognisable category of 
objects (art) operates as a legitimation of the ruling class. (Bourdieu and Shaftesbury 
resemble one another as a negative to positive image, for, of course, Bourdieu wants to 
denounce the type of division that Shaftesbury recommends25). 
However, the important point is that contra Bourdieu's interpretation Kant's aesthetic 
theory actually unsettled this partition of the sensible. Under Kant's modification 
25 However they do not precisely coincide - even in this inverted form - because Bourdieu does not view 
distinction, in the way that it is framed by Shaftesbury as an immediately political concern, having a direct 
import on the entitlement to govern. As we have seen Bourdieu views distinction rather in terms of the 
reproduction of unequal economies of value; "What matters from this perspective is less, as in Bourdieu's 
account, disinterestedness as a means of establishing a distance in social space from those whose horizons are 
limited to necessity by dint of their occupations than the role of disinterestedness in producing a position in 
political space that confers on those who can exercise command over and control of the self the capacity to 
direct the conduct of others" (Bennett 2007, pp. 217-218). 
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disinterestedness as a measure of the capacity-for-rule of the dominant could no-longer 
function. Before I address this modification I want to draw a link between Shaftesbury's 
version of disinterestedness and the philosophy of Christian Wolff, identified by Bennett as 
another important reference point for Kant. 
[By] legitimating the subordination of the lower facility of judgement 
to the higher one of reason (and, thereby, of the people to 
philosopher bureaucrats) ... [Wolff] served as the philosophical high 
priest of the Prussian state. (Bennett 2007, p. 217). 
Wolffs attitude can be clearly seen in his work Real Happiness of a People Under a 
Philosophical King (1750: 2003). Of particular relevance is his commentary on "when and 
why a ruler may be in fault" (2003, p. 9). Here he clearly divides the facility which enables 
good governance from that which threatens the social equilibrium. Wolff's and 
Shaftesbury's theories are important 'texts' of the representational regime. Shaftesbury's 
disinterestedness as the proper response to the determined category of artworks, is of the 
same order as Wolffs 'reason'; in the example taken from Reynolds' treatise, the 
ownership of land or 'pursuit of liberal occupations' enables one to be 'reasoned' in art 
appreciation and governance. 
Kant's theorisation of aesthetic disinterest should be seen as destabilising this secure, 
binary situation. According to Ranciere Kantian disinterestedness or autonomy is the 
rejection of art as a stable, distinct category: paintings of war horses or the sculpting of 
marble. The aesthetic becomes a sensorium detached from a particular category or sphere 
in which it might be 'properly' exercised. Artworks are still associated with this sensorium, 
but their 'character' is no-longer predetermined, artwork might be recognised in all 
manner of unexpected objects, or practices because they have been 'gazed upon' with 
disinterest; the aesthetic discovers artworks, rather than being linked to a determined 
recognisable category of 'things and ways of doing'. This sensorium detaches itself - in its 
autonomy - from any 'distinct', or 'categorically separate' notion of art, and in so doing 
blurs into 'the world'. To the extent that an object of 'life' and a practice of art are now 
muddled, a final distinction between art and other ways of making and doing becomes 
impossible to sustain (Ranciere, 2002). 
How does Kant secure the 'detached' unstable nature of this sensorium? Art gains its 
autonomy by being defined as a form of judgement that cannot be recuperated by 
rationality (understood as that power responsible for the production of determined 
categories). Rationality, normally conceived as playing the dominant role in 'judgement', is 
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undermined, its authority withdrawn and its deciding vote annulled. Kant theorises 'sense' 
as performing this interruption, but not with the result of instating an alternative authority, 
for instance, 'the intuitive', but enabling an irresolvable tension between rationality and 
sense (Ranciere, 2002). 
The toppling of rationality is the means by which the sensorium of the aesthetic gains its 
independence from categorisation. The capacity to make an aesthetic judgement no-longer 
depends, as do other judgements on 'knowledge'. For instance, the experience of art is no- 
longer guaranteed by knowledge of which particular king sits astride which war horse, or 
what type of honour is conferred on a subject by its particular treatment: "In aesthetic 
judgement, Kant affirms the exercise of a capacity different from that of knowledge, 
whether erudite or mundane" (Ranciere 2003b, p. 187). Art is now experienced as a free- 
play in which knowledge and sense are irresolvably intertwined. As we have seen this 
means that a particular determined class of objects and practices will no longer be the 
(only) site of aesthetic appreciation, but also and at the same time there can no-longer be a 
particular constituency (category) of people qualified to perform the aesthetic. This is 
because 'qualification' (knowledge) is no guarantee of disinterestedness. Finally this 
character of the Sensorium explains why heteronomy cannot be 'complete', there cannot 
be the absolute integration of art into the realm of 'life', defined as it is in terms of 
determined categories. Art is always finally resistant to such categorisations. 
Having escaped its categorical separation art can no longer serve as an alibi for marking 
divisions in the order of social occupations. In fact, the ruining of the clear distinction 
between art and everything else, which is also the ruination of the distinction between 
knowledge and sense, undermines division in the order of social occupations. Therefore the 
experience of the autonomy of art is the experience of the suspension of the order of 
division and hierarchy, and thus a site of potential for a new egalitarian order inspired by 
this equality within 'the aesthetic'. 
The experience of the autonomy of art at the moment when the 
orders of the sensible are suspended becomes a moment and space, 
an opportunity, for free self-shaping that is, in principle, available to 
all. (Bennett 2007, p. 219). 
Or, in terms of Friedrich Schiller's Kantian inspired aesthetic insight: 
In the days following the terror, Schiller will develop this utopian 
content of Kantian aesthetic: the ability to enjoy the appearance that 
is the education of humanity, the fragile promise of a freedom gained 
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beyond the opposition between working-class savagery and civilized 
barbarism. (Ranciere 2003b, p. 198-99). 
Ranciere has argued that this description of the aesthetic is therefore adequate to explain 
those 'social inscriptions' which followed Kant's theorisation, Bennett brings up the 
specifically German inscription of Bildung as an example. 
It is therefore easy to see how, as one of its social inscriptions, this 
conception of the aesthetic came to be connected to the programs of 
Bildung that were concerned, beyond the ethical training of state 
bureaucrats and the private cultivation of the bourgeois, to translate 
culture, in its Kantian conception, into programs of public education 
through which the governed were to be drawn into the orbit of 
practices of self-government (2007, p. 219). 
Bennett rightly identifies that Bildung - along with many other examples - was precisely 
made possible by the muddying of the relations between art and life inaugurated by the 
aesthetic regime with its desire to connect "art to the task of changing life" (Bennett 2007, 
p. 219). And it is Bourdieu's inability to theoretically accommodate this 'muddying' which 
accounts for his lopsided account of the aesthetic and its various social inscriptions. 
Bourdieu's neglect of these considerations means that he ignores 
what has been and remains a tension within the rhetorics and 
practices of the public cultural institutions developed in the 
nineteenth century - art galleries, libraries, concert halls - to the 
extent that these have operated both as key sites for the operation of 
practices of distinction while also, and often at the same time, 
aspiring to function as institutions of civic governance committed to 
spreading the reach of art. (Bennett 2007, p. 219). 
Therefore Ranciere's conception of the knotted relation of autonomy and heteronomy 
would appear to accurately account for those different manifestations of art's relationship 
to those projects of social reform which have occurred over the last 200 years. And for the 
same reason we can see why the aesthetic conception of art has been and can be utilised - 
not only by governments for the disciplining of citizens - but by those very citizens as a 
method of resistance. For example, as already mentioned those individuals involved in the 
19th century French worker's movement, demonstrated their equality 'aesthetically' and 
thereby confirmed the invalidity of that 'order of the sensible' which maintained a 
separation between those able to appreciate art and enjoy civic entitlement and those not 
so lucky. As we have seen Ranciere describes these types of 'realisation' as the 'first word' 
(2003b, p. 200) of a political project of emancipation. 
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Conclusion 
For Bourdieu 'the aesthetic' only serves the eternal reproduction of the hierarchy of 
cultural inheritance. As we have seen his argument takes two paths: First those subjects 
'within the aesthetic' are viewed as incapable of intervening into reproduction, which is 
conceived as entirely separate from all discourse (with the exception of Bourdieu's 
sociological one). Secondly reproduction is conceived singularly; power's actual multiplicity 
and the concomitant necessity for a non avant-gardist approach to resistance is not 
recognised. This is the fundamental problematic of mastery. Taken together these moves 
deny any possibility of a non-sociologically sanctioned form of politics within art and the 
aesthetic, either for spectators or practitioners. 
I have challenged these conclusions philosophically, claiming they are premised on a 
metaphysical assumption, which violently and fallaciously circumscribes dissensual agency. 
I have also shown Bourdieu's historical analysis on which these conclusions are premised is 
'shaky', unable to account for the multiple social inscriptions of art and politics within the 
aesthetic periodization. 
Alternatively, Ranciere does not read the universality of the aesthetic as a false 
'abstraction' that is simply the positive 'class lifestyle' of the dominant. Rather his 
deconstructive reading of disinterest allows him to interpret the aesthetic experience as 
dissensual to its aporetic core. More than this, Ranciere posits his interpretation as the 
actual historic-social impact of Kantian aesthetic theory (the aesthetic regime), which 
seems borne out by nuanced readings of aesthetic and political history. 
For Ranciere everyone can perform non-total disinterestedness, which is universal (quasi- 
transcendental) precisely because this experience doesn't have a 'proper' character and 
can never be resolved in any particular form. Disinterestedness then can provide a promise 
of equality to be used in registering and challenging actually existing inequality across 
multiple fronts and contexts. Therefore Ranciere's deconstruction rescues, what I have 
called, a methodological equality from the aesthetic experience which acts as a 'motor' for 
those types of slippage and re-articulation which both Butler and Ranciere conceive as the 
condition of possibility for those without power to force change into the status quo. 
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Chapter 3 
The Performance of Subjectivization as Art: How Activist 
Practices can be Aesthetic Practices 
By subjectivization I mean the production through a series of actions 
of an instance and a capacity for enunciation not previously 
identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is 
of a pair with the reconfiguration of experience. (Ranciere 1999, 
p. 35). 
Introduction 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to make some room within Ranciere's system for 
certain activist art practices as critique; my example is Suzanne Lacy's extended work Three 
Weeks In May, specifically the public performance In Mourning and In Rage (1977). 
protect such work against what I read as Ranciere's tacit exclusion of them. To put it bluntly 
any 'conventional' reading of Ranciere's writing, especially those recent texts, which 
contribute to his "aesthetic turn or shift" (Ranciere 2005a, p. 13) will be pushed towards an 
interpretation of activist art as destructive of the political potential of aesthetic 
experience26. I will argue that this is an unjustifiable restriction of the art and politics 
interconnection. Specifically, there is no necessary reason why Ranciere cannot 
countenance an artist directly performing a subjectivization within their practice. For him, 
that form of collective political action which contests police authority by way of a demand 
cannot occur directly within art practice without destroying the emancipatory potential 
contained within the aesthetic (Ranciere 2008a, p. 11). Art is barred from acting politically 
in this respect, which I propose to be a non-necessary limitation of the political agency of 
art and artists. Therefore the purpose of this chapter is to challenge the delimitation of art 
practice along this specific frontier. 
26 Peter Hallward has described this shift as marked by the publication of La Parole muette in 1998. "Since then 
you seem to have been working mainly on topics relating to art, literature, and aesthetics. Why this shift In 
Interest? (Ranciere and Hallward 2003a, p. 203) 
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in so doing I will produce a theory of art, as it relates to politics, which utilises Rancierian 
aesthetics, but stretches this category beyond recognition. Chapter One. (b) outlined a 
theory of art as political, exemplified by Duncan Campbell's Falls Burns Malone Fiddles 
(2003) a work which conforms to Ranciere's notion of 'emancipatory art'. This chapter will 
unfold a theory that has room for both Campbell's work as well as activist practices. 
One way that Ranciere articulates this 'frontier' concerns his understanding of the 
problematic nature of messages within art; in his terms messages manifest a determined 
semantic content, which is - strictly speaking - alien to art, defined as a disruption of 
straightforward communication 27. Activist art, in its adoption of causes and its 'vocal' 
denunciation of the status quo makes use of messages and therefore must be seen - in 
these terms - as betraying the disorderly character of the aesthetic regime, of re-installing 
"the aesthetic break in the representational continuity" (Ranciere 2008a, p. 11). 
However, in my attempt to unsettle Ranciere's prohibition on certain 'messages' I must be 
wary not simply to fall back onto other models of critique already rejected; for instance 
'the reveal' and 'dialectical clash'. As established in the previous chapter what all these 
methods of critique share is that their ultimate aim is to mobilise 'a public' into political 
action based on the revelation of a 'given' exploitation. In this way these techniques of 
critique presuppose a split in the intelligence of different constituencies that runs counter 
to Ranciere's description of emancipation. Therefore to guard against this eventuality I will 
again make reference to Andrea Fraser's Official Welcome (2001), this time as a point of 
counter-comparison with In Mourning and in Rage (1977). 
The type of critique I want to endorse is one wrapped up with a Rancierian democratic 
politics and not mastery, but is different to the models of emancipatory spectating already 
27 In the example below Ranciere's distinction between that which is art and that which is simply 
'communication' is clearly stated in terms of two different types of image: a non-art image and the 
'dissembling' art-image. 
'Image' therefore refers to two different things. There is the simple relationship that 
produces the likeness of an original: not necessarily its faithful copy, but simply what 
suffices to stand in for it. And there Is the Interplay of operations that produces what 
we call art: or precisely an alteration of resemblance. This alteration can take a 
myriad of forms. It might be the visibility given to brush-strokes that are superfluous 
when it comes to revealing who is represented by the portrait; an elongation of 
bodies that expresses their motion at the expense of their proportions; a turn of 
language that accentuates the expression of a feeling or renders the perception of an 
idea more complex; a word or a shot In place of the ones that seemed bound to 
follow; and so on and so forth... All these relations define images... In the first place, 
the images of art are, as such, dissemblances. (2007c P. 7). 
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discussed. I want to think a form of critique that is involved in the production of 
subjectivization, or follows along in an existing wake of political activity, either as the 
expression of the part without part, or in solidarity with that part. The primary addressee 
for this 'activity' would be the police order, and because of the specific (becoming) 
character of political subjectivization, its ultimate reference is the quasi-concept of 
equality. For this reason, although pressure is placed on the police order to change, this 
alteration is not done on the insistence of 'the one true way'. This critique avoids mastery, 
its trace preparing the ground for future political activity. As an aside, the term 'critique' is 
so associated with the strategies and assumptions of 'the reveal' that a better phrase for 
the model I'm proposing might simply be 'democratic politics'. 
The advantage of accommodating 'democratic politics' (subjectivization) as art-critique is 
that it affords the possibility that art practice might function with the same political force 
as any other Rancierian dissensual sequence. The chapter attempts to hurdle the barriers 
erected by Ranciere to exclude subjectivization so as to appropriate the political traction 
that this model possesses for a form of activist art practice. 
Subjectivization "truly distinguished" from emancipatory art 
As we have seen subjectivization is a collective demonstration acting in dissensus or 
disagreement with the police order. This disagreement is pursued via all manner of public 
demands, arguments and proofs directed by political subjects at specific representatives of 
the police. 
Ranciere's position is that subjectivization cannot operate within art and the aesthetic; 
there is something about this collective, public dis-identification that causes it to be 
disqualified. In the quotation below Ranciere explicitly makes a distinction between the 
emancipatory politics of aesthetics and the politics of subjectivization. 
A political declaration or manifestation, like an artistic form, is an 
arrangement of words, a montage of gestures, an occupation of 
spaces. In both cases what is produced is a modification of the fabric 
of the sensible, a transformation of the visible given, intensities, 
names that one can give to things, the landscape of the possible. 
What truly distinguishes political actions is that these operations are 
the acts of a collective subject offering itself as a representative of 
everyone, and of the capacity of everyone. This type of creativity is 
specific, but it is based on modifications to the fabric of the sensible, 
produced in particular by artistic reconfigurations of space and time, 
forms and meanings. (Ranciere 2007a p. 264, my italics). 
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The "collective subject offering itself as a representative of everyone, and of the capacity of 
everyone" is another way of describing subjectivization. And this type of "creativity" is 
"truly" distinct from an emancipatory politics of art. In the terms I have been using, this 
emancipatory politics of art takes two forms. First, there is work like Duncan Campbell's 
Falls Burns Malone Fiddles (2003) which causes "modifications to the fabric of the 
sensible", for instance interrupting the documentary veracity of photographs with 
animated formal elements, and fictional voiceover. These "modifications" or sensory 
clashes induce disordered interpretation of the reality presented by the artwork and thus 
disrupt 'conventional' police framings. This is emancipatory to the extent that it might 
prepare the ground for possible democratic action, by highlighting (to a subject) the non- 
totality of the police order; the "sensible modifications" produced by an artwork suggest 
that the given world can indeed be different. 
Secondly we can argue that 'the aesthetic' per se enables an experience of equality. Again 
we can draw on the example of Gauny; his ability to experience disinterestedly in the exact 
manner of his supposed betters collapses any prior hierarchic relation. But again Ranciere 
equates this demonstration with a personal, spectatorial experience; a private confirmation 
of capacity that might then be taken forward into collective political struggles. 
Therefore Ranciere erects a bar between the politics of art and that of subjectivization. 
When explaining why these emancipatory politics of art must never play a more direct role 
in collective political struggles he very often frames the issue in this way: for an artwork to 
become directly involved in such a struggle it will attempt to hail a spectator so as to join a 
cause. (See also (2009, p. 45; 2004c p60-66)). This hailing is the transmission of a message. 
Now this political effect operates under the condition of an original 
disjunction, of an original effect, which is the suspension of any 
straight cause-effect relationship... That tension had long been 
concealed as the politics of art was identified with the paradigm of 
'critical art'. Critical art plugs the gap by defining a straight relation 
between its aims and its means: its ends would be to provoke an 
awareness of political situations leading to political mobilization. 
(Rancii re 2008a, p. 11). 
I would concur with Ranciere that messages-in-art do "plug the gap", and in so doing 
introduce many problematic ramifications into the scene of art and politics. However it is 
possible to envisage the situation differently: the artist becomes directly involved in a 
political struggle as a subjectivising subject who makes demands upon the police. In this 
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modality the negative consequences of messages-in-art dissipate because now the issue is 
one of demands-in-art. 
Let us now thoroughly outline the ramifications of 'messages' so that we can identify how 
demands operate differently. 
Emancipatory art cannot use political messages 
An art is emancipated and emancipating when it renounces the 
authority of the imposed message, the target audience, and the 
univocal mode of explicating the world, when, in other words, it 
stops wanting to emancipate us. (Ranciere 2007a, p. 258). 
The content and tone of this paragraph are immediately familiar; we have covered this 
territory before. In Chapter One. (b) I discussed Ranciere's modelling of the "dialectical 
clash" methodology. Brecht's work afforded one example, valued by Ranciere for its 
dissonant clashing of signifiers and theatrical techniques, but critiqued because this 
discordant 'play' comes to a rest in a final meaning: capitalism as the dark and motivating 
force behind everyday life (Ranciere, 2005c, p. 6; Ranciere 2008a, p. 11-12). This 'final 
meaning' is of the same order as those 'hidden secrets' that today's critical artists 'reveal' 
to their spectators. This should come as no surprise because they both belong to the 
'school of the science of the hidden' (Ranciere 2004c, p. 49). 
For Ranciere then a 'message' within art, if it has a political motivation ("wanting to 
emancipate us") is short-hand for 'recuperated meaning' or the transcendental 'front of 
power' already discussed in previous chapters. There are three ways that 'messages' 
produce their authoritarian effects. 
1. The univocal determined message 
A message represents univocal objective knowledge. And this objective knowledge, or in 
the terms of the previous chapter 'singular-term-of-power' is produced by fallaciously 
isolating it from 'structurality', thereby determining its fixed and unified status. Univocality 
is therefore a consequence of determination, the halting of 'play' to produce singular 
meaning. 
Strictly speaking messages cannot be 'art' for Ranciere because art involves the withdrawal 
of the kind of determination which creates messages. As we have seen 'knowledge' which 
normally produces determined concepts, is 'interrupted' within the aesthetic experience, 
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drawn into an unstable adequation with sense disqualifying the closure upon which 
concepts rely. The presentation of a straight-forward message within an artwork is an 
ossification of the political possibilities contained within the aesthetic, which, when 
functioning properly (improperly) allows spectators to see their world in non-determined, 
multiple ways (Ranciere 2004b p. 82). Art draws attention to, rather than hiding the 
relationality, or contingency of all meaning. 
2. Message are imposed, they want something from us 
Secondly, messages impose themselves trying to make us think and feel in a specific way. 
Simply by being univocal, they ask that we as spectators accept their fixed picture-of-the- 
world. Political messages would like us to do something: overthrow (singular) exploitation. 
As we have seen in Chapter Two artists who use messages seek to transform Ignorant 
spectators into those possessing objective knowledge securing for themselves the status of 
master. Ranciere also sometimes discusses this imposition, as 'ethical': an artwork that 
wants its viewers to think and act in a certain way imposes an ethics. He uses the term 
pejoratively seeing it as commensurate with police classification. "Ethics, then, is the kind 
of thinking in which an identity is established between an environment, a way of being and 
a principle of action" (2009, p. 110). 
Imposed univocality (ethical or not) 'stultifies' and therefore destroys aesthetic regime art 
as emancipatory; for instance, the critical messages' obsession with 'one source of power' 
serves to restrict art as a disorderly site of interpretation. Imposed messages place an onus 
on spectators to follow one course of resistance, but art under the aesthetic regime is 
properly wayward, and therefore cannot plot-out any particular path to be followed: 
"[Artworks cannot] avoid the aesthetic cut that separates the outcomes from the 
Intentions and forbids any straight way toward an 'other side' of the words and the 
images" (2008a, p. 14). To suppress the 'loss' or to attempt to suture this cut is to establish 
the artwork as message, to produce a "rhetoric of persuasion about what has to be done" 
(2008a, p. 11). 
3. Messages target audiences 
Thirdly messages address specific constituencies. In the most extreme version a well 
meaning, politically minded artist might seek out those most excluded under a particular 
socio-political hegemony: ethnic minorities, illegal immigrants, the homeless, etc. However 
for Ranciere this gesture confirms and entrenches the partition of people into peoples. 
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Simply in seeking out 'the homeless' to address 'their problems' is to fantasize a coherent 
group identity. The artist's actions will be based on a received understanding 
(an 'ethical 
categorization') of what a homeless person might want or expect from life28. 
This approach again cannot but betray the political promise of aesthetic art, which is 
premised on the incapacitating of any partitions of 'difference' and thus hierarchy; that 
everyone can experience aesthetically, renders the categorization and ranking of peoples 
inoperative. The parvenu spectator in her ability to perform disinterestedness recognises 
her equality, and this recognition might inspire the development of a collective political 
project which attempts to oblige the police order to do so too. 
Does In Mourning and in Rage harbour a political message? 
It is my contention that Ranciere's rejection of messages, has contributed to a 
contemporary discourse which holds to a rather un-nuanced assertion that art must avoid 
messages to attain the desired 'radical ambiguity'. This viewpoint asserts that for work to 
be 'art' it must evoke - in Kantian terms -a free play of mental faculties. Ranciere's specific 
contribution is to insist that this free play corresponds to art's politicality. Obviously, as the 
efforts of my previous chapters have shown, I am not against this political interpretation. In 
fact I have demonstrated this perspective to be more productive, and historically more 
convincing than that foundational understanding of art represented by Bourdieu and 
Fraser. Ranciere offers more space for art to become a site of resistance to the social given. 
(However the argument of this chapter is that he could offer more space still). 
However I find the general denigration of messages within art overly prescriptive, ignoring 
as it does different modalities of message. I find problematic the way artists and critics 
assume that the expression of commitment, or an assertion about how the world might be 
different, or better, is the limit-point for spectatorial mental free play in art. To express or 
28 1 take this to be the criticism Rancibre makes of Rene Fransisco's contribution to the 26th Sao Paulo biennial 
In 2004: 
With a group of artists, [Fransisco] dedicated the money of an art foundation to 
survey the needs of the Inhabitants of a poor district. But it is not enough to survey 
their needs, it is necessary to respond to them. Rene Francisco's video shows the 
artist/artisans taking up the doing up of the plumbing and painting of an old couple's 
house... The problem is that the indisputable effort of very many artists to shatter 
the dominant consensus and reconsider the existing order tends to [return) artistic 
power back to the provocation of the ethical task of testifying to the common world 
and of assistance to the most disadvantaged... It is the forms taken today by 
[Fransisco's art]... of individual assistance to the most destitute [that] rejects the 
equality of recent artistic avant-gardes and builders of socialism (Ranciere 2005b). 
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assert in this way is to render one's art instrumental, to betray the potential politics of 
aesthetic experience. This is the particular edict that I hope to disrupt in the following 
chapter. I do not mean to justify all messages, or expressions of commitment in art, or 
anywhere else for that matter, as often these statements are tied up with the types of 
critical mastery already addressed. I have in mind rather a very particular type of message, 
what I call a political demand. 
I take Suzanne Lacy's video In Mourning and in Rage to be a particularly good example of 
the use of demands within art. Her public performance now exists as photographic, textual 
and video documentation. Below is a description of the event: 
On the morning of December 13`h, 1977, a funeral motorcade of 
twenty two cars filled with women followed a hearse from the 
Woman's Building Los Angeles to City Hall. At which point nine black- 
clad women wearing headdresses with veils to give them an imposing 
height and presence emerged from the hearse and took up positions 
on the steps facing the street. Women from the motorcade filled in 
behind them and unfurled a banner that read, "In memory of our 
sisters, Women fight back. " Then, with City Hall behind them and the 
assembled local press in front, the first mourner walked to the 
microphone and said, "I am here for the ten women who have been 
raped and strangled between October 18 and November 29, " after 
which she was echoed by the chorus of mourners who chanted, "In 
memory of our sisters, women fight back. " In succession, each of the 
nine veiled women made statements that connected the Hillside 
Strangler murders with the larger social and political issues of 
violence against women, and each, in turn, was echoed by the chorus 
in the performance of what Lacy called "a modern tragedy. " (Kelley 
1995, p. 241) 
In Mourning and in Rage then, as described, and in the terms offered under Ranciere's 
characterisation of 'messages' would seem not to be emancipated or emancipating. There 
is a strong content within the work, which is clearly expressed. The 'truth' of the 
statements in the artwork are (apparently) not open to negotiation, a reality is being 
identified and 'revealed', to this extent the work appears univocal. There is little room for a 
spectator to freely interpret the video's message; the differential and indefinitely deferred 
nature of making meaning is not emphasised. To this extent - to the extent that any 
message can be entirely 'compulsory' - the message is imposed. And by staging the 
performance on the steps of the town hall, deliberately directing her message at those in 
institutional power, she targets a specific audience. 
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However this negative assessment is only possible if the context of its enunciation is 
ignored. As part of second wave feminism Lacy represented a subjectivizing subject, and 
her artwork operated as a demand in dissensus with the police order. It is my contention 
that this situation confers upon in Mourning and In Rage a special status which makes it 
non-instrumental (enough) to be included under the umbrella of 'the aesthetic'. In this way 
I use Ranciere's own definition of the political subject against him; his post-foundational 
description of political activity can explain how some political messages (demands) might 
avoid authoritarian proscription. His ruling on the conservative nature of political messages 
within art can be ignored if the message is voiced by his own political subject, that is, if the 
message is a demand. 
Subjectivization via demands 
'As your equals we women, precarious workers, immigrants want to be able to unionise, to 
be paid fairly, to be subject to the law in the way that others are'. Is this statement a 
message? I intend to answer that it is not, or not quite. Rather this declaration is what I 
shall call a 'demand'. Demands made as part of political subjectivization do not fulfil those 
criteria which Ranciere establishes so as to dismiss political messages within art. In fact 
demands function 'aesthetically', and as such can be positioned within art without travesty 
of its political promise. In order to explain how demands function I first need to recap and 
finesse my description of politics, specifically the emergence of the subjectivizing group 
from a police order. The role that 'demands' play within this political scene confers their 
special status. 
The police functions through 'determination', or in other words, the imposition of 
categories; for instance typologies of identity, social role and civic entitlement. All are 
secured in their 'positivity' by being placed - across multiple fronts (gender, ethnicity, age, 
disability, economic bracket... ) - in binary relations of hierarchy. The Roman patrician is 
secured In his absolute opposition to the lowly plebeian, (1999, p. 24) the 18th Century 
liberal professional's right to govern established against the manual labourer (Bennett 2007 
p. 217), whose work (supposedly) did not afford the time for any 'higher calling'. The 
distribution of the sensible is the (imperfect) totality of these hierarchic relations between 
those symbolically positioned to partake in power, and those not. 
However power's attempt to binarize is flawed, falling into contradiction as its attempted 
polarisations falter. Subjectivization works to exacerbate this faltering. Ranciere has 
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described subjectivization as an "impossible identification" (2003a p. 196), one which exists 
between determined, recognised categories-of-people. 
Let me rephrase this: a subject is an outsider or, more, an in- 
between... political subjectivization is the enactment of equality - or 
the handling of a wrong - by people who are together to the extent 
that they are between. It is a crossing of identities, relying on a 
crossing of names: names that link the name of a group or a class to 
the name of no group or no class, a being to a nonbeing or not-yet- 
being. (1992, p. 61). 
Those names subjectivization "crosses" belong to a known identity cast as unequal within 
the police order and that same identity, this time, recast as equal. The recognised lowly 
"group or class" is linked to that of a "non-being, or not-yet-being" which should be 
understood as that same "class or group" 'proposed to be' the equal of everyone else. 
What does not happen when a collective subject presupposes and demonstrates its 
equality is that the police suddenly, as cause follows effect, accept the newly equal 
constituency. No, politics takes place in that hiatus between a given identity and a new 
identity figured as equal. The argument made by 'the subordinated' as per their equality is 
not straightforwardly recognised. 
[in politics] there is the dispute over the object of the dispute, the 
dispute over the existence of the dispute and the parties confronting 
each other in it. For the idea that speaking beings are equal because 
of their common capacity for speech is a reasonable-unreasonable 
idea - unreasonable, in regard to the way societies are structured, 
from the holy kingdoms of Antiquity to our modern societies of 
experts. (Ranciere 1999, p. 55). 
Subjectivization continues so long as it retains its status as lacuna within 'social objectivity', 
which is to say so long as the beneficiaries of hierarchy are in disagreement with the 
validity of the subordinates' assertion of equality. The process of dissensus and 
disagreement produces a 'zone of indeterminacy' within social objectivity, whereby an 
understanding (inkling) of the validity of the subordinates claim oscillates with an 
understanding of the unequal as simply unequal. Ranciere describes this situation as the 
paradoxical emergence of 'two worlds in one', two alternative realities jostling within the 
same social space. 
Politics makes visible that which had no reason to be seen, it lodges 
one world into another (for instance, the world where the factory is a 
public space within the one where it is considered a private one, the 
world where workers speak out vis-ä-vis the one where their voices 
are merely cries expressing pain) (2001, p. 7). 
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Importantly this 'jostling' reveals the contradiction of hierarchy in spite of (an enabling and 
ruining) equality, and thereby undermines hierarchy as a valid social arrangement. 
To restate then the inherent frailty, or contradiction of the police order as hierarchy- 
despite-equality is highlighted in subjectivization, but the veracity of this contradiction is 
not fully endorsed by the police order, who 'disagree' until the end of the political 
sequence, whereby the demonstration of equality is repressed. Or, alternatively becomes 
(non-dialectically) inscribed into the social: "[a] verification (of equality] becomes 'social', 
causes equality to have real social effect, only when it mobilizes an obligation to hear" 
(Ranciere 1995, p. 86). 
I will address this inscription in more depth later in the chapter, but first I want to specify 
how demands operate within subjectivization. 
The demand 
By way of an example lets us return to the French Tailor's strike. If we remember the 
workers, through statements and argumentation, pointed out the contradictory position of 
the public prosecutors (Monsieur Persil and Schwartz) who continued to deny workers had 
an 'equal status'. 
In this example then, "the crossing of identities" occurs through a verbal, or written 
demand, which acts semantically, i. e. it argues for worker's equal status using the preamble 
of the French Charter as leverage. These demands demonstrate at the level of content (as 
well as form). A'Iitigious' equal relation is established where before there was none. 
[Dissensus with police order] passes through the constitution of 
specific subjects that take the wrong upon themselves, give it shape, 
invent new forms and names for it, and conduct its processing in a 
specific montage of proofs: "logical" arguments [demands] that are at 
the same time a way of shaping the relationship between speech and 
its account as well as the perceptible configuration-Political 
subjectivization redefines the field of experience which gave to each 
their identity with their lot. (1999, p. 40) 
Therefore 'the demand' is a key feature of subjectivization. The performative effect of 
these words is to tear the workers away from their determined police identity as unequal, 
and drag them towards a not-yet-being of shared status 
And this movement away from a lowly position towards an equal one is a process of 
destabilization which confronts the false totality of the police order by highlighting its non- 
107 
totality. The contradiction of hierarchy-in-spite-of-equality is starkly dramatized, two 
worlds forcibly emerge in one - the world of hierarchy is shown to be invalid when 
exhibited alongside (and dependent upon) the one where all are equal with all. 
Demands are aesthetic 
On the basis of this nuanced account of subjectivization let us establish those ways that 
demands operate aesthetically and in so doing distinguish themselves from messages. 
1. Demands are not univocal 
As we have seen the experience of art under the aesthetic regime involves a dynamic 
adequation of rationality and sense. Or in other terms, art induces an experiential shuttling 
between autonomy and heteronomy. Thought and sensory experience within the aesthetic 
remain open to the possibility of re-articulating the social indefinitely. In this way art is 
multiplicitous, with different political interpretations always possible. 
Also I have established that messages, on the other hand are the product of the normal 
functioning of rationality, determined as fully figured, or present, and therefore resolutely 
univocal. The messages' relational inscription in a structure of meaning, and therefore 
always possible re-articulation (in play), is suppressed so as to present a picture of finality: 
'the way of the world', 'objective conditions', the 'singular emanation of power'. Therefore 
messages cannot be utilized within aesthetic regime art without travestying its irresolution, 
and thereby political promise. 
However a demand, under subjectivization, is not univocal existing within and responsible 
for a lacuna in the normal determining functioning of the police order. A demand produces 
indeterminacy, the condition of two worlds in one. Subjectivization via demand exists in a 
state of suspension before, or between the determining order. Until the police come to a 
decision on the status of a demand - or the project is simply abandoned - those bodies and 
subjectivities to which it refers, indeed the entire political scene `hovers' before police 
suppression or (non-dialectical) accommodation. 
On these grounds 'the demand' cannot be rejected from the aesthetic experience. In 
Kantian terms the demand exists between (or approaches) knowledge, rationality or 
'conceptual thinking'. Or in Rancit re's own terminology the demand, or political scene of 
which it is a part, represents a movement between the politics of autonomy, that is 
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distance from any 'community of meaning' and a secure, stable social position/meaning 
(heteronomy). 
2. Demands impose aesthetically 
Univocal messages are imposing. They tell us what to think and how to act. I want to show 
that demands, although they impose on the police, do so differently from messages. But 
first I need to re-examine the force that Ranciere theorises for politics. 
The police does not preside over the action of politics, remaining aloof, and deciding upon 
its eventual codification on a kind of whim, either magnanimously including the 
subjectivizing group, or pitilessly rejecting them. No, the police is not like some Roman 
Emperor in a Hollywood film, turning his thumb to decide whether a gladiator is put to 
death, or spared. The police, if "obliged to hear" are deeply implicated by a political action, 
placed under a type of stress, which forces the beneficiaries of hierarchy to accommodate 
the unequal subject, or, it must be admitted, forces them to suppress the existence of this 
equality. My point is that politics presses the police into a situation that demands a 
reaction. Politics has a force, places an onus on power in a way that it finds difficult - 
although, of course, not impossible -to resist. 
On the other hand, and as indicated in my introduction, Ranciere often seems to suggest 
that emancipatory art exists in a more passive relation with its audience, to restate: "It is up 
to the various forms of politics to appropriate, for their own proper use, the modes of 
presentation or the means of establishing explanatory sequences produced by artistic 
practices rather than the other way round". (2004c p. 65). 
Does the 'imposition' that political subjectivization places on the police prevent 'demands' 
from becoming aesthetic art? Imposition is problematic, if conceived in terms of an artwork 
offering a blue-print for action to spectators as potential political subjects, that is, members 
of a future subjectivizing group. This is how messages impose. 
Let us discuss this issue in terms of a supposed strategy of resistance wherein a police 
order is met by a 'critical' message. Here a message confronts the police order with 
(another) false totality. In Bourdieu and Fraser's terms the implacable reproduction of 
cultural inheritance is confronted with the 'objective knowledge' of this power as 
autonomous and singular. Under this knowledge power is diagnosed, and a positive cure is 
proposed to remedy is insidious effect. This singular front upon which battle must proceed 
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is, in Derridean terms, a metaphysical 'centre beyond structurality'. In the case of the 
political message a metaphysical problem - the false totality of police order - is 
compounded by another metaphysical problem - the false totality of the 'critical message'. 
And, as we are by now familiar, the net result of the political message is the establishment 
of a relation of mastery. The obsession with 'one source of power' and 'one course of 
action against that power' constricts awareness of other power fronts, or the mutation of 
existing ones. And again, simply encountering the master who wields the authority-of- 
certainty therefore positions the spectator as follower, performatively deterring her from 
personally identifying and reacting to inequality. 
However a demand operates in quite a different way. As we have seen subjectivization, via 
demand highlights the contradiction of hierarchy-in-spite-of-equality, the false certitude of 
the police order is met with a performative demonstration of its frailty. And it is so long as 
this zone of indeterminacy is maintained that politics has force, can show the police order 
to be non-total. While the subjectivizing group can maintain this dissensus the police order 
is placed under a type of stress. Derrida has described how the exposure of the dream of 
totality provokes anxiety. 
And on the basis of this certitude anxiety can be mastered, anxiety is 
invariably the result of a certain mode of being implicated in the 
game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were at stake in the 
game from the outset (2001, p. 352). 
Subjectivization via demand only has force, only truly 'rattles' the police-order so long as an 
alternative blueprint-for-order is not provided. The force of politics coincides with the 
emptiness of equality. Sure, demands will contain explanations, arguments, and proofs as 
to why a certain group is marginalised; in terms of feminism, for instance, the signifier 
'patriarchy' often fulfils this role. However in subjectivization these proofs do not 
'determine' the 'stake of equality' around which the struggle turns. As we have seen, 
Ranciere's position is that under the architecture of subjectivization the principle of 
equality is pushed to the fore (even if the word is not directly used) (Ranciere 1999, p. 30). 
This produces the opposite effect to mastery. The highlighting of the non-totality of police 
order through the performance of its contradictory nature is emancipatory showing that it 
might be challenged but not proscribing a 'front of resistance'; possible future 
subjectivizing groups are facilitated, but not directed. 
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Therefore what a demand 'wants' (the problem with which it engages) is exactly the same 
thing that Ranciere's emancipatory art practice 'wants', that is, the acknowledgement of 
the non-totality of police order. 
The problem (for emancipatory practice), first of all, is to create some 
breathing room, to loosen the bonds that enclose spectacles within a 
form of visibility, bodies within an estimation of their capacity, and 
possibility within the machine that makes the "state of things" seem 
evident, unquestionable. (Ranciere 2007a, p. 261). 
Therefore there is no reason that the specific type of imposition a demand places on the 
police should cause it to be ejected from the category of emancipatory aesthetic art. 
The beggar's pantomime 
Before I move on I want to briefly address Melanie Gilligan's critique of Ranciere's 
performative understanding of politics in her article The Beggar's Pantomime: Performance 
and its Appropriations (2007a), in which she sketches a contemporary world of capitalist 
production that is saturated by a pervasive logic of performativity. 
Theorists across disciplines have identified a generalized condition of 
performativity in contemporary labour - one emerging from the 
current regime of production, which produces and exploits 
communication and social relations in addition to conventional, 
tangible commodities (2007a, p. 5). 
Her criticism of Ranciere's political theory is that like certain contemporary artists, 
specifically Catherine Sullivan, he unwittingly rehearses this tectonic shift within capitalism, 
giving a subversive 'spin' to what is actually the simple manifestation of a new capitalist 
order. Where Ranciere sees subjects redistributing the sensible through actions of 
dissensus Gilligan sees 'performers' merely channelling the operations of post-fordist 
capitalism. 
In this sense, Ranciere's notion of fleeting political events and 
transitory roles coincides perhaps too well with a model of 
accumulation dependent on movement, flexibility, and performative 
labour... Also working to undermine the critical traction of Ranciere's 
ideas is the fact that redistributions and disruptions of the sensible 
are a primary operation of contemporary commerce. Advertising and 
media thrive on disruptive frisson; re-orderings and subversions of 
existing visual, affective, and semiotic codes (e. g., guerrilla 
marketing) can generate revenue. (2007a, p. 7). 
The portrayal of Ranciere's politics as the advocacy of a certain hectic adoption of different 
identities and roles allows Gilligan to find a correspondence between his philosophy and 
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Sullivan's highly choreographed art-performances, famous for a certain hysterical or 
schizophrenic role playing, and to damn them both as manifestations of - rather than 
critical interventions into - our contemporary (capitalist) status quo. 
However what Gilligan neglects is the importance of equality in Ranciere's theorisation of 
the force of politics. As we have seen it is only through a collective demonstration of 
equality, which is brought into contact with an instance of police hierarchy that any 
traction can be expected. Ranciere would definitely not see Sullivan's piece The 
Chittendens (2005) - as does Gilligan - as an example of subjectivization. It falls short of all 
the criteria he sets: the equality of actors' identifies' is not at stake and there is no sense 
that this scene partakes in a broader collective struggle. Not to mention the fact that 
Ranciere does not admit that subjectivization can be art. Gilligan, in deducting equality 
from Ranciere's theory of political performance has removed its 'decentred heart' creating 
a straw man. And I would argue that so long as relations of hierarchy are with us collective 
performances of equality - based around specific demands - will continue to possess 
traction on the police, in spite of that order's promotion of myriad other forms of self 
invention and renewal. 
3. Demands target audiences aesthetically 
To return to our central discussion, we have seen that one problem of the 'imposed 
message' within aesthetic regime art is that in seeking to produce a determined effect it 
aims to address a particular pre-given group of people. This 'targeting' relies on a 
categorisation of one's audience, which is, in the final instance an (unavoidable) 
stereotyping of their capacity and thus entitlements. To target an audience is to position a 
set of bodies in a particular 'destination'. 
However, as we have seen: "Aesthetic experience has a political effect to the extent that 
the loss of destination that it presupposes disturbs the way in which bodies fit their 
functions and destinations" (Ranciere 2008a, p. 11). 
The formal universality of the aesthetic experience operates as a site for the demonstration 
of equality beyond distinct categorizations and hierarchy. The experience of 'autonomy' is 
the suspension of the partitioned orders of identity and profession, whereas the process of 
'targeting' serves to shore-up this structure. 
A demand under subjectivization is often targeted; the 19th century French tailors direct 
their argument at Monsieur Persil and Schwartz, the public prosecutors. This might seem 
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reason to reject 'the demand' from aesthetic regime art, but to do so would again 
be 
mistaken. The net result of the directed demand is to disorder, rather than entrench, the 
given identities of both addresser and addressee within political speech. We have already 
analysed the way demands tear the identities of those who make them away 
from given 
police allotment. However within the political scene the identities of the beneficiaries of 
hierarchy are also thrown into doubt. When the equality of all-with-all emerges with the 
'world of hierarchy' the latter is shown to be entirely contingent. And thus the identities of 
those beneficiaries premised on police hierarchy are similarly subverted. Again, the 
'experience' of a political scene is 'aesthetic' because - for all concerned - the entrenched 
hierarchic allotment of identity is 'suspended'. 
The (non dialectical) accommodation of politics by the police 
I have shown that the critical practice which proceeds via demands differs radically from 
that which utilises messages. The former disturbs univocality; the latter offers another 
version of univocality. However I have also mentioned that for police order to be lastingly 
altered, that is, to be moved from one distribution of the sensible to another, the 
'excessive' egalitarianism of politics must - to a certain extent - be tamed. A new 
distribution involves establishing positive orders and categories which can never be 
adequate to the quasi-transcendental of equality. Therefore if the result of a critical 
practice as demand is another univocal order, then what - in the end - is the difference 
between this dissensual operation and that which utilises messages? For change can occur 
via the implementation of messages. 
The question that needs to be addressed is whether the process of 'taming', or 
accommodation, wherein a settlement is negotiated with police power means that political 
action operates as a perfect circuit, returning in its conclusion to its point of departure? If 
this is the case Ranciere's conception of politics would be antagonistic to 'progress', rather 
positing a static model where the police order always has the final word. In this reading 
politics is fundamentally pointless because hierarchy always re-emerges at the end of any 
subjectivization. These are Nick Hewlett and Bob Jessop's worries. 
As Bob Jessop... suggests, there seems to be a 'recurrent cycle' 
whereby when political insurrection takes place, it is bound to fail 
and is 'doomed to re-institutionalization'. It is not at all clear that 
there is a possibility of ongoing democratic and egalitarian politics 
because the interruption of the police seems bound to be temporary 
and fleeting, because it is defined as an exception to the status quo 
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rather than a potentially normal and ongoing state of things (or 
slowly evolving situation) in its own right. Failure of radical politics 
seems to be built into radical politics' very definition... This seems to 
break with an enlightenment concept of progress, without 
convincingly replacing it with another. (Hewlett 2007, p. 106, citing 
Jessop 2003, p. 17). 
However this criticism underestimates the significant change that politics introduces into 
the police. A distribution which results after a political sequence has obliged 
accommodation is definitely not the same as that which existed before the sequence. 
First, a new group has 'won' rights and status previously denied. They now possess a new 
role and greater share. This is a significant - life changing - victory for the group in 
question. Would this group feel that their action had been, on some fundamental level, a 
failure? They definitely did not fail themselves. 
But the stronger point is that political action serves to weaken the justifiability of police 
orders per se. Politics 'breaks' the police in a way that is impossible to entirely 'fix'. 
There is a worse and a better police - the better one, incidentally, not 
being the one that adheres to the supposedly natural order of society 
or the science of legislators, but the one that all the breaking and 
entering perpetrated by egalitarian logic has most often jolted out of 
its "natural" logic. (Ranciere 1999, p30-31). 
The 'better' police orders, are those that have been most interrupted by politics, each 
mobilization pushing to the surface the constitutive contradiction of hierarchy making it 
available for further utilisation in political action. Therefore even under the 
'accommodation' of political action, the principle of equality remains to the fore. In this 
register 'equality' is remembered as the primary stake of a particular struggle. This is most 
obvious when equality becomes enshrined in those institutions transformed by political 
action (Ranciere 1995, p. 48). These traces are reminders of the frailty of the police, 
marking with an X the site of its non-totality, or acting as a wound on the otherwise 
seemingly healthy body politic. (Art as 'untenable foundation' operates as one such 
wound). This enshrined principle - again - enables further resistance, facilitating dissensus 
without directing its path. Alternatively this is not the case if a 'message' achieves a social 
effect. What occurs here is that one police order is simply replaced by another; police 
orders per se are not tested and shown to be inadequate. Let us dramatize this situation by 
imagining an institution produced through the accommodation of a message: 
This institution is founded on a positive order conceived as `solving' the previous 
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hegemonic situation. And thus, in this register, the result of accommodating a 'message' is 
not significantly different from the result of a successful demanding political action. 
However an important divergence registers in the fact that our 'imaginary institution' 
becomes resistant to further change. The 'truth' of exploitation having been discovered 
and dealt with, would render further claims for change or reform seemingly unnecessary. 
(Unless they could precisely situate themselves within the logic of the 'first' round of 
changes). If the new institution is a manifestation of 'the solution, why maintain a rigorous 
self critical attitude, why listen to those deluded souls who still feel dominated? In other 
words this new order produced via the accommodation of a 'message' institutes an arche, 
which - unlike the 'wound' left by political action - stultifies the possibility of futural 
change. Therefore in this important register the legacy of a 'critical practice of demand' is 
also significantly different to the legacy of 'critical message'. 
And therefore Hewlett and Jessop's criticisms would seem to miss their mark. Ranciere's 
theorization of political action can only be judged to be a 'precisely recurring cycle', or a 
'failure' if one ignores the significant gains made by subjectivizing communities and if one 
conceptualises the police order as emerging unscathed - as strong as ever - from every 
encounter with politics. Ranciere does, it seems to me, replace the enlightenment notion 
of progress with one which desires a police order ever more accommodating of different 
claims to equality, without dictating how these claims are made, or who might voice them. 
In Mourning and In Rage 
Now I would like to think through this notion of demand as art in relation to In Mourning 
and in Rage (1977). 1 will also again discuss Fraser's Official Welcome (2001) to show how 
this piece functions differently utilizing the logic of 'the message'. 
The form of Lacy's work would seem to mimic the political scene as described by Ranciere, 
whereby a particular group is excluded from rights accorded to everyone else and 
demonstrates their equality partly via 'demands' so as to challenge this partition. 
However I want to proceed more slowly to establish the co-ordinates of this political scene 
because only then can we begin to see if those discourses and actions mobilised have 
equality as their final reference. Perhaps the first question to ask is whether Lacy and her 
"group" can be seen as the victims of hierarchy? 
I contend that 'women' were (still are) barred from that right bestowed by civil society, 
where it is reasonable for everyone to feel safe on the streets of a city. We can see this 
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marginalisation in the English petit-police's near contemporaneous response to the case of 
the 70's Yorkshire Ripper murders. The subsequent Reclaim the Night marches provide 
another good example of political action. 
In 1977 The Yorkshire Ripper was still terrorising the north of England 
and the police had been advising that, to avoid attack, women should 
stay inside after dark. The [Reclaim the Night] march responded 
directly to this warning (placards read "No curfew on women - curfew 
on men") and hundreds of women shouted about their anger at 
being kept off the streets - the supposedly public highways, after all - 
by the threat of male violence. (Bindel 2006). 
Police imposed a curfew on women. This was flouted demanding that it should be 'men' 
who be kept indoors, as the perpetrator was a man. This gesture exposed the inequality in 
societies' regard for woman. Women had their rights curtailed, 'for their own good', when 
it would have been just as logical, perhaps more so, to curtail the rights of men. The march 
revealed the favour men are granted in the 'right to safety'. 
So it would seem that the police category of 'woman' - at the time of the performance - 
was marginalised in some ways 'outside' the benefits of supposed universal rights (the right 
to feel safe on the streets). In both cases women belong to a category - on this issue - 
unequal/invisible/marginal to other parts of society. Therefore we can begin to see In 
Mourning and in Rage, as part of the broader movement of second-wave feminism, as a 
particular collective contestation of unequal positioning, a political gesture, in which there 
is a meeting of an egalitarian logic and a police logic. 
Although none of the performers - as far as I can gather - uses the word equality, I think 
that an 'egalitarian demonstration' operates at several levels within the work. It is worth 
mentioning that it is sometimes not always obvious whether an 'action' circulates around 
an issue of equality, and is therefore political, or whether it does not and therefore falls 
short of Ranciere's criteria. This is made explicit, as in the case of In Mourning and In Rage 
when the word 'equality' is not spoken. Todd May addresses this issue in relation to 
striking workers. 
One might even take issue with Ranciere's example [of the striking 
French Tailors], arguing that the issue at stake there was not equality, 
but wages and working conditions... Whether or not this particular 
strike was an expression of equality, Ranciere has shown in his 
analysis how it can be that a strike is such an expression. It would 
seem that most strikes for higher wages and better working 
conditions contain at least an element of active equality. Because 
they arise from a sense that those who work deserve to be treated in 
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a more nearly equal way to those who employ them, there is an 
orientation of such strikes towards the presupposition of equality, 
even when they are not explicitly or deeply implicitly tied to that 
presupposition. (2008, p. 54-55). 
I think the demand by Lacy's 'group' is that women not be treated as victims. Again and 
again, on the steps of the town hall the phrase "women fight back" (Kelley 1995, p. 241) is 
spoken. For me this demand is of the same order as a picket's claims for better wages, in 
that although not manifestly concerning equality (the word is not used) an attempt is made 
to escape one lowly position in favour of an equal one; a place where the best that can be 
hoped for is a passive acceptance of pity, to one where a (metaphoric) even contest is 
proposed, women as equally active to their male counterparts: "Women fight back". This 
chant is responsible for tearing the performers' identities away from police positioning and 
establishing that lacuna in social objectivity within which politics occurs and which accounts 
for its force. 
The staging of the performance at City Hall is also important in this respect serving to 
emphasize that the performers and their statements are of equal importance to any other 
public representative located in, or 'affair of governance' addressed within this building. 
This appropriation of a recognised 'political' location so as to press equality emphasises the 
gap which usually exists between the universal values manifested in City Hall and the 
identity 'woman'. Again we witness the symbolic leap, whereby the performers disengage 
from previous understandings of 'womani29and push towards the virtual or future 
community where they are identified as equal. It is interesting how much the speakers 
emphasise their own visibility or presence, both in the imposing costumes, but also in 
phrases like "I am here... " (Kelley 1995, p. 241). It is as if they are trying to force themselves 
Into 'being', within a sensible distribution which cannot apprehend them. 
It is in this moment when the marginal group voice their grievances - or more accurately 
when this marginal group comes into being by 'disagreeing' - that the partisan statement is 
precisely not univocal, not a message but a demand. A univocal statement identifies a 
particular reality, a reality not open to negotiation. However the 'world' to which Lacy's 
performers refer, one in which women are equal citizens (under this civil issue) was 'open 
to negotiation' because this issue was in 'dispute'. The 'referents' of their representations, 
including their own identities were in doubt, not authoritatively singular, but oscillating, 
emergent, contingent, in a word political. 
29 The different `content' of these understandings is less important than their implicit positioning of women as 
private, marginal beings. 
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Also, because the demand takes place under subjectivization, a performance of equality 
which reveals the non totality of the police order, an emancipatory effect results. The 
central stake of the disagreement is registered as the struggle against inequality. This is not 
'filled-in', or determined by a legitimating discourse (for instance patriarchy as the cause of 
all social ills)'and thus serves as an incision on the surface of the police, marking its frailty 
and encouraging (without directing) further subjectivization. 
Finally in choosing city hall Lacy targets a particular constituency of politicians and civic 
figures, directing the force of her collective performance at those not only implicated in the 
exclusions against which she protests, but also in a position to begin the (non-dialectical) 
transformation of demand into determined police reality. But this transformation can only 
occur - as it does within Lacy's performance - if the targeted demand undoes the orders of 
hierarchy between politicians and everyone else, provoking 'anxiety' and obliging the 
police to act. 
Therefore the demands and demonstrations which structure Lacy's collective performance 
are not univocal. They are targeted, but only so as to untie orders of authority, they are 
imposed, but only to press the police through a demonstration of its non-totality. Therefore 
In Mourning and In Rage is a form of art that fully embraces the political promise of the 
aesthetic. 
How does Lacy's performance compare with Fraser's Official Welcome? 
Fraser, although performing multiple shifting personas, does not perform a subjectivization. 
She does not create a political scene by taking issue with her own exclusion, by a police 
order, or in solidarity with others. The uncanny nature of her performed characters is not 
the result of bringing together a previous identity, beyond the pale of certain rights, and a 
new identity for which those rights are demanded on account of equality. There is no 
obvious meeting of a police logic and a political logic. 
Rather, I have argued that Fraser's impersonations parody those types of art world 
performance designed to secure distinction. And this is done to reveal distinction as the 
method whereby the hierarchy of social inheritance is reproduced. Fraser thereby 
communicates a univocal message, a final explanation for the operation of power within art 
and the social more generally. Her texts are very important in this respect. They are 
considered to be a facet of her practice, and they serve to anchor her production to this 
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reading. Again the problem is not that she 'spells out meaning', but that her meaning takes 
the form of a message. 
Let us pause for a second and give Fraser's work a more generous - from my perspective - 
reading. What if she is revealing the inequality at the heart of the social, showing that some 
are excluded from symbolic capital, some are treated less equally than others? This is 
undoubtedly part of her and Bourdieu's project. The ultimate motivating force for them is a 
reordering of social relations so as to mitigate social exclusion. Is this not the same as 
political action? 
No it is not. She postulates one reason for this exclusion, which is presented as unchanging 
and beyond negotiation. This content positivizes the claim for equality - fills it in, and as 
such obfuscates its emancipatory potential. This 'content' is pushed to the fore in her 
practice inducing stultification and mastery. 
Finally, even if we except that Fraser's analysis might actually mitigate the symbolic violence 
suffered by some - which is debateable - then the 'trace' which the implementation of the 
project leaves on the social, its discursive/affective legacy is still problematic. This trace is a 
confirmation of a break in intelligences between those (artist sociologists) able to perform 
the correct analysis, and everyone else whose interpretation is invalid. 
Conclusion: why subjectivization and art? 
Why should a political subjectivization be positioned as art? This question splits in two: 
firstly, what does this concept gain from being included in art? And secondly what might 
'art' gain from this inclusion? 
First, I will not answer these questions directly but rather re-iterate an explanation for why 
it might be likely to occur. I have indorsed the view that Rancierian political activity is more 
likely in a context in which equality is already written into the fabric of society (Ranciere 
1995, p. 48). And I have argued in Chapters One. (b) and Two that art under the aesthetic 
regime is part of this inscription. Within our contemporary notion of art lurks the promise 
of equality. The discourse of aesthetic regime art, as well as those museums and galleries 
which - at least in part - might be taken as monuments to this promise are available sites 
within which to demonstrate one's equal capacity (Gauny 1983, p. 45-46 cited in Ranciere 
2003b, p. 199). Thus art and the aesthetic in symmetry with the enshrined promise of 
democracy encourages political action operating as a marker against which instances of 
inequality can be measured and contested. 
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Therefore it is unsurprising that art and the aesthetic (its general 'discourse' as well as its 
institutions) would have been and continues to be an arena for subjectivization. As a side 
note, this places art activist practices which campaign for inclusion within the arts 
themselves in an interesting position. The Guerrilla Girls (Flanagan et al., 2007; Withers 
1988) subjectivize around a demand for women to be fairly included in the machinery of 
art - i. e. 'We want fair representation: more women artists in survey shows'. Here, art 
reveals itself to be like democratic government, or 'the law', both agents of the police as 
well as harbouring the seeds of their own egalitarian transformation. This shows something 
that we already knew, that the promise of art to enact equality under the aesthetic regime 
is often, perhaps most often, betrayed by the actually existing machinery of art. This is no 
reason to give up on that promise, to see, as does Bourdieu, this equality as an ideological 
cover for one deeper truth. Bourdieu's option is the worse one, leading to the endless 
reproduction of the pre-supposition of inequality. 
However in order to begin to answer our first question let us return to a more 'stable' 
example, that of an activist art practice for which the immediate target is not the 
institution of art but another facet of police order. As we have seen with Lacy the semantic 
demand: "we want to be able to unionise, to be paid fairly, to be subject to the law in the 
way that others are" is accompanied by an aesthetic demonstration, whereby the 
subjectivizing group demonstrates the equality of their intelligence through games of 
abstraction, or appropriation. I introduce this 'stable' example only to add a complication. 
As we have seen all political scenes are doubled in this way. Simply to contest one's mute 
position in society by speaking is to demonstrate one's equality aesthetically. However in 
the standard political scene this will always accompany a specific demand as part of a 
disagreement. In the classic case the Roman plebeians performed a kind of wild 
appropriation. Simply by using language 'formally', by adopting the etiquette and 
conventions of their superiors, they demonstrated their equality as well as semantically 
demanding it (Ranciere 1999, p. 24). The double demonstration in art then might be said to 
place an added emphasis on the aesthetic dimensions of the political demand; I am 
thinking of the way that the formal demonstration of visibility/audibility made within In 
Mourning and in Rage is highly exaggerated, utilizing 'imposing costumes' and loudly 
chanted speech. The non-instrumentality of art and the aesthetic seems to give greater 
licence to those subjectivizations that occur under its 'umbrella' (performed by artists, or 
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within museums, galleries etc) to amplify the 'formal' or (narrowly) aesthetic aspect of 
political action. 
Could we say then that a political subjectivization that occurs in art - because its 'formal' 
aspect is more heightened - is therefore more effective than the absolute standard scene? I 
think this is a step too far. We could argue that the heightening of this formal aspect might 
add weight to political action; the use of theatricality and spectacle producing more 'noise' 
and thus increasing the likelihood of placing the police order under stress, the stress of the 
recognition of social contradiction. 
But the counter argument can just as easily be made: the exaggerated (narrowly) aesthetic 
dimension might interfere with the police response to any disagreement, making it simpler 
to dismiss the premises upon which any claims are made. The police could use the fact that 
certain demands are made within art as a justification for rejecting them as unrealistic or 
unserious 
Therefore the primary theoretical move made by this thesis does not - has not attempted - 
to improve Ranciere's concept of subjectivization by inserting it into 'art'. However, to 
answer the second question posed above, the inclusion of subjectivization under the rubric 
of art and the aesthetic is a significant boon for an art practitioner wishing to make political 
work. My aim has been to appropriate the force of Ranciere's theory of politics for the 
practice of art-critique (democratic action as art). This force resides in the way the 
collective performance of equality attacks hierarchy at its weak point with lasting 
emancipatory consequences. Furthermore subjectivization focuses its energies on a 
particular issue, or point of dissensus, and can target a specific beneficiary of hierarchy, 
positioned so as to be obliged to hear (and act) on said demand. All things considered, 
subjectivization within art should be as effective as a 'standard' demonstration. These 
factors would seem to make this form of aesthetico-political action more politically direct 
than the more passive politics of emancipatory art. However this does not invalidate the 
politics of 'radical ambiguity'; art under the aesthetic regime if properly improper spurs all 
manner of disorderly interpretations and will (very often) involve a political stake. And as 
my analysis of Falls Burns Malone Fiddles (2003) confirms, I believe some art mobilizes an 
emancipatory politics more effectively than others. This work spurs multiple political 
interpretations, which might have any number of ramifications, and in this 'openness' 
resides its strength. 
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This chapter has performed a deconstructive-type procedure which shows that there is an 
inconsistency in Ranciere's attempt to hold apart political action as subjectivization, and 
'aesthetic action'. This chapter is therefore a polemical intervention into Ranciere's 
influential discourse, a questioning of the validity of his ethico-theoretical decision to 
exclude a specific type of commitment from art. This does not invalidate Ranciere's 
understanding of emancipatory artwork but expands its frame of reference so as to 
accommodate the 'demand' in art. In this way I have managed to further democratise 
Ranciere's democratic theory of the aesthetic. 
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Conclusion 
This project began as an attempt to understand and assimilate Ranciere's politico-aesthetic 
philosophy. In the process of its production an apparent discrepancy began to show itself. 
Both emancipatory art practice and collective political action were explained as bringing a 
paradoxical figure of equality into contact with police distributions, undermining their 
status as natural or given. And yet these two political logics, although tied together were - 
ultimately - held apart. In my favoured terminology, subjectivization was barred from 'the 
aesthetic'. Why was this? 
The chapter structure of the thesis, to a certain extent, represents both the framing of this 
discrepancy and an attempt to find a 'resolution'. Chapter One. (a) examines Ranciere's 
notion of equality showing it to be the quasi-transcendental condition of (im)possibility for 
police order, therefore causing the hierarchic constitution of that order to be necessarily 
weak. Out of this frailty the collective political subjects emerges, from Roman plebeians 
through nineteenth century French tailors, to second wave feminists. They all demand a 
historically contingent and specifically manifested case of equality which precisely 
corresponds to the non-totality of hierarchy. The introduction of this contentious equality 
of all-with-all creates a lacuna within the social which provokes anxiety among the 
beneficiaries of the status quo. 
Chapter One. (b) shows how an equality 'symmetrical' to the (strictly) political one is 
unlocked by the 'aesthetic revolution', founding a new historical regime on the unstable 
grounds of Kant's formulation of disinterestedness; an 'infectious idea', which moved 
beyond mere influence representing the "efficacy of a plot" (2002, p. 133-134). This 
aesthetic distribution deposed the previously dominant representational one, under which 
art was seamlessly integrated with the police. 
The third Earl of Shaftesbury was an influential propagator of representational logic. For 
him those who owned land or pursued 'liberal occupations' were in possession of a 
capacity (linked to reason) and leisure which enabled a proper appreciation of 'the arts'. 
And these 'gifts' were precisely those which also rendered this class both capable and 
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worthy of rule. Manual workers, on the other hand, lacked the reasoned-refinement as 
well as the spare-time for aesthetic appreciation and affairs of government. The Kantian 
intervention undermined the dominant role of reason. From this point on disinterestedness 
involved a 'free-play' in which all are theoretically able to participate, invalidating the 
notion of constituencies able to appreciate art and those unable. And at one and the same 
time, the attack on the 'hegemony of reason' subverted those arguments which sought to 
secure the legitimation of a specific class of rulers. 
Thus we can see that the cancelling of hierarchy within 'the aesthetic' is tightly bound-up 
with the suspension of hierarchy under subjectivization, their common stake being the 
demonstration of an equality antithetic to determination and categorization. They are both 
inherently political. 
However, to restate, according to Rancii re, the two 'equalities' can never precisely overlay. 
And after the work of Chapter One. (b) we can see why this is the case: aesthetic art 
provides a 'first step' towards collective political activity, but cannot 'directly' involve itself 
in such a project without travestying its aesthetic status, that is, without re-introducing the 
dominance of 'rational determination', which is - by definition - withdrawn within the 
aesthetic. However this consequence has often been ignored by artists and theorists who 
put art in the immediate service of politics by producing texts, objects and images which 
attempt "to build awareness of the mechanisms of domination to turn the spectator into a 
conscious agent of world transformation" (Ranciere 2009, p. 45). In this scenario objective 
knowledge, "the mechanisms of domination", is mined and then revealed to an audience. 
In other words, rationality again prevails. Emancipatory interpretation generated by free 
play, in which the social is imagined in different non-total configurations comes to a rest in 
the final blueprint for an alternative police order. To make art, or to theorise in this way is 
to communicate in 'messages' and to secure for oneself a position of mastery. 
Chapter Two diagnosed Bourdieu's theorization of the aesthetic as the erroneous reduction 
of art to the status of 'message'. For him aesthetic practices, recast as 'performances of 
distinction' always serve the reproduction of hierarchies of cultural inheritance (Bourdieu 
1990, p. 135). This concept of reproduction was found to represent the metaphysical centre 
of Bourdieu's system, an instance of transcendental contraband that determined the 
structure of his thought whilst being theorized as beyond all structurality. I then analysed 
how the advocacy of the theory of the 'secret centre' performatively reduces the likelihood 
of multiple, 'democratic' resistances to domination. This can be explained by the fact that 
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there is no one secret centre, power rather operates multiplicitously across many fronts, 
with the consequence that different agents will be better positioned to apprehend and 
respond to specific instances of hierarchy. The centralized logic of mastery obfuscates this 
multiple functioning and therefore reduces the likelihood of diverse resistances. Mastery is 
an instance of police distribution, serving to naturalize and thus reinforce hierarchy; 'I know 
the way better than you. 
Official Welcome (2001) falls into this authoritarian category. However not all political 
commitment within art need be so foundational. Chapter Three formulates a model in 
which artwork directly participates in collective 'paradoxical' political action thereby 
avoiding mastery. In this instance a futural political subject is not hailed, rather the artist 
communicates under subjectivization in a demanding dissensus with the police order, and 
in so doing demonstrates the impossibility of final foundations per se. This then represents 
my 'solution' to the discrepancy mentioned above. Under the specific circumstance of a 
subjectivization coinciding with aesthetic practice the politics of art and that of collective 
action collapse into one another without Introducing determination into the aesthetic. This 
scenario does not invalidate Ranciere's critique of 'messages' but provides another option 
for aesthetic practice, that of 'art as demand'. 
This enables me to situate a type of activist work, exemplified by Suzanne Lacy's In 
Mourning and In Rage as an example of emancipatory art. The benefit of which is that a 
description of the politicality of this work can draw on Ranciere's sophisticated 
characterization of the originary knotting of art and politics. I have found this framework to 
be more convincing than that 'lopsided' version offered by Bourdieu, providing a schema to 
understand the many manifestations of art in relation to its (supposed) outside, from the 
program of Bildung, the French artist-poet-workers of the 1830's, Russian constructivism, 
the avant-garde 'separatism' of Adorno, etc. 
But also by validating subjectivization as aesthetic I compliment Ranciere's 'passive' 
understanding of art's political efficacy with a more targeted version. (I have argued that 
Ranciere understands art-politics - narrowly understood - provids a defuse and general 
destabilising of grounds, which might then by used within collective political action). In my 
contribution particular agents of police power can be addressed, those persons who 
occupy a social position which enables them to redistribute the binary relations being 
contested. (In Lacy's example L. A City officials and politicians) These beneficiaries are 
placed under stress, obliged to hear the contradiction of their position. The force of 
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subjectivization coincides with its negativity and thus allows its accommodation under the 
category of the aesthetic; art-demands cannot be univocal as they split the social-given into 
'two worlds', they are targeted but only so as to untie relations of authority, they are 
imposed, but only to press the police through a demonstration of its non-totality. 
Finally the work of clarifying the conditions of mastery and message as against those of 
subjectivization and demand enables a sophisticated navigation of a current art world 
discourse, which, as we have seen, is structured around a rather un-nuanced binary 
understanding of the politics of art. As discussed there are those who support 'radical 
ambiguity' and those who favour the position of 'saying what you believe'. My contribution 
cuts across this dichotomy by introducing a form of committed art under the umbrella of 
'radical ambiguity'. One consequence of this move is to provide criteria with which to judge 
the political positions paraded under the banner of 'say what you believe'. Let me offer a 
final example. Mark Nash's article Reality in the Age of Aesthetics (Nash 2008, no page 
numbers) can be interpreted as offering tentative support for this second model. His 
argument is premised on what Ranciere might call an 'emplotment', or trajectory through 
the possibilities given within the dichotomy just mentioned. This plot can be stated thus: 
'effective political art practice must communicate a determined political stance, this 
coherency is challenged by formal, or aesthetic indeterminacy'. First he describes the 
characteristic quality of much art associated with the documentary turn: 
Artists often take an indirect route when engaging with issues that 
have an important political dimension. The idea of commitment can 
be uncool. Instead, the increasingly conventional aesthetic is 
minimalist, refusing to tell you what to think about what you are 
seeing. Rather, you have to make up your own mind, based on a very 
fragmentary mosaic (in linguistic terms there is no meta-discourse). 
(Nash 2008, no page number). 
Later he describes this aversion to commitment as potentially problematic, a bar on the 
political efficacy of such work. He gives Steve McQueen's film installation Gravesend (2007) 
as an example. The work takes as its starting point coltan mines in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. The miners work hard and in dangerous conditions, and Nash explains that their 
exploitation must be understood in terms of the broader historical and political context. 
However McQueen responds to this subject matter with an unapologetically abstract 
approach utilizing "a few key close-ups (hands breaking rock), set against "the blood-red 
sunset over the river Thames from which Joseph Conrad's Marlow sets off to explore the 
'heart of darkness"' (Nash 2008, no page number). 
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For Nash the drawback of the film is that it is "too withholding" (2008, no page number). 
Although he is sympathetic to Gravesend he seems to crave a meta-discourse which would 
stabilize the disorderly fragmentation of the work into a more coherent political 
proclamation. The problem to which I want to draw attention is that this political 
proclamation is figured as desirable (or effective) because of its distance from ambiguity. 
Politicality is figured as the opposite of, or endangered by, indeterminacy. This might 
suggest why so many calls for political commitment in contemporary art are bound-up with 
the validation of a foundational position (i. e. those pronouncements by Freee and 
Stallabrass both quoted in the introduction). However from my Rancierian perspective this 
attempt to counteract the inconclusiveness associated with aesthetic practice is 
authoritarian. 
Instead what I have proposed is a post-foundational model of commitment which 
embraces politics as a form of directed indeterminacy. Political activity produces aesthetic 
irresolution and is not the 'reassuring' opposite of Nash's 'minimal practices', rather 
occupying a similar territory. A demand, expressed by a subjectivizing subject challenges 
the police order with a demonstration of its non-totality, and it is this mobilization of 
indeterminacy which is the very reason for its political efficacy. 
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PhD Corrections: 
Between Mastery and Subjectivization; Jacques Ranciere and 
a Politics of Art without Foundation 
Steve Klee 
1. Briefly expand Ranciere's understanding of equality, especially as 
developed in The Ignorant Schoolmaster. 
My response to this request consists of two parts. 
Part One 
The following section should be read in relation to page 23 of original document: 
Ranciere is saying that all people have an equal intellectual capacity. This means that, if we 
are to follow the spirit of The Ignorant Schoolmaster, everyone is potentially as proficient 
at all subjects as everyone else. There are two claims here; anyone can learn any subject: 
"Jacotot's printer had a retarded son. They had despaired of making something of him. 
Jacotot taught him Hebrew. Later the child became an excellent lithographer" (Ranciere 
1991 p. 18). 
Those who deny this equal ability of everyone 'across the board' who say that there are 
those who are good at philosophy but bad at maths are in fact anti-equality. They secretly 
set one proficiency, normally their own, above and beyond others' in a hierarchy of 
embodied expertise, that is, a hierarchy of persons attached to specific expertises. 
The second claim is that anyone can learn a subject equally as well as any other person30 
This can be seen in the following quotation, attributed to Baptise Froussard, a director of a 
30 But even in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Ranciere's most uncompromising text on equal intelligence, he does 
seem to equivocate over the assertion that everyone might have the capacity to achieve a given intellectual 
task equally well. For example there is a section on artistic proficiency where he says: "Undoubtedly, there Is a 
great distance from this to making masterpieces. The visitors who appreciated the literary compositions of 
lacotot's students often made a wry face at their paintings and drawings. But it's not a matter of making great 
painters; it's a matter of making the emancipated: people capable of saying, "me too, I'm a painter"" (Ranciere 
1991 p. 66-67) 
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school in Grenoble who visited Jacotot's institution to see for himself the remarkable 
pedagogic results about which he had heard. 
After an hour, a new astonishment came over him when he 
heard the quality of the compositions written beneath his 
nose, and the improvised commentaries that justified them. 
He particularly admired an explication of art done on a 
passage from Athalie, along with a justification or verification, 
which was comparable, in his opinion, to the most brilliant 
literary lesson he had ever heard. (Ranciere 1991 p. 43) 
To restate: these feats of learning are reducible to intellectual equality. We all possess the 
ability to learn any subject, and learn any subject as well as anyone else. If we fail to do so 
this is not because of a lack of innate ability but because of a lack of will. 
There aren't two sorts of minds. There is inequality in the 
manifestations of intelligence, according to the greater or 
lesser energy communicated to the intelligence by the will for 
discovering and combining new relations; but there is no 
hierarchy of intellectual capacity. Emancipation is becoming 
conscious of this equality of nature. This is what opens the 
way to all adventure in the land of knowledge (Ranciere 1991 
p. 27). 
However there is no need to necessarily defend the most uncompromising claims made in 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster in order that the assertion of the 'equality of intelligences' 
retains its political usefulness. For example we need not claim that everyone is equally 
capable of a certain gold standard of proficiency in all subjects, that we could all become 
astrophysicists and brain surgeons (or astrophysicists as well as brain surgeons), if only we 
applied ourselves properly. For the notion of the equality of intelligences to retain its 
political usefulness we need only make the more limited assertion that everyone has the 
capacity to understand that they are being dominated, or exploited and the intelligence to 
be able to fight back (to rally arguments, organise, strike, protest etc) against this 
subjection. 
To presuppose that people are equally intelligent is not to 
presuppose that they are capable of the same SAT scores or 
that anyone could have formulated the theory of relativity... It 
is to presuppose that we are equally capable of putting 
together meaningful lives in interaction with one another, 
and to rise to the tasks that life puts before us (May 2008 p. 
57). 
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Part Two 
The following section should be read in relation to page 24 of the original document: 
Before I continue in my effort to elaborate the connection between the philosophies' of 
Derrida and Ranciere I need to flag an issue, one that causes me to precede with caution in 
the intention of comparing equality with certain pseudo-ontological figures such as 
absence, dissemination, detour, diffdrance, writing... In important respects the work of 
Derrida and Rancii re would seem incompatible, even opposed. And one area where this 
difference would appear to manifest particularly starkly is in Ranciere's theorisation of 
equality. 
We have seen that Ranciere unconditionally affirms that everyone is in possession of an 
equal intelligence. Consequently he views political action or indeed emancipatory 
education as dependant on a decisive performance of equality. This agental action which 
utilises words and gestures turns the police order 'upside-down'. Therefore Ranciere's 
emphasis on unconditionality and 'punctual action' (we are simply equal, here and now! ) 
would seem very different from the accepted image of Derridean thought; is he not known 
for an emphasis on the relational, provisional quality of meaning? His philosophy of 
'Diffdrance' militates against, indeed deconstructs, notions of decisiveness or punctuality. 
As I outline later in this chapter Derrida views 'determined concepts', which would seem to 
be tied up with any instance of 'unconditional affirmation' as a fallacy, corrupted by a 
contradictory diffdrance. In these terms then Derrida's theoretical emphasis would seem to 
be very different from Ranciere's. Consequently my attempt to tease out the philosophical 
status of Rancierlan equality precisely by reading it alongside Derridean differance would 
appear wrongheaded. 
However although they are very different thinkers I believe we should not be blind to the 
suppositions that they share. Several commentators have noted their commonalities. For 
instance Michael Dillon has written that: 
Like many contemporary continental thinkers the starting point for 
Ranciere is that, 'the initial logos is tainted with a primary 
contradiction' (Disagreement). That primary contradiction, as he 
says in Ten Thesis on Politics, establishes a fundamental 
incommensurability that is in turn a supplementarity or remainder 
(2003 p. 2). 
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it is not contentious to suggest that Derrida is being evoked as one of these contemporary 
continental thinkers, Dillon's use of the word 'supplement' suggests as much. And even 
more explicitly Andrew Parker in his introduction to The Philosopher and His Poor states 
that Ranciere's later work "clearly owes something to deconstruction" (Parker 2003 p. 
pxvii). How then do we square this circle? How can there be both an apparent 
oppositionality and similarity within the thought of these two thinkers? And in what way 
does this problematic centre on the issue of equality? 
We can begin to clarify this situation if we both focus on a specific text and interrogate 
those parameters within which their oppositionality would seem to emerge. I want to use 
Ranciere's essay Does Democracy Mean Something (2010), often described as an ode to 
Derrida so as to reveal that their dissimilarity is not reducible to a dichotomy between a 
philosophy of deferral (Derrida) and one of affirmation (Ranciere). Affirmation in the hands 
of Ranciere is also at the same time a type of deferral. 
In Does Democracy Mean Something Ranciere shows himself not to be fundamentally 
opposed to Derridean deferral. In fact he expresses solidarity with Derrida's reading of 
'democracy to come' (Derrida 1994) precisely as that which thwarts the notion of any 
particular democracy as fully present and as such operates as a virtual synonym of 
diffdrance, supplement, trace etc. Ranciere and Derrida are here both set against the self 
satisfied triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama's thesis about contemporary liberal democracy 
as having achieved the 'end of history'. Fukuyama posits "a liberal democracy that has 
finally realised itself as the ideal of human history" (Ranciere 2010 p. 58 citing Derrida 1994 
p. 85) 
Ranciere says: 
A democracy to come, as Derrida sees it, is not a democracy 
that will come in the future, but a democracy emploted 
within a different time, a different temporal plot. The time of 
'democracy to come' is the time of a promise that has to be 
kept even though - and precisely because - it can never be 
fulfilled. It is a democracy that can never reach itself, because 
it involves an infinite openness to that which comes - which 
also means an openness to the Other or the newcomer. I 
cannot but agree with this principle. (2010 p. 58-59) 
Ranciere'cannot but agree' with the conceptualisation of an infinitely deferred democracy, 
one which can 'never reach itself' and this is so because it is a conception of the existing 
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institution of democracy that he shares. Unlike Fukuyama who views liberal democracy as a 
realised ideal, the police order can never reach final fruition. And if for Derrida it is the 
infinitely deferred 'democracy to come' that stands in the way of any finalised democracy, 
then I would argue that for Ranciere the impediment is equality. Why make this claim? 
Because Ranciere does so too, in Disagreement he clearly ties the equality of speaking 
beings to the internal contradiction of the police order. It is through political action - 
dependent on equality - that this contradiction is revealed, showing the existing order to 
have been and to be forever 'undone'. 
Political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes 
the police order by a basically heterogenous assumption... the 
equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being 
(1999 p. 30) 
As we have already seen (pages 23 and 24 of this thesis) a further similarity between 
Ranciere's notion of equality and Derridean 'infrastructure' reveals itself when we 
elaborate the exact logic of the contradiction. It is not that equality is simply 
heterogeneous to police order but that very order also depends upon it. This point Is 
expressed succinctly in The Ignorant Schoolmaster: "social inequality is unthinkable, 
impossible, except on the basis of the primary equality of intelligence" (1991 p. p87). 
Equality is the condition of possibility for the police order as well as being the condition of 
impossibility for its full realisation. Equality, through its demonstration in collective politics 
renders nonsensical the attempt to finalise any hierarchic police order. Therefore, in this 
sense, the equal capacity of all with all serves to discredit and continually defer the 
realisation of an ultimately impossible social totality. 
However, there is undeniably a difference in the way that the two philosophers 
conceptualise how this deferral of democracy as existing social institution, or police order, 
actually occurs. To put it very schematically we can say that Ranciere - as we have seen - 
positions this 'deferral', better described in his case as an interruption, in the decisive 
action of a collective political subject. 
Whereas for Derrida the modality of deferral is such that actual instances of political 
dissensus are theoretically devalued considered with suspicion even, so that "in order to 
avoid any pre-emptive identification of the event, the other or the infinite, he has to 
perform an endless supplementive process of deconstruction, crossing-out and 
apophansis" (Ranciere 2010 p. 60). 
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This theoretical emphasis serves to close down the space for what Ranciere has called 
democratic practice or subjectivization, that dissensual activity of a subject enacting the 
egalitarian trait here and now. This speech or action is decisive, and dependent on an 
unconditional affirmation of the equality of all with all. 
It would seem then that it is in the way that these philosophers mobilise the notion of 
deferral (in aggression to an idea of a fully 'realised' democracy) that their difference 
becomes apparent. Despite 'appearances' any affirmation of the equality of intelligences 
made by Ranciere in texts or performed by political agents 'on the street' is bound up with 
a type of deferral. 
In this section I have attempted to reveal that the difference between Derrida and Ranciere 
does not lie in a dichotomous distinction between an affirmative, punctual thought and 
one of deferral but in a dissimilarity in the `positioning' of deferral. In so doing I have 
attempted to pre-emptively justify reading these theorists together to draw comparisons 
between certain pseudo-ontological figures within Derrida's oeuvre and Ranciere's highly 
novel elaboration of equality. 
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2. A clarification (and further illustration) of the differences between 
'demand' and 'message' 
The following section should be read in relation to page 118 of the existing document: 
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The following section extends my attempt to clarify the difference between demand and 
message. One aspect of this task will involve characterizing the Zapatista movement - at 
least its 'emergent period' between 1994 and 97 - as an example of subjectivization. It is 
my contention that in this well known popular rebellion the critico-political signification of 
demand was in evidence. I will then compare the political demand made within the 
Zapatista movement with the critical message manifested in the famous disavowal by the 
French Communist Party of the May 68 uprising. Finally I will describe how Fred Lonidier's 
exhibition N. A. F. T. A (Not a free Trade forA!! ) (1999) should also be viewed as a partaking in 
a subjectivization and as issuing demands to a specific police authority as represented by 
the "industrial community" (Lonidier 1999). 
What is the difference between a demand and a message? The first stage of any answer 
must make clear that demands operate within what Ranciere calls subjectivization, 
democratic action or simply politics. Messages on the other hand partake in the dynamic of 
mastery. 
Subjectivization disrupts the police order through a collective performance of equality 
thereby introducing a troubling indeterminacy into the count of existing social groups. A 
basic unit of subjectivization is what I have called 'the demand'; if subjectivization is 
premised on the demonstration of equality then 'the demand' is the signification - directed 
primarily at 'power' - through which that display is expressed. This signification can take 
myriad forms: a speech made at a rally, a written manifesto or letter, a physical action or 
an image... 
In contradistinction the procedure of mastery although ostensibly critical of the existing 
order presupposes an inequality between constituencies within the social, which ultimately 
supports police order stultifying the possibility of subjectivization. Or in other words, the 
consequences of this procedure are not the introduction of a 'troubling indeterminacy' but 
the shoring-up of the hierarchic categories of police order31. One basic unit of mastery is 
'the message' being a signification not directed (primarily) at 'power', rather aimed at 'the 
31 I want to pre-empt any possible misconception that a demand is somehow not a 'straightforward' 
signification. A demand Is not more cryptic than a message nor Is it shrouded In a 'poetic language'. This 
misconception of demands centres on the way in which they Introduce indeterminacy into the police order. Just 
because demands provoke a type of confusion amongst the beneficiaries of hierarchy does not mean that their 
semantic content is unclear. This Is absolutely not the case. As we shall see, and have seen (p. 30-31/104-107), 
demands are the means by which an absolutely unequivocal expression of equality confronts a police hierarchy: 
"We women, the aged, minorities, the young etc demand the rights afforded others". (A demand Is also made 
when expressing solidarity with those 'parts without part'). It Is only through this unequivocal statement, In the 
here and now, that the police Is confronted by its non-totality and therefore made aware of the pure 
contingency of its own categories. Therefore a demand does not have an indeterminate semantic structure 
rather the demand reveals the police order to be non-determined, a structure without closure. 
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people' and designed so as to raise their political consciousness. (Again this signification 
can take many forms). The author of the message presupposes that 'the people' must be 
led (and led towards an awareness of a positively conceived universal principle of 
domination)32 and therefore assumes an inequality between himself and others. 
The difference between message and demand is decisively dependent on the difference 
between an empty or pseudo universal and a positive or determined universal. Put bluntly 
the demand occurs under (and produces) conditions which emphasize that equality is the 
empty universal around which all political dissensus circulates. 
On the other hand the message obfuscates equality as the decentred heart of political 
struggle by filling the universal with positive determined content and this move at one and 
the same time instantiates a relation of mastery. Therefore I will now discuss the difference 
between a political perspective consonant with the empty universal and one consonant 
with the positive, determined one. 
In Disagreement Ranciere often refers to equality in terms of an "empty freedom" that 
everyone possesses: "politics begins with a major wrong: the gap created by the empty 
freedom of the people and the arithmetical and geometrical order" (1999 p. 19). 
First, what does it mean to call this Rancierian notion of equality an empty or pseudo 
universal? 33 It means that equality acts as the universal stake within political struggle - 
every instance of politics (as defined by Ranciere) will ultimately be a matter of 
demonstrating the existing equality of all, thereby proving the hierarchy of the police order 
to be invalid. (To be precise then, in the register of my discussion here, it is the nexus 
'inequality contested by equality' that is the 'empty universal'). Although this nexus 
operates universally in one respect, that is, by remaining the same under every occasion, 
unlike other universals it cannot be proscriptive in terms of the content of its 
32 This bracketed caveat Is Introduced because to convey a 'universal principle of domination' to 'the people' 
does not always result In a message. There Is one very Important exception; one can convey that inequality is 
the universal cause of domination (and that consequently the cure for this domination Is the performance of 
equality) without communicating via message. (Ranciere's own work can be cited as an example here). This is 
because equality under Ranciere's system Is not a positively conceived universal, rather it possesses an 
emptiness. Equality Is an empty, or pseudo universal; I realise that there is some resistance to interpreting 
equality as'empty', particularly when certain Derridean'pseudo ontological' figures are used as an alibi for this 
reading. In my viva of 31g March 2010 Peter Haliward contested my position on this Issue. I have modified my 
stance and Implicitly answered his criticisms In a new section on pages 140 to 143. The philosophical statuses of 
the positive and empty universals are not symmetrical. To preach Inequality as the universal cause of 
domination and the verification of existing equality as its cure does not suppose a difference In capacity 
between people, rather It supposes the opposite. 
33 For a longer more philosophically detailed discussion see pages 22 to 27 
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manifestation. This is because there are many, many ways that people can be treated 
unequally; they might be paid less, discriminated against because of their colour, gender, 
age etc. And consequently there are many, many registers in which the subaltern can 
perform this equality so as to resist their positioning. 
Therefore the nexus `inequality contested by equality' is empty in that it does not proscribe 
a particular type of exploitation, or resistance. All manner of socially and historically 
contingent forms of exploitation might come to fill the space of domination. At certain 
times in certain cultures or geographic regions the issue of race might become the most 
virulent way in which inequality expresses itself. At other times and places gender might 
become the dominant frontier for inequality34. But these struggles are always, if they are 
political, versions of inequality and can be contested via - always different - performances 
of equality. Finally to ascribe to the empty universality of the political nexus inequality/ 
equality means that one cannot denigrate certain political struggles as inauthentic35, rather 
one must remain open to the possibility of new and surprising frontiers across which 
equality might be contested. 
The demand then is a signification involved in the process of political resistance, which 
always emphasizes the nexus inequality/equality as the crux of that and every other 
struggle against domination. This 'emphasizing function' is most obvious when the word 
equality is explicitly used in a confrontation with beneficiaries of hierarchy. An example 
that Ranciere uses to exemplify the 'political demand' (and appears a number of times in 
this thesis) Involves a Tailors strike of the 1800s. The victimised Tailors contest their 
treatment in a court of law stating: 
If Monsieur Persil or Monsieur Schwartz is right to say what he 
does and do what he does, the preamble of the charter should be 
deleted. It should read: the French people are not equal. If by 
contrast [the preamble] is upheld, then Monsieur Persil or 
Monsieur Schwartz must speak or act differently. (Ranciere 1995, 
p. 47). 
34 I am of course simplifying the situation here so as to make my point; these 'times, cultures and regions' can 
and do overlay; racial and gender domination can and does exist simultaneously. 
35 One can of course say that certain struggles are simply not political in that they do not meet the structural 
criteria for political activity set out by Ranciere. For instance war or trade agreements between parties of equal 
strength or visibility will not be political contestations. 
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The Tailors straightforwardly demand that their equality, inscribed In law within the French 
charter of 1830, be recognised in word and deed. I will give two further more detailed 
examples of 'demand' but now I want to discuss 'messages'. 
A positively conceived universal posits a specific content for the universal feature; for 
instance 'Capitalist exploitation' lies behind all forms of domination. And this 'filling out' of 
the universal feature can only result in a political message. One clear example of this form 
of signification would be: 'sexism and racism are ultimately reducible to class war'. This 
statement adheres to the avant-gardist perspective that Capitalist exploitation (as 
universal) must be responsible for exploitation under every circumstance. There is a clear 
element of proscription here concerning the appropriate frontier across which an 
'authentic' exploitation might operate. This is not to say that this perspective views 
capitalist exploitation as operating in exactly the same way every time. This outlook can be 
cognisant of the internal complexity and multiplicity of capitalism, which undoubtedly 
produces all manner of exploitations. However the problem persists because this 
'heterogeneous domination' is always seen to be the result of capitalism. Therefore under 
this perspective sexism and racism do not have their own integrity as struggles but are 
merely consequences of capitalist exploitation: "Racism, for instance, could be accounted 
for as a way to divide workers against one another, or sexism as a way to keep the 
reproduction of the working class intact" (May 2010 p. 74). However in the last forty five 
years or so this avant-gardism has been contested by the appearance of political 
movements which defy its logic. 
The events of the late 1960s in the West revealed that Marxist 
class analysis could not account for the particularity of different 
oppressions or the integrity of the resistances against those 
oppressions. Racism is not simply a matter of working-class 
politics. It has a history which precedes and, while intersecting 
with, is irreducible to class. The civil rights movement cannot 
simply be thought under the categories of class struggle, nor can 
the woman's suffrage movement, the gay rights movement, or the 
struggles of various indigenous groups in their various countries 
(May 2010 p. 74). 
Also if placing 'empty' equality in the universal position allows one to be open to the 
possibility of new and surprising frontiers across which inequality might be contested then 
replacing it with a positive content introduces a more close-minded attitude. 
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Again one can cite examples where avant-gardist political attitudes have closed down or 
undermined the possibility of resistance by discouraging/disparaging the veracity of 'other' 
political approaches. 
In France, the events of May 1968 led to the demise of the 
Communist Party itself, since it could not recognize the 
irreducibility of all other struggles to its own; in fact, it proved 
itself willing to turn against its own striking workers and align itself 
with the rightist De Gaulle government in order to prevent the 
emergence of those irreducible struggles (May 2010 p. 74). 
In this respect the nomenclature of the PCF issued a number of 'messages'; claiming on the 
3'd of May that the student movement represented mere "grouplets", suggesting an 
inauthentic, meagre political manifestation. Then later they argued for workers to leave 
picket lines and return to their factories because they were "not yet ready for revolution" 
(Ross 2002). 
In this way the attitude of the French Communist Party is a prime example of mastery: a 
rigid belief in a 'positivized' descriptive schema which dictates the proper conditions for 
revolution is communicated to 'the people' so as to discourage them from taking 
'alternative' political paths. (For a full discussion of mastery see page 73 of this thesis). 
I now want to discuss a political movement which unlike the French Communist Party of 
the 60s is premised upon the presupposition of equality. Following Todd May I diagnose 
Zapatismo as an example of subjectivization, a struggle that has emphasized 'empty 
equality' as the key stake in its attempt to overthrow oppression36. Consequently the 
Zapatista's have utilized demands. 
36 This footnote provides a sketch of the political 'wrongs' that the Zapatistas' contest: In 1988 there was a 
change in the Mexican government with Carlos Salinas de Gortari elected as president. The new incumbents 
ushered in a slew of privatizations, trade liberalizations as well as wage and price controls. Over the same 
period and Into the early 90s there was a sharp drop in the price of coffee which had a detrimental impact on 
the Mexican population and the Chiapas region particularly. Against this background there was an amendment 
to an important article of Mexican Agrarian law. Article 27 had been inscribed in the Mexican constitution 
(1917) during the protracted period of revolution (1910-20). It gave poor agricultural workers (campesinos) the 
right to petition for land redistribution, also stating that Mexican land should stay in Mexican hands. The 
modification annulled both these features, thereby protecting the increasing privatization of Mexican farming 
land. Soon after these changes the Zapatistas began preparing for open conflict. The timing of the rebellion was 
set for January the e 1994 to coincide with the commencement of NAFTA, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. This agreement provides integration of the US, Canadian and Mexican economies through the 
removal of national trade barriers. Both the amendments to Article 27 and NAFTA are neoliberal political moves 
serving to keep land in the hands of big agricultural organisations eager to export their goods within the global 
economy. The losers here are primarily the campesinos of the Chiapas (overwhelmingly indigenous) unable to 
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The Zapatistas are a collective resistance movement who grew out of and fight for the 
indigenous campesinos communities of the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. In 1996 
they negotiated an agreement with the Mexican government known as the San Andres 
Accords. I quote a section of these accords, as a clear example of 'demand'. 
Mutual treatment among the peoples and cultures that form 
Mexican society is to be based on respect for their differences, 
on the premise of their fundamental equality. As a consequence, 
it is to be the policy of the government to conduct itself 
accordingly and to promote in society a pluralistic orientation 
which effectively combats every form of discrimination and 
corrects economic and social inequalities. (Womack 1999 p. 311) 
Again this demand explicitly utilises the word equality which is positioned in the paragraph 
so as to suggest a primacy. Fundamental equality would appear to be the stake against 
which multiple discriminations and exploitations should be measured. This example then 
neatly fits my criteria for a demand in that it emphasises the empty equality of all with all 
and does not 'fill in' that space with a positive feature that is responsible for Chiapian 
inequality per-se (for instance neoliberal capitalism). 
Let me be absolutely clear on this point. I am not saying that Neoliberal capitalism is 
somehow not responsible for the domination of Mexicans; that we shouldn't point the 
finger "because it is a complex situation", absolutely not. 
Neoliberal capitalism is to blame for much Chiapian misery but in a historically and socially 
contingent way. Certainly it is tied up with many 'ills' but not all, and not - from our 
Rancierian position - as the prime mover. We might say that it Is the presupposition of 
inequality which 'enables' man to exploit one another economically. We shouldn't give 
into the temptation to elevate neoliberal capitalism to the position of 'universal'. Rather 
the universal feature of every political wrong (as strictly defined by Ranciere) is that it 
follows from an instance of inequality. 
However demands do not always explicitly use the word equality, how then can one be 
sure to recognise them? 
utilise the land in a more collective and locally sensitive manner and unable even to contest - as they would 
have been able to do under the old article 27 - the neoliberal developments 
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To begin my answer I shall invent a signification which acts as a short hand for many of the 
statements associated with the Zapatista movement: "Neoliberal capitalism is responsible 
for the exploitation of the indigenous population of the Chiapas and this is intolerable". 
Is this a demand or message? The answer is that it can be either depending on the 
conditions of its enunciation. There is not always a clear semantic distinction between 
demand and message; For example demands are necessarily a collective enunciation, a 
statement made as part of a broader social movement or in solidarity with that movement. 
This cannot always be ascertained by looking at words on a page. Certainly in the example 
above the distinguishing features are to be found in the context in which these words 
might be spoken or written. 
Simply put we must look for evidence in the context of the enunciation to clarify whether 
the term 'neoliberal capitalism' in this statement represents a positivized universal 
principle of exploitation or whether the sentence operates within a political situation in 
which equality as a pseudo or empty universal plays the privileged role. 
If this statement is spoken as part of or in solidarity with the Zapatista movement then the 
words do form a demand. If on the other hand the words are part of a discourse which sees 
neoliberalism as the evil lurking behind every instance of political wrong and is therefore 
resistant to popular movements which do not conform to their theoretical stance then the 
words form a message. 
The Formal conditions of Demand 
One way of describing subjectivization is as a collective resistance movement. Demands are 
therefore always issued by those in the process of collectively resisting domination. 
Let me first address the issue of 'the collective' then I will turn my attention to the issue of 
'resistance'. 
Political action - and therefore the demands which flow from it - involves a collective 
presupposition and demonstration of equality. There is no logical reason why a 
demonstration of equality might not be made individually. In fact this procedure would 
seem to be described in the Ignorant Schoolmaster. Jacotot's method asks of a student that 
they verify the equality of their intelligence via scholarly work. This would then seem to be 
an individual demonstration. However for Ranciere political or democratic action of the 
sort that has the potential to undermine the police order must be collective. 
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A subjectivization is necessarily a collective process. Demands will therefore be issued 
collectively or made on behalf of a collective. 
Subjectivization as 'resistance movement' should be understood as a localised struggle 
against a specific instance of inequality. For the Zapatista's this might be the unequal 
treatment of the indigenous population of Chiapas as expressed in the denial of their right 
to collectively farm the land as manifested within the changes to Article 27, and the 
inauguration of NAFTA. 
Under Ranciere's system although what is revealed by democratic action is the unjust 
nature of inequality as such37, this universal point is made through a specific, particular or 
localised encounter with the police order. Therefore a demand always results from, is the 
contestation of, a specific localised instance of inequality or wrong. 
In my book, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, I advocated the thesis of 
the French theorist of emancipation, Joseph Jacotot, according to 
whom emancipation can only be the emancipation of individuals. 
This means that that there is no political stage, only the law of 
[police] and the law of equality. In order for a political stage to 
occur, we must change that assumption. Thus... I shall say that 
[police] wrongs equality, and I shall take the political to be the 
place where the verification of equality is obliged to turn into the 
handling of a wrong. (Ranciere 1992 p. 64) 
Thus the local aspect of the Zapatista's struggle is a contextual feature which allows us to 
recognise their words as demands. 
However a subjectivization is not only a collective, localised resistance movement but is a 
resistance movement which contests an unequal position. The demand must be part of a 
demonstration of equality which tears subjects away from their existing subaltern position 
where they are considered invisible or mere victims towards a new equal identity. Purely 
by making the demand, by speaking "equal to equal" with their oppressors they begin the 
journey of subjectivization. The demand is only a demand when it institutes this dis- 
Indentification from a lowly identity. Therefore the demand always operates within a 
hierarchic situation. As I have already said under this definition there are no demands in 
war, or trade disagreements between sides of equal strength or status. Therefore a 
demand will always issue from a subaltern figure to a supposed superior (or from someone 
37 It Is on this point (as well as others) that Rancii rian politics differs from a politics of identity. However an extended discussion of these issues is beyond the remit of this text. 
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who sides in solidarity with the subaltern). Under this 'architecture' of hierarchy equality is 
a key stake - and revealed as such - in the political action. 
However more needs to be said on this point. Resistance movements of the dominated are 
not always tied up with the presupposition of equality. The performance of equality is 
premised on revealing the equality of everyone. Movements which see themselves as being 
equal to their dominators and superior to everyone else are not egalitarian. This would be 
the case with the avant-gardist political model which provides a positive universal 
explanation for domination: "We are equal to our neoliberal oppressors but superior to 
those deluded others who do not recognise capitalist exploitation as universal; we are 
superior to those others who insist on claiming there are struggles irreducible to this 
'centre' of exploitation". Therefore when attempting to recognise whether the 
signification of a resistance movement is that of demand or message one must judge the 
egalitarian credentials of that movement. It is only within a collective movement which 
judges or presupposes all to be equal that'the demand' is enunciated. 
One of the most compelling pieces of evidence for the presupposition of equality as the 
primary motivation for Zapatismo would appear to be the movement's attitude towards 
women. In the traditional culture of the Chiapas women occupy a subservient role denied 
many of the rights afforded their male counterparts. Now as we have seen the Zapatistas 
grew out of and fight for this community - often against neoliberalism - but the Zapatista 
movement is also famous for its rejection of the forceful patriarchy endemic within the 
traditional communities. This rejection is often described as the "revolution within the 
revolution". In fact their first public declaration made in January 1994 included the 
Woman's Revolutionary Law. The timing of this declaration means that the issue of 
women's rights would seem not to be an addendum to the 'main' struggle but absolutely 
central to the guiding principle of the movement. The Woman's Revolutionary Law 
included for the right to take part in revolutionary struggle, the right to work and a fair 
wage, the right to decide the number of children they bear, the right to chose whom to 
marry, the right not to be physically abused... 
Importantly the demands made under this law do not follow an avant-gardist logic which 
supposes the reason for gender inequality is reducible to neoliberalism. The two struggles 
are not causally connected in this way; rather it would be logical to suggest that their 
commonality, that which unites and animates both struggles is simply the presupposition 
of equality against inequality. 
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In addition the movement emphasizes its solidarity or equality with other struggles. This is 
made clear in Zapatista Major Ana Maria's speech of 1995: 
Behind us are the we that are you. Behind our balaclavas is the 
face of all excluded women. Of all the forgotten indigenous 
people. Of all the persecuted homosexuals. Of all the despised 
youth. Of all the beaten migrants. Of all those imprisoned for their 
word and thought. Of all the humiliated workers. Of all those who 
have died from being forgotten. Of all the simple and ordinary 
men and women who do not count, who are not seen, who are 
not named, who have no tomorrow (Holloway and Pelaez 1998 p. 
189) 
This genuine egalitarianism is not just a feature of Zapatismo but of all subjectivization. 
Demands function and can be recognised under the conditions of subjectivization. These 
conditions are: a collective contestation of a localised hierarchic situation (directed at 
specific beneficiaries of that hierarchy) by a performance of the equality of every speaking 
being. If these conditions are met by any signification then it is necessarily a demand. 
On the other hand a message need not be issued as a collective nor does it necessarily 
focus on a contestation of a localised instance of inequality. Often the author of messages 
will ignore particular conflicts concentrating instead on generating a generalised theory of 
power or domination. (However this 'turning away' from specific instances of conflict to 
theorise power-in-general does not necessarily result in messages. Again Ranciere's own 
work might be characterised in this way). The author of messages also tends to conceive of 
their signification being directed (primarily) at 'the people' and as possessing a pedagogic 
function rather than being a direct confrontation with power. However the decisive 
difference is that messages presuppose inequality; the author of a message identifies 
domination with a positivized universal feature thus introducing hierarchy into their own 
discourse. The notion of power as operating across one frontier can only denigrate those 
others (mere grouplets) who insist on resisting in ways irreducible to the schema of 
message. 
I now want to bring my discussion back to art practice and briefly discuss Fred Lonidier's 
exhibition N. A. F. T. A (Not a free Trade for All) at the Theatre Gallery of the Autonomous 
University of Baja California, Tijuana, Mexico (March 1999). The show consisted of several 
wall mounted installations of photographs and texts. 
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Again the 'issue' concerns NAFTA and the removal of trade restrictions between the US and 
Mexico, which Grant H. Kester points out enables the "corporate sector... [to pit] ... workers 
and local governments in the United States against those in Mexico, in pursuit of the lowest 
possible wages and tax burdens" (Kester 2004 p. 177-8). 
Within this setting Lonidier's work addresses the collusion of the Mexican government and 
multinational corporations based primarily in the United States to disrupt any attempt by 
the Mexican 'maquiladora' workers to develop Independent unions outside of the 
government controlled 'official' organisations. 
specifically want to focus on a piece titled The Mask... of Democracy... Unmasked? This 
consists of four portrait photographs of grassroots union organisers, all wearing masks to 
conceal their identity, alongside texts which recount their experiences. For example one 
reads: "Well, we have already declared ourselves to the fight for our union... The injustices 
that worker's suffered have not been resolved by the company, but the company continues 
to inflict them upon the personnel" (Kester 2004 p. 179) 
I believe this artwork, acting as part of the exhibition and within the broader Mexican 
workers' movement should be seen as a demand. 
Firstly, the work does not formulate a political strategy that the workers are advised to 
follow, rather it serves to amplify the discourse through which the group comes together. 
He sees himself as working "not only on behalf of, but alongside, communities in struggle" 
and spends substantial periods of time building relationships with union members and 
organisers (Kester 2004 p. 180). His exhibition operates alongside - in solidarity with - 
rather than performing a directorial role. 
The amplification also deliberately brings the workers' discourse into contact with specific 
beneficiaries of hierarchy. The exhibition is sited in a gallery located in the midst of an 
industrial zone; you can see a maquiladora plant from the front door. Also Lonidier 
extensively advertised the exhibition, leafleting the Maquiladora Association Office and 
putting up posters in the area. It is clear that certain 'beneficiaries' were hailed by the 
exhibition as members of what Lonidier calls the 'industrial community' (Lonidier 1999) put 
pressure on the University resulting in the closure of the exhibition. As Ranciere says 
politics is about obliging the police to hear (Rancie re 1995 p. 86). The closure suggests that 
the exhibition made enough noise to get attention but not enough to make the police 
order listen. 
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Under these conditions the artwork takes on the precise valence of demand. The 
photographs amplify the workers calls to be considered as equals, to be spared 
humiliations and ultimately to be free to unionise without corporate persecution. Also this 
labour movement would appear to be genuinely egalitarian in that a stated aim is to 
"encourage class solidarity across boundaries of national and ethnic difference" (Kester 
2004 p. 177). This then is not a struggle against an oppressor at the expense of other 
constituencies, rather there would seem to be a commitment to an 'expansive' equality. 
The demands tear the workers away from their previous identity as lowly pressing towards 
a new equal one. Interestingly the photographs highlight the workers' indeterminate 
identities at the point of subjectivization via demand. They are pictured behind Halloween 
masks: Frankenstein's monster, Jason from the Friday The 13th movies, a Witch and 
Skeleton. These cheap joke-shop masks sit oddly within Lonidier's mug-shot format. When 
looking at these types of image - passport photos, facebook profile pictures - we are 
conditioned to see 'likenesses', portraits of individuals, whereas in Lonidier's versions 
anonymity prevails. 
This work acts as a conduit for the demands of the maquiladora workers through which 
they are shown to be equal. The proof that anyone is equal to anyone else is what 
threatens the police order based as it is on hierarchy. Finally, the masks neatly "double" or 
comment upon the process of subjectivization via demand in that they convey anonymity 
and threat. 
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3. Revision and clarification of the critique of `transcendental', 
`univocal' or `metaphysical' categories 
This following section should be read in relation to the introduction: 
Before I begin the first chapter I want to define several terms which play an important role 
within this thesis. These are: metaphysical, transcendental and univocal and they have 
been used as virtual synonyms throughout the text. 
The term metaphysical has a tremendously long and complex history, but perhaps one 
might give a rough definition as that which pertains to "the features of ultimate reality, 
what really exists and what it is that distinguishes that and makes it possible"(Honderich 
1995 p. 556). However I introduce this rather vague definition so as it mark my distance 
from It. My usage is more specific and drawn from what might be called deconstructive 
discourse, that Is, from the writing of Jacques Derrida and his commentators, specifically 
Jeffery Bennington and Rudolf Gasch6. 
For these writers metaphysics names the Western tradition in philosophy, a tradition that 
"does not begin with Plato and does not end with Austin or Lacan" (Bennington 2000 p. 9). 
In addition practitioners of deconstruction also use the term, often lengthened to the 
metaphysics of presence' to describe a problematic tendency within this very corpus. 
Whatever the doctrinal inclination of discrete philosophies they all (as metaphysical) seek 
out some supreme value which is inseparable from a value of presence, whatever 
particular content It might otherwise be supposed to exhibit. This value or term or concept 
Is realised In contradistinction to a denigrated other with which it forms a binary pairing. 
Put crudely It is this 'realization' as opposite that is problematic from a deconstructive 
perspective. This process of 'realisation-in-opposition', or 'cutting out' or 'isolating' denies 
the constitutive relationality of all values, terms or concepts. (For a more detailed 
examination of this terrain see pages 24-29 of this thesis) 
And It Is this isolated value, term or concept which I have consistently named metaphysical, 
or transcendental. In this I have followed Derrida. 
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[Each] time a discourse contra the transcendental is held, a matrix - 
the (con)striction itself constrains the discourse to place the non- 
transcendental, the outside of the transcendental field, the excluded 
in the structuring position. The matrix in question constitutes the 
excluded as transcendental of the transcendental, as imitation 
transcendental: transcendental contraband. (1990,244a). 
In this quotation then we have Derrida describing the philosophical procedure which 
produces transcendental contraband. (For a more detailed discussion see pages 69-71 of 
this thesis). However the important point here is that that the transcendental term is 
conceived as inhabiting a separate zone, its own "field". To restate, the transcendental or 
metaphysical term - in this narrow Derridean sense - acquires "a reassuring certitude, 
[because] it is itself beyond the reach of play" (2001, p. 352). 
I now want to distance my use of 'transcendental' from that employed within Kantian 
philosophy. As I understand it Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) excised the 
religious connotation associated with the word generating a new sense which ever since 
has been central to modern philosophy. Previously it had been utilised in a theological 
context, paired with immanence. Kant stripped this away and employed it in a discussion 
of the nature and function of the understanding. Or in other words he employed 
'transcendental' to discuss the conditions and parameters of knowledge itself. More 
precisely transcendental knowledge is that which examines how it is possible for 'man' to 
be predisposed so as to 'experience' in the first place: "I call transcendental all cognition 
that deals not so much with objects as rather with our way of cognizing objects in general 
insofar as that way of cognizing is to be possible a priori" (Kant 1781/1996 p. 64) 
There is no attempt within this thesis to bridge the gap between the narrowly 
deconstructive sense in which I use 'transcendental' and the way it is articulated by Kant. 
This is because it seemed to be beyond the parameters of my research subject. 
Univocality is a term I take from Ranciere who often applies it to artworks. He criticises 
those pieces which adopt "a univocal mode of explicating the world" (2007a p258). One 
way of interpreting Rancii re here is that he is criticising a type of image production that 
obfuscates its own constructed or representational quality so as to present what would 
appear to be an objective 'window on the world'. This is what animates his implicit criticism 
of Bernd and Hilla Becher's photography in the quotation below: 
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The problem is to define a way of looking that does not pre-empt the gaze of 
the spectator... it is true for the photographs of blast furnaces or of 
warehouses and shipping containers that anticipate a new objective gaze as a 
product of objective framing against blank backgrounds (Ranciere 2007a p. 
236) 
What the Becher's photographs attempt to annul is that one cannot "escape the slippages 
of surface and gaze" and therefore the image can never objectively record a referent 
without distortion or remainder. 
Univocality, the presentation of an objective and therefore singular reality would seem to 
share much with my usage of transcendental and metaphysical. Within the context of this 
thesis all three connote a term, concept or knowledge-of-the-world which is presented as 
fallaciously separate from the vagaries of representation and interpretation, thereby 
securing for itself an illusory status as fixed, unified and unchanging. 
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4. A short expansion of the discussion of Lacy's work in the 1970s 
The following section should be read in relation to page 114: 
However before doing so I want to sketch the backdrop against which In Mourning and in 
Rage emerged focussing on Lacy's early career especially as it intertwines with the genesis 
of American West Coast feminist art. 
Writing in The trouble between Us the sociologist Wini Breines described feminism in the 
mid 1970s as "a tidal wave at its crest, evident locally and nationally in the thousands of 
activities and projects initiated by feminists" (Breines 2006 p. 151-152) noting that the 
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number attending the International Woman's Year Conference in Houston in 1977 
exceeded twenty thousand. 
This period then was a high watermark for feminism and Lacy was actively involved. She 
had just completed two important projects the first being a performance titled Cinderella in 
a Dragster (1976), which included her driving around the campus of California State 
College, Dominguez Hills in a borrowed dragster before later in the day acting out the 
domestic activity of baking a pumpkin pie. A documentation photograph of Lacy in the 
dragster was included on the cover of the first issue of the art quarterly High Performance. 
Also she had just completed her now famous Prostitution Notes (1976), which involved 
interviewing sex workers and mapping the movements of their daily lives. 
Both pieces show Lacy confidently examining the roles assigned to women, whether that of 
housewife or prostitute and challenging the prejudices which attach themselves to such 
names. For instance when Lacy began Prostitution Notes she believed that the world of 
'working-girls, Johns and pimps' would be significantly divorced from her own life and 
experiences. In actual fact she found that a male friend of hers was a prostitute and that 
many locations familiar from her daily life were also hotspots for the sex industry. She was 
surprised by, and the resulting work communicates, the often banal nature of this world, its 
lack of exoticism and its imbrication with other more apparently 'ordinary' lifestyles. 
Lacy had been Involved in feminism and activism since her time as a graduate student at 
Fresno State College. Here she taught a course in feminist psychology for her peers, 
introducing the then novel pedagogic technique of all-woman group meetings. She also co- 
coordinated with Faith Wilding a feminist reading group called The Second Sex as well as 
campaigning in support of the United Farm Workers, a union for migrant agricultural 
labourers. 
It was in Fresno that Lacy first encountered Judy Chicago who in 1970 set up an off-campus 
all-female experiment called the Feminist Art Program (FAP). After some resistance by 
Chicago Lacy was admitted to the programme; Chicago had been hesitant because she felt 
that Lacy was primarily an activist and would not become a professional artist (Irish 2010 p. 
26). 
In autumn 1971 FAP moved to CalArts and although Lacy moved with the programme she 
switched to the Social Design course. Therefore she was not directly involved with 
Womanhouse perhaps the best known production of that programme. This large-scale 
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collaborative project involved the Twenty Five FAP students as well as teachers Judy 
Chicago and Miriam Shapiro and three invited artists. This team found a disserted mansion 
on a residential street in Hollywood which they substantially renovated before producing 
installation artworks for each room. The house was opened for exhibition on the 30th 
January 1972. Chicago and Shapiro wrote in the catalogue essay: "The age-old female 
activity of homemaking was taken to fantasy proportions. Womanhouse became the 
repository of the daydreams women have as they wash, bake, cook, sew, clean and iron 
their lives away" (Chicago and Shapiro 1972 no pages) And in pursuing these fantasies 
through manual labour and ingenuity not only were seminal works like Wilding's Crocheted 
Environment created but also the women learnt "to push against their role limitations as 
women and to test themselves as artists" (Anon no pages). 
In the summer after the completion of Womanhouse Lacy Collaborated with Chicago, as 
well as Sandra Orgel and Aviva Rahmani to produce Ablutions (1972) another very well 
known piece and according to Lacy the "first contemporary feminist artwork on rape" (Roth 
and Lacy 2002 p. 300) The performance took place in a studio in Venice, California which 
was transformed through the scattering of broken egg-shells, piles of rope and chain and 
littered animal organs. The central performative element consisted of three metal tubs set 
in the middle of the room, one containing a thousand eggs, another cows' blood and the 
final one watery grey clay. Two naked women took turns to bath in the different liquids. 
They were then wrapped in white sheets and laid on the floor. Meanwhile another woman 
was led into the space and bound entirely in gauze. Throughout the piece Lacy nailed fifty 
beef kidneys to the walls and once this task was completed she - along with another 
performer - tied together all the elements in the room including bathtubs, kidneys and 
figures into a web of rope and string. Throughout the piece tape recorded accounts of 
women who had suffered rape were played. As Lacy and the other mobile performer left 
the space one recoded phrase was left to repeat: "and I felt so helpless all I could do was 
just lie there" (Roth, M 1983 p 86) 
Chicago, Lacy and their collaborators conceived of the project as both a ritualistic healing 
ceremony and a forceful assertion of an active female identity which might counter the 
objectivising perspective endemic to mass culture. This tendency was particularly clear in 
two film releases of the previous year: A clockwork Orange (Kubrick) and Straw Dogs 
(Peckinpah). 
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Another important work is the 1975 piece One Woman Shows because it represents Lacy's 
shift to a larger scale of work in which organizational process, as well as interpersonal 
relationships are dramatized as the core content of the artwork. This piece would seem to 
lead onto Prostitution Notes a year later, as well as her subsequent large-scale social events 
such as Three Weeks in May. 
One Woman Shows consisted of a month-long piece in which a group of women 
sequentially performed personal actions. This collective were brought together via a chain- 
mail logic whereby those that Lacy asked to perform invited others and so on. What started 
as a single performance soon became a series of simultaneous rituals all taking place in 
public space, a "community in process" (Irish S 2010 p47). 
Finally I want to discuss Lacy's installation She Who Would Fly (May 1977) which operated 
as a node in the larger Three Weeks in May project from which In Mourning and in Rage 
emerged. The exhibition consisted of a powerful text describing a rape victims' experience, 
a flayed lamb's carcass with white feathered wings which was suspended from the ceiling 
and above the entrance four naked women in red greasepaint watched the visitors. The 
combination of perched women and winged carcass was an attempt to symbolise the way 
"consciousness wrests free from the body during rape" (Irish 2010 p. 67) 
Meiling Cheng has written that: 
The work's most important aspect is the moment when the 
audience members suddenly discover that they are being 
watched by these bird-women... This is the moment of 
theatrical reversal that the artist desires, one that 
symbolically transforms the performers from traumatized 
flesh/objects into accusatory subjects. (Cheng cited by Irish 
2010 p. 67) 
I will make the argument in relation to In Mourning and in Rage that performances which 
manage to capture the movement from one 'state' to another, from "flesh objects" to 
"accusatory subjects" map very succinctly onto Ranciere's concept of subjectivization. The 
collective verification of equality, which is often tied up with the contestation of an allotted 
victim status is a process of moving between identities, of dis-identifying with a subaltern 
social position and thereby inhabiting an anonymous equality. This introduces a shock or 
disquiet within the police order in much the same way that Lacy's work might be seen to be 
shocking or disquieting. This is not surprising because as I shall argue in detail Lacy's 
practice should be seen as partaking within a broader feminist subjectivization and the 
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performances within She Who Would Fly and Ablutions would seem to double or 
exacerbate the key features of every subjectivization whether feminist or otherwise. 
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